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ABSTRACT 
'The purpose of this study is to examine which instrument 
or set of instruments of monetary policy is optimal 
in the 
case of the U. K. economy. A model of the U. K. economy 
is 
developed that includes both the. 'real' sector and the 
'monetary' sector. The emphasis is on the correct specifi- 
cation and estimation of the structural equations; we, 
thus, 
estimate this model with the help of three econometric tech- 
niques: ordinary least squares, two-stage least squares, and 
full information maximum likelihood. The stability of the 
parameters of the estimated relationships is tested, and 
also the stability of these relationships for prediction. 
Forecasts for a post sample period of one quarter is obtained 
practically in all cases, as well as forecasts of twelve 
quarters in one case. These forecasts are based on actual 
rather than forecasted values of the exogenous or predeter- 
mined variables. 
The dynamic aspects of the model are carefully examined, 
and dynamic multipliers are derived. It is on these dynamic 
multipliers that our conclusions on the question of optimal 
monetary policy in the U. K. are based. This analysis suggests 
that an interest rate policy aiming at controlling the 
treasury bill rate, and through this rate the long-term bond 
rate, is the optimal policy; however, the money stock has a 
role to play too. The latter can be manipulated in such a 
way to help the monetary authorities to achieve the target 
interest rate. 
Finally, some light is thrown on the question as to 
whether the setting of the instruments of monetary policy 
by the authorities is affected by the rest of the economic 
system. Clearly, if the answer to this question is positive 
then what is required is join estimation of the relationships 
that explain the setting of. the instruments with the rest of 
the basic model. Our conclusion is that we find no strong. - 
reasons for joint estimation. This analysis focuses also on 
the supply side of these assets, a problem that has been 
2. 
neglected by the literature on the monetary problems of the 
U. K. economy as well as elsewhere. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE PROBLEM IN GENERAL: 
1.1 Introduction: 
The problem of optimal choice of monetary instruments 
arises as a result of the argument that monetary 
authorities. may operate through either interest 
rate changes or money supply changes. They could either 
control the money supply and leave the interest rate 
to fluctuate according to demand conditions, or control 
the interest rate and thus make the money supply demand 
determined. They cannot operate through both instruments 
independently, and therefore must decide whether to use 
the interest rate or the money supply as the policy 
instrument. * 
, On. the. propor choice of monetary policy instruments 
three major positions in the debate may be identified: 
Firstly, -there are' those, whom we might, perhaps unfairly, 
call Keynesians, wh'o favour using an interest rate policy. 
Monetary authorities should push interest rates up in 
times of boom and down in times of recession, while 
letting' the money supply to be an endogenous variable 
determined, by purely demand conditions. This thesis is 
derived from the so-called "Keynesian Economics", on the 
ground that in the Keynesian system it-is interest rates 
which transmit the impact of monetary changes to the real 
sector; in other words, monetary policy will not affect 
* In the literature use is made, sometimes, of the concept 
"proximate" or "intermediate" targets instead of "policy" 
instruments. If the monetary authorities exercise per- 
fect control over the money supply and the rate of 
interest, they are then "instruments" of monetary policy. 
In reality, however, such a perfect control is question- 
able; in that case the money supply and the rate of 
interest are more appropriately termed as the "proximate" 
targets (74,107,1244); however, open market operations, 
Banlc Rate and so on are in fact "policy" instruments. 
See also (19,20). 
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any "real" magnitudes in the economy (investment, national 
income etc. ) unless interest rates are affected. Formally, 
this statement is not strictly correct for even in the 
Keynesian model there is a deterministic link between the 
rate of interest and the money supply, so that in general 
either can be used as the proper policy instrument. It 
is 
only when wo make stronger assumptions, such as the existence 
of a liquidity trap, and more importantly that the demand 
for 
money is. relatively unpredictable, that the-Keynesian model 
favours an6interest rate policy. 
Even if, however, such assumptions were not made, 
Keynesian theorists would still favour an interest rate 
policy. The argument may be summarised as follows: to 
begin with, it is the conviction of Keynesian theorists that 
financial assets, particularly short-term liquid assets, are 
close substitutes for money, whereas goods and real assets are 
viewed as not being such close substitutes. * We assume that 
we are at equilibrium, and, suddenly the monetary authorities 
increase the money stock by, say, open market operations. 
The°increase in the money stock implies that the extra con- 
venience which the increased money balances provide does not, 
other things being equal, match the opportunity cost repre- 
sented by-the return available on other assets. Purchases, 
*A somehow different approach has recently been revived by 
Leijonhufvud (92) who emphasises the distinctive charac- 
teristics of'-short and long-term assets, a distinction 
which he attributes to Keynes. Now, Keynes's model 
consists of only two financial assets, a non-interest 
bearing asset, i. e.. money, and an interest bearing asset, 
i. e. bonds. Many economists understood Keynes to be 
differentiating between money as normally defined, i. e. 
currency-and. bank deposits, and all other financial assets. 
Leijonhufvud, however, argues that Keynes treated money as 
a paradigm for all short-term financial assets, and bonds 
as representing all,. long-term financial assets. One very 
important implication of this approach is that the "specu- 
lative demand for money" ceases to be an explanation of 
the holding of money, ýand becomes instead a theory about 
the determination of the yield curve, specifically whether 
changes in short rates of interest can induce sizeable 
changes"in interest rates at the long end of the yield 
curve. 
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therefore, of close substitutes for money which provide such 
a return ensues, and this raises the price and lowers the 
yield on such financial assets; this, in turn causes 
further purchases of somewhat less liquid assets, further 
along the liquidity spectrum. Eventually the price and 
yield of the long-end of the financial market are affected, 
thus bringing about a divergence between the cost of capital 
and the return on capital. 
Those familiar cost-of capital effects are not the only 
ones explicit in the Keynesian analysis. The impact of 
changes in interest rates upon expenditure includes also 
"availability" and "wealth" effects. Availability effects, 
in general, are present because of rigidities in certain 
interest rates and because of their divergence from the more 
freely determined market rates. * Such a divergence may 
cause changes in the channels through which funds flow in 
which case credit may be severely rationed, and in markets, 
such as housing, where credit subject to such effects is of 
great importance, the impact of availability effects can be 
enormous. Wealth effects come about because changes in 
interest rates alter the present value of existing physical 
assets. For example, if interest rates rise, the present 
value of physical assets will fall, and the ultimate owners 
of such real assets will feel worse off; since no-one fools 
better off, one should expect these ultimate owners to change 
their expenditure behaviour. 
It, thus, follows, that the effect of changes in the 
money supply upon expenditure decisions and income is regarded, 
by Keynesians, as taking place almost entirely by way of 
changes in interest rates on financial assets caused by the 
monetary disturbance; interest rates, -therefore, provide 
more information than does the money stock. Suppose again, 
that the money stock increases but, due to an increase in the 
demand for money, or due to a very elastic liquidity prefer- 
once curve, the interest rate changes very little. A'Keynesian 
*A very good example of "sticty" rates are the Building 
Societies Association's recommended rates. 
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would predict that income will be very little changed. In 
other words, since changes in the stock of money can be 
offset by shifts in the liquidity preference curve, knowlodgo 
of changes in the stock of money has less information content 
than knowledge of changes in the long-term interest rate. 
This analysis, if true, has an immediate and obvious impli- 
cation for monetary policy. It implies that monetary policy 
could be undertaken with greater certainty by acting directly 
to influence and to control interest rates than by seeking 
to control the money stock; the monetary authorities, in 
this case, have to provide however much money it talces to 
achieve their target interest rate. 
The above analysis raises the very important empirical 
question of whether changes in interest rates have much 
effect on expenditure decisions. Surely this is the essence 
of, the whole Keynesian argument. The empirical evidence on 
this question had appeared for long to suggest that it was 
very doubtful whether changes in interest rates had much 
effect on expenditure decisions. This, then, implied for 
the Keynesians that monetary policy had very little effect 
in influencing the level of expenditures; in fact, this 
body of empirical evidence (notably 7,38,759 76,77), has 
been influential in conditioning the conduct of monetary 
policy in recent decades. More recently, however, more 
detailed empirical investigation has suggested the existence 
of some noticeable interest rate effect, though most of the 
work has used U. S. data. The most important and carefully 
researched study is the one by de Leeuw and Gramlich (36), 
where it is shown that'tho'interest rate effect is-very 
important but with'some ing. * 
To be absolutely sure about the Keynesian argument, one 
has to distinguish between different degrees of substituta- 
bility between money and different financial assets. The 
smaller the degree of substitutiondbetween money and other 
financial liquid assets, the greater the required variation' 
* See also the papers by'Di. Feldstein (43), Hines and 
Catephores (73) and Trivedi (120). 
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in interest rates on such assets need to be to restore 
equilibrium between the demand for and supply of money after 
initial disturbance caused by open marlcgt operations under- 
taken by the authorities; the larger, therefore, is the impact 
on expenditures via these changes in interest rates, with, of 
course, the climate of expectations in the economy remaining 
unchanged. The greater the degree of substitution between 
money and other financial assets, the loss must be the 
expected effect from any given change in the money supply. 
The authorities' actions, though, could still have a 
considerable impact on the level of interest rates and thus 
on expenditure decisions, by adopting a policy of implementing 
very large changes in the money supply. This policy, however 
is found to be accompanied by severe difficulties; there are 
the difficulties in maintaining an efficient and flexible 
system ofTfinancial intermediation, and also such a policy 
does require a very stable relationship between changes in 
the money stock"and-interost rates. 
The inevitable conclusion, then, is that if there were 
a high degree of substitution between money and other financial 
assets, and if this relationship was found to be stable at an 
empirical'level, then a change in the money supply would have 
a small, but predictable: effect on interest rates of substi- 
tute financial assets. - In contrast, if there were a small 
degree of substitution between money and. other financial 
assets, ' and -if this relationship was 'empirically unstable, 
then a change in the money supply would have a powerful but 
erratic effect. 
It therefore, follows that there is "a close relationship 
between the view taken of the degree of substitution between 
money and alternative financial assets, and the stability of 
that relationship, and the importance and reliance that 
should be attached to control over the quantity of money. 
At one pole there is the view expressed in a passage in the 
Radcliffe Report (75): 'In a highly developed financial 
system. .. there are many highly liquid assets which are 
close substitutes for money' so 'if there is less money to 
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go round. .. rates of interest will rise. But they will 
not, unaided, rise by much. . .1 
(para. 392). It is only 
logical that the Committee should then go on to conclude 
that control over the money supply was not 'a critical factor' 
(para. 397). * At the opposite pole there is the monetarist 
view, of which Professor Friedman is the best known propo- 
nent". ** This brings me to the second position taken in the 
debate on the optimal choice of monetary policy instruments. 
Secondly, there are those - with Milton Friedman the 
protagonist, the monetarists - who argue that monetary 
policy should set the money stock and let interest rates 
become an endogenous magnitude. One variant of this thesis' 
is that the authorities should simply achieve a constant 
rate of growth of the money stock; another variant is that 
the authorities should adjust the growth in the money stock 
in response to the current state of economic activity as 
measured by the level of national income, causing the money 
stock to grow more rapidly in recession and less rapidly in 
boom. . 
It is not. at all surprising that the proponents of this 
view believe in a money - stock - policy. For one thing, the 
models used by this group assert that there is a strong 
relationship between current changes in income, and current 
and past changes in the money supply (53,56). It is the 
apparent statistical success of these models in the U. S. A., 
in particular, which has produced the "monetarist revolution" 
there, though those results are open to criticisms and 
different interpretations. For another, it is the theoretical i- 
rationale of monetarists. The monetarist tradition views 
money as an asset with certain unique characteristics, and 
* The instrument of monetary policy suggested by the 
Radcliffe Committee was the level and structure of 
interest rates (75, para. 514 and Ch. VII). 
See Goodhart C. (62) p. 163. We note that our analysis 
of the Keynesian and the Monetarist views, relies 
heavily on Goodhart's (62) paper, especially pp. 1G1-1G6. 
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as such it can be thought of as a substitute not just for 
any one small group of assets, but for all assets, financial 
as well as real ones (119,53). This conviction simply means 
that when people have excess money balances they will proceed 
to spend their excess money holdings not only on financial 
assets but on goods°and services. too. Similarly when they 
are short of money balances they will adjust to their 
equilibrium position - where the desired holdings of money 
balances are just equal to the actual money balances - by 
foregoing some planned expenditure on goods and services, 
as by selling some financial assets. This belief, then, 
implies that the interest - elasticity of the demand for 
money with respect to any one asset, or particular class of 
assets, is bound to be low, and it is low for the simple 
reason that money is-not asubstitute for that asset, or class 
of assets, but is an equally good substitute for all assets - 
financial and real. : Afore formally, all goods and other 
assets which are not immediately consumed, are supposed to 
have what is termed the "own-rate of interest"; in other 
words all assets that are not used for immediate conswnption 
are assumed to yield future services, and the relationship 
between the value of these services and the present cost of 
the asset is viewedýas a rate of return. This rate of return 
is the '"ownn-rate of-interest". Equilibrium is reached where 
the services yielded by a stock of money (convenience, 
liquidity, l etc. ) are at the margin equal to the own-rate of 
interest on other assets. - 
Keynesians and monetarists - 
would be in agreement on this point; where, however, they 
do disagree is that Keynesians would argue that the relevant 
own-rate is. that on- some financial asset whereas monetarists 
would argue that, it, is, the generality of own-rates on all 
assets. Keynesians, therefore, expect people to buy financial 
assets when there is, an. excess of money balances over their 
desired volume of. money holdings, whereas monetarists expect 
people to, spend, the excess of their money balances on a 
wider range, ofa, assets including physical assets such as 
consumer durables as, awell as 
financial assets. The impact 
of changes in the quantity of money, therefore, will be 
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widely spread, according to the monetarists, rather than 
working through changes in particular interest rates. Thus 
relative own-rates of interest change, and expenditure on 
assets,. real, and financial, is supposed to respond quite 
sensitively to variations in, relative own-rates of interest. 
The overall effect of monetary policy in influencing all own- 
rates of intorest. wwrill, however, tend to be öut-woighod in 
each individual, case by factors special to that asset-changos 
in taste, supply/domand4factors particular to that market 
etc. - so that no'singlo interest rate can be taken as 
representing adequately, or indicating, the overall effect 
of monetary policy. As the effect of monetary changes is, 
on relative "real" rates, it is useless to look for the rate 
of interest - particularly the rate on any financial asset - 
to represent the effect of monetary policy. Furthermore, 
since monetary policy impinges on a broad range of assets 
and, a correspondingly broad range of associated expenditures, 
the Koynesain practise of, looking only at recorded market 
rates, which are only part of a much broader spectrum of 
rates, makes one underestimate the actual impact of monetary 
policy. Also recorded market interest rates may not provide 
an appropriate measure of the cost of capital, since these 
interest rates are not,, roal rates of interest that affect the 
basic forces of productivity but nominal rates that are 
influenced by the expected rate of inflation;. moreover 
monetary influencos may work through channels that we have 
not beenable to identify. In fact, it may. -not be possible 
to trace through any particular channel, as monetary policy 
operates through an extremely complicated process of portfolio 
adjustments. 
, For all these reasons, monetarists consider that oven 
the 
most complex-structure-of aggeneral equilibrium model cannot 
be expected-to capture actual monetary influences adequately. 
A more reliable-empirical approach would be to pursue the 
methodology of positive economics, the essence of which is 
to select the crucialýand, simple theoretical relationships 
that allow one to predict-something largo (such as GNP) 
14. 
from something small (for instance, the supply of money), 
regardless.. of the intervening chain of causation. One such 
relationship is, claimed to be the velocity function - i. e. 
the relationship between money and nominal income - which 
has boon shown, on average, to be very stable and conse- 
quently the key relationship in understanding macroeconomic 
developments (53). It, thus follows that a very promising 
approach to monetary policy and its impact on the economy 
is to-try-to relate changes in income directly to changes 
in the quantity of money. 
The crucial distinction between the above two schools of 
thought as to the best conduct of monetary policy seems to 
be their different assumptions about the degree of substitu- 
tability between alternative financial assets and money 
balances; and in particular whether there is a significantly 
greater degree of substitution between money balances and 
such financial assets than between money balances and real 
assets. The importance of this difference of view may be 
illustrated with an example. We assume that the monetary 
authorities undertake open - market sales of bonds. According 
to the extreme Keynesian view the open-market sales and 
the resulting shortage'of cash in relation to the volume of 
transactions to be financed would increase interest rates, 
but, probably, not by much, because an increase in rates on 
financial assets which are very close substitutes for money 
would simply make people prepared to organize their affairs 
with smaller money balances.; The money supply, then, has 
been reduced without much effect on financial markets. 
Expenditure decisions are effected, not directly by tho fall 
in the quantity of money, but only by the second round effect 
of changes in-conditions in financial markets; the impact, 
therefore, on expenditure decisions would be very small 
indeed, both because the interest rate changes are small and 
because of-the apparent-insensitivity of many forms of 
expenditure-to much small changes in interest rates. The 
extreme monetarist would agree that interest rates on 
financial assets would-increase as a result of the initial 
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open-market sales; this increase in rates, however, would 
not restore equilibrium by making people hold a lower ratio 
of money balances to total incomes. The initial sales of 
financial assets by the monetary authorities, resulting in 
higher interest rates, would only bring about a short-run 
partial equilibrium in financial markets; the desire to hold 
more of the cheaper financial assets would not, probably, 
be to hold smaller money balances, but rather to hold less 
of other goods. Full equilibrium would only be re-established 
when . 
the' desired ratio of money balances to incomes is restored, 
which would be achieved by a reduction in real expenditures. 
In sum, monetary policy, by causing a reduction in the 
quantity of money, would bring about a nearly proportionate 
fall in aggregate e:: pendituro. Interest rates, though, 
-which were initially forced upwards by the authorities' open 
market sales of public debt, would fall back as a result of 
the deflationary impact of'the restrictive monetary policy 
which would be restraining both the demand for capital and 
the rate'of price inflation .ý The monetary policy instrument 
therefore, proposed by monetarists is that of money supply, 
which-can register the thrust of monetary policy, 'unlike 
interest"rates which'although changing initially,. they 
are expected to reverse back to their original position at 
the end of the day. Thus, using interest rates as the 
instrument of monetary policy would be giving the wrong 
information. 
Thirdly, there are the fence-sitters, who argue that 
monetary authorities should use both the monety stock and 
the rate of interest as instruments. It is, naturally, 
recognized that the money stock and the interest rate cannot 
be set independently, but a certain relationship between the 
two could be maintained. In other words the central bank 
could not possibly observe the rate of interest and then set 
the money stock'since any change in the money stock will 
affect the rate of'interest. Similarly, if a certain relation- 
ship between the money stock and the rate of interest is 
maintained, i. e. a supply of money- function, then it is 
possible to choose a point on this function, thus establishing 
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a '! combination" policy. The trouble with this thesis 
is 
that it is usually not explained satisfactorily how the 
instruments should be adjusted according to economic 
conditions. It has been shown, however, by Poole 
(107) that 
this thesis can be made precise within the context of a well 
defined model. The same author offers an explanation 
(108) 
as to how the instruments should be adjusted according 
to 
economic conditions. This explanation, which wo may call 
'! The Rule of Thumb Approach", suggests that in a recession 
insterest rates should fall and the growth of the money 
stock should rise. Falling interest rates is not enough; 
as incomes decline interest rates. fall in any case, so 
that 
even if wo observe falling interest rates monetary policy 
might still be tight. But if the growth rate of the money 
stock rises as interest rates fall in a recession, then 
monetary policy must be easy, at least relative to the 
previous period. A rise in the money growth rate is also 
an insufficient criterion. Thus, if the demand for money 
increases during a recession and the money stock growth 
rate increases, but at a slower rate than the demand for 
money, then monetary policy is still too tight. Conversely, 
during an inflationary boom the money stock should grow at a 
slower rate and interest rates should be higher than before. 
Comparing actual U. S. A. monetary policy since 1951 with that 
called for by his rule,, Poole finds that his rule would have 
been superior. This rule apart from being very general, it 
can also be criticised'on the ground that it does not take / 
into consideration the lag in the effects of monetary policy. 
1.2 Monetary Policy Under Certainty: 
The problem of optimal choice of monetary instruments 
may puzzle those who think of policy formulations in terms 
of deterministic macro-models. In such models, the policy 
prescriptions may be in terms of either the interest rate 
or the money stock; it makes no difference which instrument 
is selected. This point may be demonstrated within the 
context of a liiclcsian IPI-IS type model. The model consists 
of the following six equations: 
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(1)' Y=C+I 
(2) C' = 'co+c1Y 
(3)' Y io+i1r 
( lk ) iris tis 
2r 
(5) f '11d='d 
o +d I 
Y+d 
. r1s 11. 
d (G )' 
Ci> O 
i 1<0 
äo, di> 0, d2C0. 
where Y=natioriäl income, kis=money supply, rid=demand for 
money, r=rate"of interest, I=investment e: cponditure, 
C=consumption expenditure, and nil variables are in real 
terms for' simplicity, with P(=Price level)=P=l. 
The usual substitutions grivo us the following two 
equations: 
(1ý Y ao+a r 
(2) rI ." do+d1Y+d2r 
thö IS-curve with a1<0, 
tlio L11-curve with do, d1 0 and d2<0. 
- There= are then two equations and three unknowns, Y, 11, r. 
The monetary policy makers select either N or r as the policy 
instrument so that there are-two ondogenous variables and one 
exogenous (the policy,, instrument). 
If, ' then`, ' tho rate of interest is the policy instrument, 
(3) and (4) are our reduced forms: 
(3) Y= ao+a1r 
(4) Ms= (do+d1ä0)+(d1a1+d2)r, 
which wo can oxpross diagrammatically in figuro 1. 
r 
r 
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Given now that Yf is the desired level of Y, say, the 
full-employment level of Y, wo may obtain the optimal value 
for the instrument r, for from (3) we may have: 
(5) r= 
ra 
1 
In this case, the monetary authorities typically peg 
the rate of interest at r, letting the money supply to be 
determined by the forces which govern the IS curve, i. e. 
productivity and thrift. One immediately recognises that 
in fact this has been the case in the U. K. post-war II 
period - without forgetting, however, the implications of 
the D. C. E. concept and policy - as well as in the U. S. A. 
during and after the Second World War until 19117, and less 
firmly thereafter until 1951. There are some people, 
however, notably M. Friedman and his disciples (47,118,52) 
who argue that in fact monetary policy cannot peg interest 
rates, for more than very limited periods; suppose that 
monetary authorities set out to keep interest rates down. 
They will try to. do so by buying securities and the more 
rapid rate of monetary growth necessary to peg interest 
rates will stimulate spending thus increasing the desired 
cash balances which will raise the liquidity preference 
schedule and the demand for loans and it may also raise 
prices and reduce the real. quantity of money. Those effects, 
the argument goes, will reverse the initial downward pressure 
on interest rates fairly quickly, in something less than a 
year, and after a somewhat longer interval, say a year or 
two they will tend to return interest rates to the level they 
would otherwise have been. 
If, on the other-hand, M5 is the policy instrument, (G) 
and (7) are our reduced - form equations. 
ý6)y, ao 2 
do 1+ a1 rs 
d2+a1d1 a1d1+d2 
-aod1-do 1s ý? ) r= a1d1+d2 + a1d1+d2 
Ti 
19. 
I 
or cliagrarmcttically. . 
(fic, urc. 2) : 
r) % 
UI 
r r. I- - 
Fi .2 
ý IS 
0Y Yf 
Given, as before,, that Y. is the desired level of Y, the 
can obtain the optimal value for the instrument ris; from, 
(6): 
rls _ 
(4,11do-ood2) 
+( 
d2+a1d1) 
Y" 
a1 a1 f 
It follows that the rate of interest, in this case, is 
demand determined. There is no agreement, however, amongst 
monetary economists as to whether the money supply is an 
exogenous quantity or endogonous. The argument runs along 
the following lines: the money stock at ahy moment in time 
is the result of portfolio docisions by the Central flan1c, "by 
the commercial banks, and by the public (including the non- 
banT. c financial intermediaries). The Central flank determines 
the amount. of High-Powered Money or Monetary Base (AI. D. )- 
i. e,. currency plus bank reserves - that it will supply 
(a 
clear oxpoSition, of, M. D. is given by 2). The commercial 
banks determine the volume of loans and other assets that 
they teil], acquire, and the public determines . how 
to allocate 
their holdings of monetary wealth among currency, demand, 
-. time, and savings deposits, intermediary claims and other 
financial assets. The money stoc1c",, that emerges. reflect all 
these decisions. The crucial question, then, is whether the 
Central-Dank by controlling the M. D. can actually achieve a 
fairly precise grip over t1ie money stock. This depends, 
obviously, on whether the link between M. D. and money stocl: 
is fairly tight and therefore predictable. If there is a 
20. 
ti, slit link the authorities can, in fact, formulate their 
policio3 and achieve any particular tarot for the monoy 
stock; on the-other, hand if thorn is a. slippago and the 
Central flank control over the money stock is not sufficiently 
precise to achieve a given target, it will necessarily have 
to formulate°its'policios in terms of other variables that 
it-can control. In other words, the crucial question in 
whether the money stock is bast viewed as an endogenous 
variable - determined by the interaction of'the financial 
and-real sectors, - and outside the direct control of the 
Central Dank, or as an, exogenous variable - as a policy 
instrument - that the authorities can control, and whose 
behaviour can be made to conform to the stabilisation 
guidelines. , 
Clearly the monetarists or Friodmanists, believe that 
the Central-Banlc'can, and should, define its objective and 
implement its-. policies in terms-of money stock; they assume 
then,,, that theýCentral Bank can engineer the desired 
behaviour of-the-money stock through control over the N. B., 
so that-the money stock is, in fact, an exogenous quantity. 
This- proposition, -howevor, has-been challenged by those who 
follow the "New View'", approach to Monetary Economics (65, 
118); they argue that the stock of money largely reflects 
the public's preferences for demand and time deposits, 
savings deposits, intermediary claims and other financial 
assets, and it cannot, therefore, be considered as an 
exogenous magnitude. 
" It is to be noted, -however, that even if one decides 
that the money stock is largely egiogenous, this does not 
rule out"that. the monetary authorities can control the money 
stock (39,40941). They can do so, provided that they are 
prepared to permit the changes that such a policy may cause 
in the levels of prices and interest rates as well as in 
employment and in the trend-of the level of economic activity 
in general. . "". 
The inevitable question now that arises from the above 
discussion is which one of the two instruments is the 
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optimal; the above, deterministic model suggosts'that it 
makes no difference, the two instruments are equally optimal: 
for if the target is, say full employment Y, this target can 
be achieved either by setting that interest rate which is 
consistent with the target, given, the parameters and other 
exogenous variables in the system, or by setting a money 
stock which is consistent with the target. In other words, 
in this model the choice between the optimal interest rate 
and the optimal money stock is not an interesting one 
because one variable implies the other. 
The monetarist, however, would argue that even within 
the context of this simple deterministic modol, a money 
supply-policy is still preferable to an interest rate policy. 
They argue that the rate of interest that is relevant for the 
IS curve is a real rate of interest while the authorities are 
at best able to fix a nominal rate. Those two are equal if 
and only if the general public's expectations of inflation 
are zero. Otherwise they differ, and it becomes impossible 
for the authorities to set a particular value for the role- 
vant real interest rate for the simple reason that it is 
impossible for them to know what the expected rate of 
inflation actually iss at any given point in time. 
1.3 Monetary Policy Under Uncertaint: : 
The problem, however, becomes interesting when one 
drops the assumption that the values of the endogenous 
variables are known with certainty. Once one starts intro- 
ducing stochastic disturbances either in the monetary or 
real sector it could be demonstrated, as several authors have 
done - chiefly 47,113, . 
69,714,82,96,107,110,127 -* that 
the interest rate and the money stock are no longer perfect 
substitutes; which of the two instruments is optimal depends 
crucially on the particular values of the structural para- 
metors, on the variances and co-variances of the stochastic 
* Sec also the following papers: 57,67,70,80,81,83 
and 111. 
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disturbances, and on the relative costs of stochastic move- 
ments, in the money stock and interest rates. In general 
terms, if the source of instability lies in unpredictable 
shifts in the IS-curve - which, of course, results from 
instability in the underlying consumption and investment 
functions -; while retaining the unrealistic assumption 
that 
the position of the LM-curve is known, it is better to pur- 
sue a money stock than an. interest rate policy. In figure 
3. what is known about the IS function is that it will lie 
between the extremes of IS1 and IS2; if the money stock is 
sot at some fixed level, then the LM-function will be L, 11, 
and income therefore will be somewhere between the extremes 
of Y. and Y,,. 
r 
r3 
r 
0 
0 
Y 
On'the other hand, if the policy-makers follow an interest 
rate policy and set-the interest rate at r0, in which case 
the LM-curve will be LM,, income will be somewhere between 
Yj and Y2, a wider range than Y1 to Y`, and so the money 
stock policy is superior to the interest rate policy. In 
this case' variations in the rate of interest with a 
fixed. Pis, 
should reduce the impact of, these shifts on income relative 
to what they would be if the interest rate wore set at its 
" optimal fixed value. ý, In other words the fixing of the money 
stock yields a smaller variance for Y. The reason being that 
with the stock of monoy. fixed,. there is a kind of automatic 
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stabilisation; for any discrepancy between the expected and 
actual values of exogenous demand produces a stabilising 
change in interest rates, and thereby a-stabilising change 
in the induced component'of total demand. Whereas with 
interest rates pegged there is no stabilising change in the 
induced component-of demand, whatever the discrepancy 
between the expected and actual values of the exogenous 
component,, even if the actual stock of money may differ 
from the expected which case is of no consequence whatsoever. * 
If., the-primaryasource of instability is unpredictable shifts 
in the LM-curve, it is preferable to set the interest rate 
at its''optimal'value'and'simply accommodate the shifts in 
this curve. ' In'-figure It it is assumed that the position of 
the 'IS-curve is known with certainty, while the LN can be 
anywhere between Lrii''and LMZ-due to unpredictable shifts in 
the demand for money, if , a-money supply policy is pursued. 
In,, such a case income may end up anywhere between Y1 and Y2. 
But 'an , interest' rate policy-can fix, the LM-curve at LM 3 so 
that it`cuts the IS function'at the full employment level of 
income, 'Yf. In this`case'the fixing"of the stock of money 
yields the largest, variance for Y; by pegging rates there can 
be no discrepancy between desired Y and actual Y, because'' 
unpredictable shifts in the demand for money are not per- 
mitted to affect the'interest rate. Policy-makers simply 
adjust the stock of, money in response to the unpredictable 
shifts in, the 
x 
demand 
. 
for money. ** 
* "It'is to be noted that this case is perfectly consistent 
with the. monetarists' policy prescriptions of, controlling 
the money supply; for they believe that the volatility of 
investment behaviour is the main cause of the relatively 
unstable IS-curve. 'They regard, however, the demand for 
money function which determines the L11-curve as being 
stable over time., 
** This'policy prescription'is obviously Keynesian; 'for it is 
the . belief of , 
this group *of economists that the LDi is 
unstable -chiefly the Radcliffe Reports' claim of an 
extremely unstable velocityýof circulation. The Keynesians 
would also argue that the IS-curve is unstable, for the 
very same reason of the monetarists' conviction on the 
instability of the IS-curve, but they would go on to suggest 
that the L11-curve is by far more unstable than the IS-curve. As it is hhown below in this case an interest rate policy is preferable to a money supply policy. 
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The main criticism, applicable to both a money supply 
policy or interest rate policy is that they are influenced 
greatly by feedbacks from the real to the financial sector, 
so that, their position or direction of change at any time 
is 
,a 
result of. opposing influences. In addition, many of 
the important endogenous and exogenous variables are 
observable only-after a considerable lag. Thus the monetary- 
policy-maker does not have complete knowledge of either the 
functions. relating the policy instrument to the endogenous 
variables, or the non-policy variables amongst them. It is for 
all these reasons that optimum monetary policy is conceivable, 
which may be defined as the combination of those actions of 
the monetary-policy-maker to have, the maximum possible impact 
on the targets chosen by him. 
It then follows that a third case may emerge once one 
recognises that in general both the real and the monetary 
sectors are'subject to stochastic disturbances which result 
in shifting the LM and IS curves; for example we may suppose 
that the main source of instability of the economy is in the 
instability of the investment function. trio may also have dis- 
turbances in the monetary sector which could come about from 
mistakes by the monetary authorities, or perhaps shifts in 
the public's demand for money, or indeed shifts'in the 
behaviour of the banking system which obviously affect the 
supply of money. In figure 5, it is assumed that the error 
terms shift the L11 and IS curves within the area abed. 
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It should then follow that in this case our conclusions 
are the same as above, in that depending on the random dis- 
turbances if the real sector's shifts tend to be more 
unsystematic than the ones in the monetary sector we should 
then choose the Nis as our instrument, and the rate of interest 
if the monetary disturbances tend to be greater than the ones 
in the real sector. We illustrate these two cases in-figure 
6, where the unpredictable disturbances are larger in the 
expenditure sector, and in figure 7 where the unpredictable 
disturbances are larger in the monetary sector. 
r 
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In the case of figure, 6 variations in the level of income 
are smaller when the money stock is the instrument, whereas 
in the case of-'figure 7 variations in the level of income 
are smaller when the rate of insterest is the instrument. 
The above analysis concentrates entirely on the importance of 
the relative.. sizes of expenditure and monetray disturbances. lie 
must, .. 
though, 
. consider the slopes of the Lrt and IS curves and 
examine whether this makes any difference in the results. Con- 
sider figure 8: in this case we have two pairs of IS-curves With 
different slopes. Itis easye. to, see that disturbances that shift 
L111, back. and forth which lead to income fluctuations greater than 
Y1 to Y2 -, which fluctuations would occur under an interest rate 
policy - must suggest than an interest rate policy would be pre- 
ferred regardless of whether we have the pair ISI and IS,, or 
the pair IS3 and IS4. Similarly, a money supply policy would 
be preferred if the shifts in the UI lead to income fluctuations 
rl, 
r 0 
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smaller than Yi to Y2 regardless of the pair of IS-curves wo 
might choose. 
Next consider, figure 9 whore wo have two pairs of LrI- 
curves with, different slopes: 
r 
LriI LM, 
Fi 
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It'is obvious that if the 1S1-shifts produce income fluctu- 
ations greater than Y1to Y2, 'then a money'supply policy is 
preferred regardless of the pair of LM-curves the would 
choose. Contrary if'the income fluctuations arising from 
shifts in the IS11,, are smaller than Y1 to Y2 on, interest 
rate policy would be indicative regardless of which pair of 
LM-curves prevail. 
The overall conclusion'* then is that the crucial issue 
* We note: that. in the case whore the. IS-curve slopes upwards 
- that is when higher income levels encourage investment 
more than savings via`some form of accelerator type 
mechanism - and cuts the LNI-curve from above (so that 
stability is' ensured) the same conclusions hold. There is, 
however, one important exception: monetary policy appears 
to be more powerful the higher the elasticity of the 
demand for money - 3. e., the flatter the L11-curve - which is contrary to the standard results demonstrated within 
the context of the traditional model which assumnos a downward sloping IS-curve. See W. Silber "Monetary Policy 
Effectiveness: Tire Case of a Positively Sloped IS Curve", The Journal of Financo,, December 1971. Soo also C. A. E. Goodhardt: Money, Information and Uncertainty, footnote 1, 
pp. 233 -234; riacmillan 1975" 
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for-deciding upon whether an interest rate or money supply 
should be followed is the relative sizo, of the disturbances 
in. the expenditure and monetary sectors, and not the slopes 
of the IS and LN curves. To be absolutely sure with the 
argument, however, one has to add that once the choice 
between the two policies has been made, slopes, then, do 
play a vital role. If a money supply is superior, then the 
steeper the LM function is, the lower the range of income 
fluctuation, as can be seen from figure 9. It is also clear 
from figure 8pthat under an interest rate policy an error in 
setting the interest. rate will lead to a larger error in 
hitting the income target if the IS curve is relatively flat 
than if. it is relatively steep. But those facts do not affect 
the choice between interest rate and money supply policies. 
Another suggestion, that` of I: areken and Pierce in (1}7 
and 48), is the use of a "Proviso Clause", with either the 
stock of money or some index of interest rates as the proviso 
variable.. Again depending on the variances of the error 
terms the monetary authorities may peg either the rate of 
interest or the stock of money and depending on the values of 
the uncontrolled variables from their target level, revise the 
target values of the policy variables. For example, the 
authorities may fix interest rates, until an initial obser- 
vation of the stock of money is obtained; they than could 
change rates, perhaps in proportion to the discrepancy 
between the actual stock of money and the expected stock. 
Or they could fix the money stock at some predetermined 
value, and then depending on what interest rates have emerged 
change their target Isis -values. It follows that the choice of 
the appropriate policy instrument depends again on the relative 
disturbances of the real and monetary sectors. 
It could, however, be shown-(107) that by using a loss 
function of the type: 
L-= EE (Yo - Yf)2 
- giving the expected loss from failure of the level of 
income, Yoe to equal the desired level i. e. target level - 
that there could be an optimum combination of the two 
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instruments in which the interest rate and money stock are 
maintained in a certain relationship to each other - the 
nature of the relationship depending on, the values of the 
parameters - giving a level of income which is unique in 
the sense that its difference from the target level (Yf) is 
the minimum possible; and, that this "combination policy" is 
superior to either a pure quantity of money policy or an interest 
rate policy. Wo may.. demonstrate this argument using the 
L11-IS schedules, as we have done above. In figure 10 the 
disturbances are assumed'to prevail in the expenditure 
sector only; we know that-'in this case the appropriate 
policy is the one that fixes the money stock. We assume, 
however, that instead of fixing the money stock, the money 
stock is reduced every time the interest rate goes up, and 
increased every time the interest rate goes down; if, now, 
the proper relationship between the money stock and the rate 
of interest can be established, then the LAS-curve can be made 
to look like LMG of figure 10: 
I, 
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It follows that, income, in this case, can be-pugged at Yf; 
this is so-because the. disturbances in the IS function 
produce , changes 
in the, rate of interest, which in turn cause 
spending changes sufficient to completely offset the effect 
on, income of, the initial disturbance. 
30. 
Y1 Y1 Yf Y2 Y2 
We examine, now, the case where the money stock increases 
as the rate of interest rises and decreases as the rate of 
interest falls. Wo use figure 11 to elamine this particular 
case: 
r 
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U1 and LN2 represent the leftmost positions of the U1 func- 
tion as a result of disturbances in the monetary sector; 
Lall prevails when the money stock is fi.; ed, and Lr12 when the 
combination policy of introducting a positive money-interest 
relationship is followed. We ignore the rightmost positions 
of the LN-curve for simplicity. LM3 is the position of the 
LM-curve when an interest rate policy is pursued. If either 
LM1 or LN2 prevails, the intersection with IS1 producos the 
lowest income, which is below the Y1 level obtained with 
LP13. But since in the case of Lri,; , the level 
of income 
associated with this policy i. e. Y is only just lower than 
Yi whereas when IS2 prevails'Y2 seems to be much lower than 
Y2, it follows that on average the difference betwoon Y1 and 
Y2 the difference in income when a combination policy 
is pursued - is smaller than the difference between Y1 and' 
YZ - i. e. the difference in income when an interest rate 
policy is pursued. Therefore, it is better to adopt L112 
than LN3 although the extremes under LP12 are slightly larger 
31. 
UlI I 
TIf 
than under LN .. 
The empirical evidence on the problem of which instru- 
ment or combination of instruments is optimal, is practically 
non-existent. Poole (108), however, cites as, some piece of 
evidence the Friodman-N2eiselman debate (3,37,53,54,55, 
72); this debate showed than one can predict income equally 
well from money as from autonomous expenditures. This 
suggests that the demand function for money and the expendi- 
ture function are, roughly. speaking, equally unstable. What 
is important, however, is not stability, but predictability, 
and on this score to predict income using an autonomous 
expenditure approach is more difficult than to predict income 
using a money stock approach because autonomous expenditures 
themselves are more difficult to predict than is the money 
stock. Hence Poole suggests that the evidence supports a 
money stock target against an interest rate target. 
The studies by Poole as-well as the other ones referred 
to above, use as their main apparatus the LN-IS model. Such 
a model can be criticised on several grounds: (a) it assumes 
that expectations are known and unaffected, by policy, (b) 
it assigns no role to the relative price of existing assets 
and newly produced assets, and (c) it ignores the distinctions 
between real and nominal, anticipated and actual interest 
rates. In addition all these studies and in particular the 
Poole's papers, deal only with one part of the problem, the 
minimisation of income fluctuations at a particular point of 
time, and not with the shift of the curves over time. 
Another criticism is that these studies ignore one very 
important aspect of monetary policy, namely that of the time 
lags. An important paper by D. Tucker (121) has shown that 
in fact lags in the money - demand function tend to counter- 
act, rather than reinforce, the investment lags.. This is an 
argument against those economists who believe that monetary 
policy is very slow in its impact; for slow lagged response 
of investment to interest rate and income changes does not 
provide a sufficient condition for monetary policy to work 
slowly. This study also provides an argument for using the 
money supply as a target. In the Tucker model the investment 
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lag is long, but monetary policy has only a sliort. lag. This 
is so because an expansionary monetary policy may, if e: rpen- 
ditures are slow to respond, result in a very largo initial 
(but temporary) drop in the rate of interest. This, however, 
is only true if the interest rate is allowed to vary 
substantially; if the monetary authority. changed the rate 
of interest by so much, and kept it there, then this initial 
overshooting of the interest rate would not occur. The lag 
in monetary policy is then long because it is determined by 
the slow response of expenditures. On the other hand if the 
monetary authority followed a money supply policy and allowed 
the interest rate to overshoot, then the Tucker analysis 
applies, and the lag is shorter. 
Another criticism on the studies we have considered so 
far is on the assumption that the monetary authority can 
control the interest rate and or the money supply without 
error; this amounts to assuming that the rate of interest 
and/or the money supply are instruments of monetary policy. 
Waud (124) has demonstrated that this assumption is falla- 
cious for the interest'rate and money supply cannot possibly 
be considered as instruments but only as proximate targets. 
Furthermore, he argues that one cannot determine the super- 
iority of the two because the monetary authorities cannot 
distinguish between stochastic shifts in the system and 
shifts in structural pararnaters with their different impli- 
cation for monetary policy. Shifts of the latter type 
change the values of the proximate targets which correspond 
to, the desired target income level, while stochastic shifts 
do not. Inability, then, to distinguish between those two 
types of shifts means that the monetary authority may 
'frequently be in the position of trying to maintain the 
proximate target variables at levels which no longer 
correspond to the desired target income level. Therefore, 
the monetary authority might be better advised to focus on 
ultimate target variables such as the employment and/or the 
income level, relying for purposes of policy implentation on 
the assumption that open market operations, say, ' will 
unambiguously push income and employment in the desired direction. 
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In view of the above analysis, one can argue that the 
choice between a money supply policy and an interest rate 
policy should be made on the basis of thron criteria: 
(a) the relative importance of unpredictable shifts in the 
, moo e 
demand for and expenditure functions, 
(b) the difficulties of measuring the rate of interest as 
well as the money supply, and 
(c) the length of the lag of monetary' policy. 
We now move on to discuss the problem of optimal monetary 
policy within the context of the U. K. monetary environment. 
.ý 
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CIIAPTEI1 2 
THE U. K. CASE: 
2.1 Background Analysis: 
It is. the propositions put forward in the last paragraphs 
that we would like to apply in the case of the U. K. economy, 
and in particular under what assumption and values of the 
parameters of the structural equations the above criteria 
hold. It is then self-evident that this requires a syste- 
matic study of the British financial environment, say, since 
the 1950s, and naturally the monetary policies pursued. 
Analysis then of the structure of the various markets where 
the Bank of England operates in, and study of the Bank's 
strategies in the context of such market conditions allows 
one to make an estimate of the extent to which the authorities 
control the key- variables within the monetary and financial 
system. One could in fact sketch the following picture for 
the British financial environment; the monetary authorities 
have absolute control over the Bank Rate which they sot 
themselves, and through the network of banking conventions, 
also upon the related rates on bank deposits and advances 
(for the recent changes see below). They are in a position 
to influence the treasury bill rate given their power as 
lender of last resort, though for short periods the discount 
houses, if under pressure from the banks, may frustrate the 
authorities' control over this rate. The bank has no direct 
control over the other short-term money markets in London of 
which the most important is perhaps the Local Authority 
market although the Bank may indirectly influence the rates 
in this market via the treasury bill market. 
The authorities' main concern has been, although with 
decreasing emphasis after 1968, the management of national 
debt with the objective of maximising the demand for gilt- 
edged securities, not only to provide for finance for current 
requirements but also for the refunding of a continuous flozT 
of maturing debt. From this was derived a concern for the 
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stability of interest rates both short - and long-term, at 
a level which reduced the burden of debt finance. The Dank 
has, consequently, been seeking to obtain stability in both 
the treasury bill and gilt-edged markets. The Dank of 
England has generally boon prepared to operate freely 
between cash, treasury bills and, gilt-edge securities, so 
that neither the cash ratio nor the liquid assets ratio 
could provide a firm fulcrum for an effective monetary 
policy. * 
In the gilt-edged:. market the authorities give priority 
to "maximising the long-term demand for debt" which has led 
them to pursue a policy which wo may call as the "leaning 
into the wind" policy, (60,103,114). The result of this 
policy is that the authorities cannot control the total 
volume of sales of debt on the market, and in addition they 
have been unable to switch short-term debt, from the banking 
system to the, public. All this means that such a policy 
makes the authorities incapable to control the cash reserve 
base. They have, however, been able to reduce the total 
volume of central government created liquid assets available 
to the banking system i. e. treasury bills plus cash reserves, 
though they do not control the proportionate distribution 
between these which is determined by the banks themselves. 
The authorities have, furthermore, been able to control the 
total of treasury bills available to the banking sector in 
the short-run, despite their inability to use open market 
operations in the traditional manner, by employing the 
technique of calling for special deposits (1960). This has 
not, however, proved sufficient to restore control over the 
money supply, since the banking system has been able with 
considerable case to engineer a substitution, after a very 
short lag, of private sector liquid assets for the withdrawn 
treasury bills. Since the money supply has not boon under 
* This question of controlling the money supply via a cash- 
asset ratio or a liquid-asset ratio has produced a very lively discussion and a number of important publications (25,269-279 23,31,32,33,1019-113)- 
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satisfactory control, the authorities have responded by 
resorting to an over wider use of direct controls, simply 
informing the banks - and a growing circle of non-bank 
financial intermediaries - during poriods of squeeze what 
they may and may not do. 
The empirical evidence on the effectiveness of special 
deposits and requests is rather discouraging. Goodhnr-tL. 
(G0) and Norton (103) provide results to show that the 
evidence suggests that the effect of such requests upon the 
granting of credits by the banks to the private sector and 
the calling of special deposits, was not very large. Norton 
concludes that: "It is tempting on the basis of the fore- 
going to argue that the authorities would be advised to 
abandon requests and deposits and rely instead on more 
flexible interest rates and possibly a stricter control of 
the money supply. The official argument against more flexible 
rates has asserted. amongst other things that the market is 
unstable. But the finding of this paper suggest that this is 
essentially a short-term phenomenon and may well be due to 
the way the authorities operate in the market. If this is 
correct, then a large part of the case for official policy 
disappears". 
All this has contrasted of course very strongly with 
textbook models that see the central bank achieving control 
over the quantity of bank credit through open market opera- 
tions leaving the prices of credit in various channels to be 
set primarily by market forces. 
It follows that although the post World War II British 
monetary policy - strictly since the return to a flexible 
monetary policy in 1951, when the level of tho Bank Rato gras 
raised from 2 to 2.1/2 percent* - has been the one We sketched 
in figure 1, there is a lot to be said about a kind of 
"combination policy" the authorities have tried to pursue in 
terms of controlling both the level of bank lending and the 
level and structure of interest rates. By setting the level 
* Bank Rate was unchanged from the last quarter of 1939 to the last quarter of 1951. 
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of Dank Rate and pegging gilt-edged prices, the Dank has 
attempted to control the level and structure of interest 
rates. This policy has been facilitated because of the 
existence of various restrictive agreements between the 
clearing banks and the discount houses, which have resulted 
in a fixed relationship between the level of Bank Rate and 
certain important interest rates, such as the maximum rate 
paid on clearing bank deposit accounts, the rate on bank 
lending to borrowers of first class rating, the rate on 
basic call money and the spread of rates on fine bank bills. 
Given a change in the level of Dank Rate than, an immediate 
and direct impact on the level of these interest rates 
ensues; this means that the Dank Rate is not simply the 
rediscount rate of the central bank but also something 
similar to the American Regulation Q. The change in the 
level of Dank Rate and therefore the level of those other 
rates, is expected to affect the "liquidity" of the economy; 
at the same time limits on bank lending to the private sector 
are places{, in particular on the level of bank advances and 
on the terms of hire-purchase agreements for consumers. The 
aim of the latter has been to control the volume of credit 
and indirectly to impose some control over the money supply. 
The mechanics, now, of monetary policy are in accordance 
with the Keynesian tradition of. macroeconomic analysis, being 
set out in the Radcliffe Report'of 1959 (75), and more 
recently in various research publications of the Dank of 
England (29,62). Emphasis is placed on the role of credit 
and interest rates in influencing expenditure, subject to 
time lags; the stock of money has never been an e:: plicit 
concern of the authorities. It is argued that the correlation 
that, exists between changes in the stock of money and changes 
in money incomes greatly overestimates the importance of 
monetary policy because of the two-way relationship between 
money and income. This concern with credit has also boon 
evident in the attempts of the monetary authorities to control 
the volume of certain types of credit referred to above. 
This policy, however, has shown itself to be inadequate. 
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In the first place there is the empirical evidence* that 
seems to suggest that the official argument asserting that 
the market for government securities war, unstable, may woll 
be"duo to the way the authorities operated in this market. 
It is not perhaps surprising at all, than, that the authori- 
ties changed their tactics in that market towards the 
beginning of 1969 as it is clearly stated in the Bank of 
England Quarterly Bulletin (March 1969). Secondly, the 
emphasis on controlling the price and quantity of credit has 
increasingly, since 1961, led the authorities to use a 
battery of direct instruments of control - the imposition 
of specific ceilings on the growth of banks' starling 
lending to the private sector of the domestic U. K. economy-; 
during the fiftie's, and early sixties the call for restrictions 
was in the form of "requests", but since May 1965 the 
authorities have imposed "specific ceilings". The effect 
of this policy has been the creation of new markets for 
credit not directly controlled by the authorities; and one 
should not forget the poor empirical evidence of those 
"requests" as we have already mentioned. 
Thirdly, because of the growth of an integrated world 
capital markot'and the relative decline of sterling in the 
post-war-period as the world's trading and reserve currency, 
the importance of Bank Rate in the world capital markets has 
been diminishing. It can be argued that it has been deter- 
mined increasingly by monetary policy outside the U. K.; in 
the heyday of the Sterling Era when other currencies were 
pegged to sterling, monetary policy in the U. K. determined 
interest rates in the world economy as a whole. Now, however, 
with the Dollar Era, it is the U. S. A. monetary policy that is 
crucial to the determination of the level of nominal interest 
rates in world capital markets. 
Fourthly, 'the importance of control of the money supply 
was impressed on-the U. K. in 1968 by the I. M. F. After the 
devaluation of 1967,, and the package of tight fiscal policies 
which- accompanied it. the authorities in the U. K. PPur_sued tý 
* Chiefly Norton (103). 
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relatively easy money policy. Domestic credit expansion in 
1968 grow by 15%o despite the fact that there wore ceilings 
on bank lending and perhaps not surprisingly there was a 
substantial deficit on the U. K. balance of payments account 
in that year. Given the substantial and growing debit to 
the IAIF, policy-makers faced no alternative in 1969 but to 
accept the DIP's diagnosis of the continued deficit. So in 
June 1969 the U. K. sent a letter of intent to the IMP stating 
that' the level of domestic credit expansion* was to be a 
variable which the Dank of England set out specifically to 
control. If one then thinks of the domestic credit expansion 
as an indicator of the money supply, it follows that the 
monetary authorities in the U. K. were proposing to put more 
emphasis on the Money Supply rather than on intorest rates. 
Finally, the collective interest rate agreements of the 
clearing banks which were allegedly an important facet in 
implementing, the Bank of England's policy, have boon under 
considerable criticism for some time now. The Prices and 
Incomes Board Report (99), was highly critical of the Banc' s 
interest rate cartel as well as their effective agreements 
on charges; so was,. the Monopolies Commission (95). Further- 
more, these agreements have helped towards the creation of new 
institutions and, markets, not always under the control of the, 
authorities. 
As"a result- of these defects in the existing system 
there have-been numerous-proposals for reform. They range 
from the abandonment of all controls on the allocation of 
bank asset's and'the-removal of all barriers which prohibit 
entry into banking (64) to the detailed control of all typos 
of'financial institutions-'by minimum capital, reserve and 
liquidity requirements as'well as detailed supervision of 
the allocation of their assets-(125), culminating to the 
proposals of the'Dank of'England (September 1971), which we 
Domestic. Credit Expansioný(D. C. E. ) may be defined as: D. C. E. =_ QN± AR where, &M = changes in the Money 
Supply and AR = changes in eoroign reserves. 
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mayýcall as the "Competition and Credit Control" proposals. 
The proposals'of the Bank of, England and the particular 
form in which they are to be implemented are, sat out in 
three basic papers (9,10,11). In addition, an address 
by the Governor of the Bank of England (8) is also useful ,qr 
in understanding the new system as it constitutes an 
official statement of the economic thinking which underlies 
the changes. 
2.2 The Competition and Credit Control Rogrimo : 
'Let us trace these 'new proposals in their proper per- 
spective. The letter of Intent of the Chancellor to the 
I. M. F. published on the `24th `June 1969 and the 13an c's 
publication (March 1969) constitute, perhaps, the starting 
point. The letter stated that the government's objectives 
and'policies implied a Domestic Credit Expansion (D. C. E. ) in 
the 'fiscal year 1969/70' of not more. than £1100 m. n. which 
obviously meant. shift in emphasis in monetary thinking in 
the U. K. ' towards putting more reliance in monetary control 
on the. volume. of money and credit and loss on the level and 
structure of interest rates... This shift is clearly stated 
in the. D. E. Q. B. (March 1969), where the authorities admit that 
they-had already moved towards being. concerned about the 
total. change: -, in, money supply and loss about the movement in 
gilt-edged prices, -by changing their tactics-in the gilt- 
edged market from previous concern, i. e. from a policy of 
pegging-the. interest rate on government stocks to allowing 
them to fluctuate., 
A 
Rather-than'supporting the market where 
holders of securities want, to sell - as the "leaning, into 
the wind" policy would require - the : flank would allow, and in 
fact have allowed, the-strain-, to be reflected in a change in 
prices, thereby avoiding pumping in additional. cash into the 
economy. - More recently (9,10,11) new techniques of none- 
tary-. control have, been- introduced: to 
. 
begin with, the 
existing liquidity and quantitative lending controls have 
been replaced by other , means of influoricing'all bank, not 
simply deposit bank,, lending: in sterling; a minimum reserve 
(12.1/2', S) 
, has been implemented across the whole banking 
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system with the London and Scottish clearing banks abandoning 
their collective agreements on interest rates. 
All banks then, not only the deposit banks, have to 
maintain a fixed minimum ratio of 12.1/2 per cent of eligible 
reserve assets to eligible liabilities; the Finance Houses 
are obliged to maintain a ratio of 1Wil) of eligible liabilities, 
while the discount houses must keep at least 500' of their 
funds in public sector debt, a ratio fixed in line with the 
average recent practice of the market. The range of eligible 
assets for the discount houses runs wider than that prescribed 
for the banks, to take in local authority bonds and govern- 
ment - guaranteed stocks with up to five years to run to 
maturity. The Bank continues to provide last resort lending 
facilities only to the discount houses, provided that the 
discount houses continue to cover the weekly treasury bill 
tender. The houses, however, since Seotember 1972 have 
discontinued their-long-standing practice of tendering at a 
common agreed bid. - 
The interpretation of the observance of the above 
mentioned ratios is more strict than that applied to the 
previous 28 ratio, as the institutions have to maintain 
these as minimum ratios on a day-to-day basis. The Dank 
suggested that a ratio of eligible assets to eligible 
liabilities of around 12.1/2%31, might be appropriate, this 
being close to the average hold by the banking system as a 
whole for sometime during the years before the introduction 
of these proposals. 'Assets qualified to be included in the 
12.1/24 ratio are: ' Balances with the flank - other than 
special deposits; the London Clearing Banks have agreed to 
maintain a minimum of 1.1/2`ö of their eligible liabilities 
in the form of balances with the Bank'of England and it is 
understood that such balances will be kept close to this 
minimum. The other banks do not hold any balances with the, 
Bank of England other than trivial amounts. Treasury Bills, 
other Government and nationalised industries securities with 
a year or less to final maturity, local authority bills 
eligible for rediscount at the Bank of Lnglandj commercial 
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bills eligible for rediscount at the Dank up to a maximum of 
2% of eligible liabilities, and money at call with the London 
money market - but not money at short notice and other call 
money or_balances in the inter-bank or local authority 
markets. The money at call includes: 
(a) members of the London, Discount Market Association, 
(b) discount brokers and money trading departments of 
- certain banks, 
-(c) money brokers and jobbers on the London Stock Exchange. 
Finally, company tax reserve certificates do qualify to 
be included in the 12.1/2% ratio. One should note that no 
new issues of these certificates are to be made, and all 
outstanding certificates should have been surrendered during 
the period up to the 31st December 1974. 
The other new'concept which has been introduced is that 
of 'eligible liabilities'; these are net sterling deposits 
of the banking system as a whole, excluding deposits 
originally made for over two-years, which are more in the 
nature of longer-term transactions rather than short-term 
bank deposits.., Eligible liabilities include sterling - 
certificates of-deposit - certificates which acknowledge 
the deposit of large sums of money and which can be readily 
bought and sold in-a special market. 
The main implication of these proposals is that the 
major institutions doing deposit - taking business on a 
wholesale level are to be controlled directly rather than 
indirectly through the banks; and this wide - extending 
reserve ratio is to be'rendered variable by the retention 
of the Special Deposit'System which might indeed be used to 
discriminate between various classes of deposit. Again the 
continued use of""quantitative guidance" is envisaged, at 
least unless änduntil powers of II. p. terms' control are 
relinquished. Even more recently (9th October 1972) the 
Sank Rate-was abolished and replaced by a floating "minimum 
lending rate": determined, by market forces. 
The inevitable conclusion is that those developments are 
in'line with the spirit of the Radcliffe Report: certainly 
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the authorities' proposals for control of financial inter- 
mediaries reflect in part a subscription to the Radcliffe 
view on the role'of non-bank intermediaries. Furthermore, 
these developments carry further the evolution of policy 
since 1968/69, representing a further limitation of the 
dogree'of`market intervention and giving greater importance 
to the'level of interest rates and the credit base of the 
banking-system. What is less obvious is how the objective of 
managing,, the, National Debt - previously given first priority - 
is, now: regarded. The only explicit official reference to 
this. was. the Governor's Munich speech (8) in which he said 
that, the, ßank, would. continue their normal operations of 
selling longer dated gilt-edged securities against purchases 
of,, short-dated stocks, but they-would not buy stock outright. 
Thus they would, not, normally be prepared to facilitate move- 
ments, out-, of gilt-edged by the banks, even if their sales 
should , 
cause, the, market temporarily to weaken quite, sharply. 
In the same-speech the Governor indicated that basically 
the''new approach to monetary'policy implicit in the proposals 
reflected'a-change in ýthe official' attitude towards two key 
questions: Tirst, what monetary variable should the 
authorities attempt to influence; and second, by what means 
should they attempt to influence, it. The answer to the first 
key'questionýis`that the emphasis°is now towards broader 
monetary 'aggr'egates "We have increasingly shifted our 
emphasis' towards the broader monetary aggregates - to use 
the'inelegant but apparently unavoidable term; the money 
supply ., under., one_. or, more. of. -its; many definitions, for example, 
or domesticcredit expansion" (10). It has, not, been made 
clear, however,. how monetary aggregates are thought to, 
influence the_economy,, nor whether the authorities regard 
any particular monetary aggregate as being of outstanding 
significance in this respect. 
As far as., the second key question, is concerned the 
authorities-would seek to influence-their monetary aggregate 
via the-structureýof interest rates "In future the authorities 
would seek to influence the structure of interest rates through 
III,. 
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a general control over the liquidity of the whole banking 
system" (8). The reserve ratio and special deposits would 
reinforce their power to influence the rate structure "The 
Intention is to. use our control over liquidity, which those 
instruments will reinforce, to influence the structure of 
interest. rates". (8)... The resulting changes in relative 
rates of return will then induce shifts in the asset port- 
folios of both the public and the banks. 
The newxpolicy, will,., it seems, be based upon open market 
operations supported, if necessary, by calls of special deposits. 
It will take effect by shifting the relative terms on the 
various assets which the banks may hold, thus inducing them 
to, make changes, or to refrain from changes which they may 
have envisaged. For example, if interest rates are raised 
at. a time when the banks-as a whole have no excess reserve 
assets, they could then'find that they have to sell invest- 
ments on unfavourable terms if they wish to expand their 
advances. A single bank, however, would have other ways 
open to it of acquiring reserve assets, again perhaps on 
unfavourable terms. Again, it is intended that open market 
operations should affect-the availability of reserve - assets, 
and thus the credit base of the banks. These are the 
traditional ways, in which open market operations were 
supposed to work; the mechanism of control and the objectives 
of open market policy have both been adjusted, in the light 
of previous shortcomings, in-the hope of malting the policy 
more effective. 
Another interesting question is the significance of Bank 
Rate changes under these'new arrangements. Apart from its 
effect on the treasury bill discount rate, the influence of 
Bank Rate in the past depended, to a large extent, on the 
fixed links maintained between it and clearing bank interest 
rates ' under- the now abandoned agreements. It seems likely, 
, therefore, that Bank Rate will in future exert a more. 
tenuous influence. At the same time, however its influence' 
may be diffused more widely through the financial system, 
reflecting the composition and uniform application of reserve 
assets and'possibly special, deposits requirements. It is no 
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surprise then that the Bank Rate was abolished in October 
1972 and replaced by a floating "minimum lending rate". 
All in all, then, under these new arrangements, the 
monetary authorities will exercise control through interest 
rate policy and its effect upon the asset preferences and 
reserve position of the banking system; the objective is to 
control the, money supply or some similar "monetary aggregate" 
i. e. D. C. E., rather than bank lending as previously. 
There is, however, an apparent inconsistency between the 
consultative document(s), and the Governor's speech referred 
to above. The speech starts from the assumption that mono- 
tary policy should seek to influence some monetary aggrogate, 
the key issue being which one, and proceeds to explain that 
the Bank has been shifting from seeking to control bank 
lending to, seeking to control the money supply or D. C. E. 
The speech, ' however, quickly returns to the assumption of 
the' consultative document(s), that the objective of monetary 
policy is to influence or control the structure of interest 
rates. 'Nevertheless, there remains an inconsistency between 
theoretical approach and proposals, since reliance on a 
reserve ratio that'can be varied by the authorities - which 
is broadly the centre - piece of the new proposals - assumes 
that the aim of policy is to control a monetary aggrogato, 
and not to control either the structure of interest rates or 
the*quantities, of particular types of credit, which should, 
by implication, be'left to come out of the wash; whereas 
both the document and the speech still emphasize interest 
rates and the amounts of particular types of credit as the 
objectives of policy control. Perhaps the answer to this 
inconsistency is. that what the monetary authorities have in 
mind is perhaps a kind of 'combination policy" referred to 
in the introduction. They may like to set the money supply 
schedule such that at different interest rates different 
quantities of money would be forthcoming. In other words 
they-may-neither pur. sue, a pure Radcliffian policy that would 
make the money supply perfectly elastic in a_ 
, 
specified set 
of interest rates i. e. the money supply would not be a 
perfectly elastic function'of interest rates, nor a pure 
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Friedman extreme that would make the money supply function 
perfectly inelastic with respect to interest rates. They 
would, thus, make a certain stock of money available and 
only that stock at specified sets of interest rates. 
Another interesting point in connection with the last 
paragraph is the problem of the appropriate indicator(s) of 
monetary policy that will be used to determine the direction 
and strength of change in policy. The authorities we are 
told, are concerned with control of 'the broader monetary 
aggregates" which is interpreted as "the money supply under 
one or more of its many definitions for example, or domestic 
credit expansion" (8). This-gives four alternatives, N19 
M2, N3 and D. C. E. It seems, however, that the level of 
interest rates is also to be some indicator of policy and 
again we are faced with alternatives: we can consider the 
inter-bank market rate, local authority market rate, 
Treasury bill rate and in general the yields on short-term 
gilt-edge stock. Yet a third type of indicator'may be the 
composition of bank lending to the private sector of the 
economy. The fact that no particular indicator is specified 
is quite deliberate, as "it is seldom possible or desirable 
for the authorities to put their eggs in one monetary basket" 
and therefore "one must in practice take account of movements 
in many financial indicators, varying the relative importance 
attached. to them as circumstances chango"(8). However, wo 
are neither told in a precise manner what the indicators are 
nor how the weights attached to them should vary as circum- 
stances change. 
Finally,. there is the problem of whether, under the new 
arrangements, the banking sector could engineer a reshuffle 
of their assets, so "_ds,., to frustrate any policy of the 
authorities to change the reserve asset ratio. It appears 
that this is very possible, indeed: first, by purchasing 
eligible short-term bonds and bills from the uncontrolled 
private sector; there-are substantial quantities of some 
reserve assets held outside the banking system and non- 
reserve assets can, still be the new material from which 
reserve assets can be "manufactured". Secondly, by 
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increasing call loans to the discount market backed by non- 
reserve assets a possibility which, in the case of the latter 
is enhanced by the different definition-of eligible reserve 
assets for the banks and discount houses. 11. Parkin (1011) 
argues strongly in favour of this possibility: "The main 
conclusions reached are that call money has provided and will 
continue to provide a moans whereby the Banking System as a 
whole can substantially insulate itself fron: Dank of England 
policy and render the "Competion and Credit Control's regula- 
tions very imprecise". 
Under such circumstances, credit creation is increased 
if assets are switched to those able to treat them as 
eligible reserves. The extension, though, of officially - 
required reserves to all banks and the finance houses . 
effectively reduces the range of outside holders of official 
reserves able to supply the banks with additional reserves. 
The eligibility of gilts with under one year to maturity, 
however, may well enlarge the scope of shifts botwoen bank 
and non-bank holdings of reserve assets beyond that feasible 
under the former liquidity ratio mechanism. In the case of 
the discount market, which can help the banks to expand 
reserve assets by increasing call money to the market whose 
members could then expand their holdings of one to five year 
gilts, the development of such a. process on any scale will 
be affected by the cost to the discount market of further 
increasing their holdings of longer-term debt in periods of 
rising interest rates. 
2.3 Optimal Monetary Policy in the U. K. 
The question of optimal monetary policy has not been 
debated much in the U. K., the main reason being that given 
the pre-1971 uncompetitivenoss of the financial system,. stable 
relationships could not possibly be established. Since, 
therefore, there are some reasons for thinking that nmacro- 
economic relationships, especially the demand functions, are 
likely to be more stable, in terms of their usual arguments, 
in. a competitive environment (109)-Such as the one implied 
by the 1971 "Competition and Credit Control" proposals - 
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the question of optimal monetary policy becomes very impor- 
tant indeed. Laidlor (91) calls for a money supply policy; 
his analysis is based on the Poole-modal, and argues that 
since the Lill-curve seems to be more stable than the IS, and 
given the complexity and instability of the time lags, a 
desirable framework of monetary policy should concentrate 
on'regulating the quantity of money, and that the authorities 
should control the long-run growth path of the money supply 
and keep it reasonably steady. One, howovor, could disagree 
with Laidler's argument on the following grounds: 
(a) The stability of the IPI-curve is based on the stability 
of the demand for money function; and although there 
seems, to be evidence of stable demand functions for 
money, the predictive reliability of these functions 
outside their sample period has not yet been 
established (62)., 
(b) The stability of money supply multipliers in British 
post-war experience is very doubtful; this is very 
true even if the money supply is treated as an erogenous 
(5,111) which in itself is again questionable. 
(c) Finally, there, is evidence that changes in aggregate 
. demand are more closely related to changes in bank 
lending to the private sector than to changes in any 
of the traditional money supply concepts (61,62). 
The picture wo have'sketched, then, in this and in the last 
section should enable us to build upa model for the financial 
sector chiefly a model of the U. K. money supply determination 
which is so important especially for the "combination policy" 
model. Given certain assumptions about the real sector, a 
model could be set up resembling the UI-IS apparatus in 
appearance but in fact with more realistic assumptions and 
of more dynamic nature which would be the corner-stone of 
the whole' analysis. 
It is hard not to mention at this point the criticism on 
W-IS framework, which is directed on its very static nature. 
However, there is no reason why this comparative static 
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framework should not be made dynamic as Noronoy and Nason 
show (98). So developed, this dynamic Hicks-Hanson model 
of the Keynesian system gathers substanrpe for assessing the 
financial sector's role. The underlying structural equations 
are broadened and ro-ostimatod to take account of price and 
credit rationing effects upon the slopes and positions of 
the pairs of schedules determined in each income period. 
Furthermore, because the under-lying structural equations are 
specified and, estimated as an interdependent economic system, 
the approach becomes useful for deriving quantitative assess- 
ments of the effects of financial sector developments and for 
policy analysis. This typo of dynamic interdependent format 
has been attempted in some small-scale and in most large- 
scale econometric models of the U. S. economy, as Fisher and 
Sheppard report in (46 chs. 2 and 3)., 
We may note, at this point that one could not possiblS 
ignore the real sector for in that case a specification bias 
is involved in the estimates of the structural coefficients 
(116,117). Brainard and Tobin (17) also argue for the 
importance of explicit recognition of the interdependence 
of the financial and real sectors in both theoretical and 
empirical discussions of monetary problems and spocificiations 
of related econometric models; failure to show clearly those 
interrelationships could easily lend to serious errors. Our 
relationships to be estimated should include behavioural 
functions in the real sector to which the monetary relation- 
ships are linked. There is also another important reason as 
to'wby one should want to set up a model in this way. Most 
of the studies undertaken to solve the problem of optimal ... 
monetary instrument use reduced - form equations with the 
money supply taken to be exogenous. If, however, the money 
supply is endogenous then it merely reflects fluctuations 
elsewhere in the system both in the real and financial 
sectors and the"consequence of this for the "reduced form" 
approach is that one cannot'talk in terms of one-way 
causality. " Therefore, in these circumstances what is 
required is a model, specified and estimated within the 
context of a simultaneous equation framework, which reflects 
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and takes, account of. any two-way causation. In fact the 
empirical work on-the British monetary affair has had a 
strong bias towards "reducod-form" approaches thus 
establishing the bias referred to above. 
This argument is particularly applicable in the case of 
the monetarists position'that thb money stock influences 
money income. This criticism has led to the so-called 
"Reverse Causation Argument": the fact that money stock 
is,. well correlated with. monoy income also moans that money 
income is-well correlated with money stock. Correlations 
do not establish: much more than a suggestion of causal 
nexust. unless. there is some extraneous evidence to suggest 
the direction, of causation. Correlation in itself is not 
necessarily evidence-of causation, and even were it, the 
direction of-causation is not a question to which either 
correlation or regression theory can provide an answer. 
Further evidence is required to identify the direction of 
causation. and this must, essentially come from outside the 
realm of, statistical". theory. -The-monetarists, howovor, have 
tried to shore up their position by. producing studios and 
arguments which suggest that the direction of causation runs 
from money -stockIto money income. 
Under'tho assumption then that this model is a satis- 
factory-representation, of the economy it should be possible 
to estimate-how: any set of-variables that concern us behave 
if the monetary authorities pursue different policies or sot 
of policies. This should enable us to say something about 
the stability of our structural parameters and the kind of 
optimum monetary policy to be suggested in terms of setting 
target values for the. money supply and/or the rate of interest 
that should servo as connecting links between the actions of 
the monetary authorities and their objectives. 
The. next step, therefore,, In the analysis should be the 
specification of the. particular, modol, we have in mind; 
before we embark on this task, though, we feel wo must say 
something about the criteria for choosing the. instruments of 
monetary policy. 
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2.4 Criteria for Choosing Instruments of. Monetary Policy: 
The problem of choosing an instrument, in a world of 
imperfect knozwledgeg may be consi"dorod in terms of a number 
of factors of which the most important ones can be: the 
choiceFof economic model; the problem of measurement; the 
goals of policy; and the extent 'of the monetary authorities 
autonomy. * 
Clearly, 'the choice of a particular instrument must 
depend on whether the monetary authorities can have a firm 
control over it (the autonomy problem). Related with this 
problem is-the one of goals of policy; in connection with 
this problem we may think of a situation whore there is a 
specialization of monetary instruments to particular goals, 
in which case the choice of instrument may reflect some 
priorities about goals., The problem of measurement arises 
as a result of the fact that-data are not always speedily 
available and indeed arc not always reliable; it also 
arises as a result of the question as to whether the 
statistically observed figures form good correlates of 
theoretical variables. The choice of economic model and 
in particular the assumed link between monetary and real 
variables, usually exert a considerable influence in favour 
of one instrument rather than another. 
We begin our discussion of the critoria for choosing 
instruments of monetary policy with the choice of economic 
model factor. 
We illustrate the'point about models, with the help of 
some specific-examples, Wo may take up as a-starting-point 
the UI-IS model'. ' As we have already, soon in Chapter 1, this 
model in its deterministic form, it makes no difference which 
instrument is chosen, both are optimal. In a world of 
uncertainty the choice depends on the stability of thie 
This section draws heavily on Artis, TI. J.: 1I11onetary Policy in the 1970s in the Light of Recent Developments" in Issues in Monetary Economics, Proceedings of'the 1972 Money Study Group Conference, edited by Johnson, H. G. and Nobay, A. R. 
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functions, that determine the LM and IS functions. Adlieronco, 
therefore, to what can perhaps be described as a Keynesian 
model, of this kind does not commit one to. a preference for 
one or other instrument of policy without an evaluation of 
the relative stabilities of the schedules. 
The models, now, which assert that, 
Yt = (1/it)rlýý 
or, in more contemporary form: 
Yt f`i Mt, N-. 1 ,00000 rit-i. 
), 
obviously favour-a money supply policy. Nonoy multiplier 
relationshipsFassort a stable relationship between chanaos 
in money supply and changes in nominal income on the basis 
of-an assumption about the e:: ogeneity of money. Those 
models are usually described as 'reduced forms' of some 
structural system and they are usually criticised on the 
grounds that different structural systems can give one, 
the same reduced-form. In the absence, therefore, of an 
explicit specification those 'reduced forms' should be bettor 
described as 'pseudo-reduced forms'. 
The Wicksollian view of monetary phenomena would seem 
to suggest a money-supply policy, although in detail it 
would justify an interest rate policy. The form of the 
latter., though, is such that it must be treated in associa- 
tion with the 'natural' rate of interest which is not, really, 
an observable item. Harrington* argues that in certain 
circumstances' the Wicksellian system does not indicate the 
money supply as an instrument. This argument is applicable 
when bank interest rates are constrained by monopolistic 
practices to a sub-equilibrium position, with the result 
that non-banl. 'financial-intermodiation in effect accomplishes 
some-of the work -, that. would otherwise be done by increases 
in the. -money supply. I 
* Harrington, R. - "The Nonotarist Controversy" rIanchostor School, December 1971. ,' 
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There are, finally, the-models of the monetary process, 
which stress that the important links between financial and 
real variables occur at the level of stock market pricos, 
rather than in the market for government bonds; further- 
more, the architects of those riodols* take the view that 
relationships between the financial markets directly affected 
by monetary operations, and th oso markets where the signifi- 
cant link with real variables exists, are unstable and 
complicated. The. obvious difficulty, however, with this 
approach is the autonomy problem: 
The measurement problem is an important one in that 
unless it is-resolved any model that claims to have established 
a particular instrument as the optimal one is likely to pro- 
duce severe criticisms'. There are two important questions 
related directly to this problem: firstly, there is the 
question of how far available, data series provide information 
relevant to. the theoretical variables; secondly there is the 
question of the speed of collection and reliability of the 
data themselves. 
It-seems that as`far as'the first question is concerned 
advocacy of an interest rate instrument encounters the most 
difficult measurement errör. The relevant interest rate to 
expenditure°decisions, 'it is`arguod, is the real rate of 
interest', "'whereas the directly observable data refer to 
nominal rates. In the unlikely event of price oxpoctations 
not changing it'can be argued that nominal rates are not a 
bad guide; otherwise nominal rates can be a misleading guide. 
Related problems of course are expectations about future 
levels of, interest rates that can influence the timing of 
expenditures' and there is. also the-problem as to which 
interest rates are the, most relevant. 
'Advocacy of a money-supply=policy does not preclude 
similar criticism; there is not a priori presumption that 
one definition of the money'supply must be superior to 
* See Tobin in (117, pp. 21-21k; 7n-82) for an example. 
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another. - On this particular problem wo shall havo moro to 
say in the next chapter. 
On the second question of speed and reliability of 
collection and publication of the data, interest rates seem 
to be the victors. These data are instantly available 
, whereas money, supply data are available six months behind 
the event and, until recently quarterly. Beyond those 
factors, there is the problem of allowing for seasonality 
and as it is usually reported in the quarterly Bulletin of 
the Bank-of England this problem constrains any short--poriod 
'monetary rule'. 
Turning now to the goals of policy, wo may note that, 
generally speaking,.. the implicit objectives have to do with 
stabilising the level of economic activity or with the level 
of prices or the balance of payments. A related problem is 
that of time-lags. Monetarists, for example, believe in long 
lags and that the läng-run effect of money supply variations 
falls on prices rather than on real incomes. Studies, however, 
reported, in the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bulletin tend to 
reverse sharply the monetarists' belief of 'long' lags, 
while Tucker (121) has shown that it is possible for monetary 
policy to, have quick effects despite of long lags in invest- 
ment functions. Hamburger* concludes that the measurement of 
policy lags depends to a great extent on the choice of policy 
instrument. There is therefore a lot of dispute and ambiguity 
as to when the effects of changes in the stance of policy 
could become apparent. 
Finally, wo have the autonomy problem. What wo actually 
mean in this case is that the variable which is chosen as an 
instrument could be controlled by the monetary authorities. 
This means that it is no argument against, say, the choice 
of interest rates as an instrument, that the authorities chose 
not to control it, but instead to control something else, say, 
the money stock. Autonomy must not be confused with oxogonoity. 
* Hamburger, N. J.: "The Lag in the Effect of Monetary Policy: A Survey of Recent Literature" Federal Reserve 
Bank of N. York, Monthly Review, December 1971. 
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Autonomy over a variable does not necessarily imply that 
this particular variable may be taken as statistically 
exogenous. Thus the authorities might be able to control 
the money supply via the monetary base of tho system, 
although the money supply is an endogonous variable, say, 
a°function of some rate of interest, income, and the 
monetary base. In this case we do have autonomy but, clearly, 
we-do not have exogeneity. 
The criterion of autonomy is most forceful in its appli- 
cation to the open economy; in particular, the British case 
may suggest that only D. C. E. can be regarded as an instru- 
ment. This follows from assumptions that interest rates 
and price levels are determined by the world, so that the 
authorities in this country have no option other than to 
apply that concept of the money supply that does take into 
consideration any movements in the Balance of Payments. 
Even then, the authorities would not be working in an 
environment of complete autonomy. 
The inevitable conclusion is that once autonomy is 
taken-into consideration accurate control is probably not 
feasible; instruments are subject to large random fluc- 
tuations. 
f 
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CHAPTER 3 
v 
THE MODEL 
In this chapter we, discuss the basic features of the 
model referred to above. We begin with the monetary sector 
where we discuss the demand for money and the supply of 
money. 
3.1 The Monetary Sector: 
. 
In any real economy where the monetary authorities can 
hope to influence behaviour in a predictable way via changes 
in the money supply, there area number of preconditions 
that have tobe fulfilled. Among the most important of those 
preconditions are that the monetary authorities should be 
able. to control that set of assets which constitute the 
"money, stock", and that-the demand function for this stock 
must be stable enough. so. "that the consequences of any 
changes in its volume would, be predictable with a high 
degree of reliability. And as Professor, Shackle notes* 
"If the controlling of money is to provide a means of 
controlling the economy, money has to be something which 
passes two. tests. It must, itself have, or it must transmit, 
powerful effects on the-economy; and. it must itself be 
susceptible to. control in appropriate respects". Whether 
these preconditions are met in the case of the U. K. economy 
has, been the, subject of a good deal of debate, and the 
problem has not been solved yet; and not surprisingly so: 
"These two requirements give us, perhaps, a sort of map- 
maker's fix on the definition of money. Neither requirement 
alone-is sufficient-,, -and, --of course, there is no presumption 
that 'such a. (money V 'can be' identified or shown to exist" .** 
Central, to the debate, though, is the question of a proper 
* See Professor. Shackle's comments on Profossor Clover's 
papor, at the Sheffield seminar on money in 1970, reported in Monetary Theory and Monetary Policy in the 1970s, Proceedings of the 1970 Sheffield Money Seminar, editod 
by'Clayton G., Gilbert, J. C. and Sedgwick, p. 32. 
** Professor Shackle's "Discussion Paper" op. cit. P"32. 
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definition of the "money stock". In general, there are four 
approaches to defining "money": * The Conventional approach 
the Chicago approach, the Gurley and Shaw approach, and the 
Central Bank approach. 
The Conventional approach is really the oldest and, 
probably the most accepted way of defining money, and views 
money by its distinguishing functional characteristic as a 
medium of exchange. According to this view, ** then, the 
theory of the demand for money is a theory of the demand 
for an asset that is a generally acceptable moans of exchange 
and also happens to be a store of value; it goes on to argue 
that a nation's money stock consists of currency (coins and 
legal tender paper money) as well as demand deposits (checking 
account money). Unlike demand deposits, than, which are 
readily transferable by cheque, time deposits, savings 
deposits and so forth are not means of exchange. Another 
argument*** which has been put forward to support this 
approach says that demand deposits, even though they are 
the liabilities of commercial banks whose owners are members 
of the economy, represent not wealth to the community, 
while time deposits and the liabilities of other financial 
institutions do not represent net wealth. It is argued that the 
principal means by which monetary policy works is the wealth 
effect and that the proper empirical definition of money is 
confined to currency plus demand deposits, since it is only 
changes in the real quantity of these assets that represent 
changes in the community's wealth. So, under this approach 
we have: 
11 1= Cp + DD 
* These four approaches have come to be recognised by a 
number of economists. For an example sec Johnson, B. G. Monetary Theory and Policy "American Economic Review, 
June 1960, PP"351-351k. 
** See, for example, Latano, U. A. "Cash Dalances and the Interest Rate -A Pragmatic Approach" Review of Economics 
and Statistics, November 19544, pp. 1i56-60. 
*** Due to Pesek and Saving (106). 
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where Cp = currency held by the public, and DDs demand 
deposits. 
The Chicago approach, associated with Professor )lilton 
Friedman and other University of Chicago monetary theorists, 
defines the function, of money more broadly as 'a temporary 
abode of purchasing power'*; this approach, then, includes, 
in its definition of money not only currency and demand 
deposits, but. time depositis (DT) - interest-boaring deposits 
at commercial banks - as well (51)** This definition of 
money is, obviously, in conflict with the conventional defi- 
nition because commercial bank time deposits are not directly 
spendable. They do not function as a medium of. oxchangos; 
the owner of a time deposit who'wants to use it to buy a car, 
for example, must exchange this deposit for currency or 
demand deposits before he is able to make the payment for 
his purchase. One, however, could argue that although time 
deposits are not directly spendable, they should still be 
included in the'definition of money given that commercial 
banks would always transfer money from a time deposit to 
a demand deposit. Professor Shackle's remarks on this point 
are very clear ". '. . And so must time deposits. In 
Britain at least, the distinction of availability between 
demand and time deposits (current and deposits accounts) is 
practically negligible. A note to my bank will transfer 
money at any moment, at a loss of seven day's interest. I 
cannot write a cheque on my deposit account, but I can write 
one on my current account which, even if that account is 
empty, will be honoured if covered by my deposit balance. 
No holder of accounts in a British bank would make any 
distinction between the-two sorts of account in regard to 
their readiness of availability, as opposed to., the question 
of loss of. interest"*** Is this the reason, perhaps of the 
* See Johnson, H. G. "Monetary Theory and Policy", op. cit. 
PP"351-3511'. 
** See also Selden, R. T. "Monetary Velocity in the United 
States" in Friedman, DI., ed. Studies in the quantity Theory of Money, Chicago 195G9 pp. 179-257. 
*** Professor Shcakle's "Discussion Paper", op. cit. P. 33 ýý i 
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inclusion of time deposits in the Chicago definition? The 
answer is that the criteria upon which the Chicago definition 
is based are rather different. Those are the following: 
First-the Chicago theorists have shown that national 
income is more, highly correlated with money as they have 
defined it than with money alternatively defined. Since 
changes, in, the money supply are hypothesized by the Chicago 
theorists to bring about. predictable changes in national 
income, the Chicago definition is held by these theorists 
to come closest to meeting the empirical criterion of putting 
monetary theory in a good light (53). 
Second, the approach is based on the theoretical criterion 
of defining as a single good those things which are perfect 
substitutes for each other. It is, then, argued that time 
deposits are indeed such close substitutes for currency and 
demand deposits, -that it is more fruitful to treat them as 
if-they were perfect substitutes than not. The relatively 
timeless'and-costless ease of transferring time deposits 
into demand deposits-and currency, as well as the notion 
mainly held by the monetarists that a time deposit is actually 
"money in the bank! ", provide support to the close substitu- 
tability argument. One, however, could not possible go as 
far as to-argue-that they are perfect substitutes, for if they 
were, one, -then, would have-to provide a satisfactory answer 
to the obviously awkward question as to why anyone would 
wish to hold non-interest-bearing demand' deposits or currency 
when there is interestýto be earned on time deposits. 
The Gurley' and Shaw Approach owes its name to a series 
of co'ntribution's* culminating in a major theoretical 
'These are the following three articles by Gurley, J. G. 
and Shaw, E. S. (1) "Financial Aspects of Economic Development", -American Economic Review, September 1955. (2) "Financial Intermediaries and the Saving-Investment Process" Journal of Finance, May 1956., (3) "The Growth 
of Depth and Money in the United States, 1800-1950: A, Suggested Interpretation "Review of Economics and Statis- tics, - August 1957. 
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work*: -by Gurley, J. G. and Shaw, E. S. wore they argue 
that-currency, and demand deposits are not unique assets 
(except as a medium of-exchange) but are instead just two 
amongst-many in the-family of claims against financial 
intermediaries. Furthermore, they particularly stress the 
close substitution relationships between currency, demand 
deposits,, commercial bank time deposits,. savings bank 
deposits, savings. and loan-association shares, and so on, 
all of which, -are viewed by the public as alternative liquid 
stores of value. 
This approach seems to be very similar to the Chicago 
approach. They, aro in fact similar in their objective, for 
both attempt to define money to include all those assets 
that-are means of payment plus"thoso assets which are close 
substitutes for the means of payment. They differ, howovor, 
in their.. analysis; whereas the Chicago approach considers 
only time, deposits to be close, substitutes for the moans of 
payment, Gurley and-Shaw expand the number of substitutes 
to include deposits of and claims against, all types of 
financial intermediaries. The Gurely and Shaw analysis, 
though, raises the important question of how to account for 
the substitution relationships. when defining the money stock. 
Gurley suggests that the money supply should be defined as 
a, weighted gun of currency, demand deposits, and their 
substitutes, with the weights being assigned on the basis 
of the degree of substitutability. * According to this 
definition, weights of unity are assigned to currency, 
demand deposits, and their perfect substitutes, if any. 
Zero weights are given to assets which are totally unrelated 
to demand deposits and currency; and weights between zero 
and one. are assigned to assets which are imperfect substi- 
tutes for demand deposits and currency. lie illustrate this 
point with an example. Lot us assume that the economy's 
only assets are as follows: (1) £100 in currency. (2) £300 
in demand deposits, (3) 9200 in'Duilding Societies share 
* See Gurley, J. G.: Li idit and Financial Institutions in the Postwar Economy Study Paper 1109 Joint Economic Committee, 86th Congress, 2nd session, Washington, 1960. 
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accounts, and (11) &2#1100 worth of broad. The economy's total 
assets are £1000. Now, wo make the following assumptions 
on the substitutability relationships: tho asset demands 
for currency and for-demand deposits are independent of the 
demand for bread, whereas the degree of substitutability 
between Building Societies share accounts and currency - as 
well as demand deposits - is somehow determined to be 0.25. 
The, weighted sure money supply would consequently be equal to 
£1100, since currency and demand deposits would be assigned 
a weight of one, the Building Societies share accounts a 
weight of one-fourth, and broad a weight of zero. It is to 
ibe noted, however, that no attempt has been made to use the 
weighted sum money supply for testing monetary theory or 
for carrying out monotary policy. The practice has been to 
account for the Gurley and Shaw substitution relationships 
in-ways other than how money is defined; so most researchers 
and policy-makers have tended. to consider the substitution 
relationships by including rates of return on substitutes for 
currency and demand deposits explicitly in the analysis of 
currency and demand deposits. In so doing they have avoided 
the problem of having to make arbitrary assumptions about 
the degree of substitutability. 
Finally, there, is the Central Bank Approach, the approach 
to money taken by many, monetary authorities. In this case 
the tendency is to view money in its widest possible concept 
to the point, in fact,; that money is used as if it were 
synonymous with credit. * This iss actually, quite under- 
standable once wo note that the main interest of this approach 
is not monetary theory as such, but monetary policy'. We, thus, 
have the notion of "total credit availability" in the U. S. A. 
as the hey monetary policy variable for regulating the economy, 
and in the U. IZ. the notion of the "liquidity" of the economy 
* 'Credit, here, is used as a general terra meaning funds loaned to borrowers; not just credit extended by commercial banl: s, Which gives rise to der7. and deposits, but credit extended by the widest variety of sources. 
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as it is exemplified by the Radcliffo Committee 
(75 ch. VI) 
and since clarified by R. Sayers. * It follows,, therefore, 
that unless money is defined very broadly as total credit, 
the term monetary policy would not have any meaning, for 
what the Central Bank has in fact followed is a credit 
availability (or liquidity) policy. 
I 
In terms of economic analysis and research three 
definitions for money are usually used: 
(1ý NI1 = Cp + DDS what wo have called the 
Conventional 
Approach, 
(2) 112 = Cp + DD + DT9 the Chicago Approach, and 
(3) M3 = Cp + DD + DT + D01 
where D01 = other savings deposits meaning 
those assets 
that are very close. substitutes for 
time deposits, e. g. 
mutual savings bank's deposits etc. 
All the above approaches to defining money 
include 
currency'and demand deposits in their definitions. They 
all agree that those assets which serve as a medium of 
exchange. are money. Where they disagree is on the question 
of whether other assets are so close to currency and demand 
deposits that one or more of these other assets should also 
be defined as money. At the heart of the controversy over 
what and what not to include as money are the substitution 
relationships between money, conventionally defined, and 
other assets. 
" The, term "cross-elasticity of demand" is useful when 
measuring the substitution relationships. It is defined as: 
Q. eQJ1 Q< ,ýP eXy = ,,, _pp= or, using derivativos : I 
dQ^ YPyyyx 
exy dP Q 
Yx 
* See Sayers, R. S. "Monetary Thought and Monetary Policy in England", Economic Journal, December 1960. 
I 
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where x and y denote assets. 
If exy> o then the assets are substitutes, and perfect 
substitutability means 
©xy - 
Imperfect substitutability moans. o <e <ov 
" If c, {y' =. o 
than the assets are completely independent. 
If exy <o then they are complements. 
While these propositions hold for the more general case 
in which-prices are expressed in terms of costs, they must 
be reversed in sign for cases in which prices are expressed 
in terms of yields or rates of return. The following 
expression, then, dQ, ry 
e'cy, 
dry t 
where-r1 indicates the rate of-interest on asset y, provides 
the rate-of-return cross elasticity. We may now generaliso by 
saying that substitution-relationships between financial 
assets, whose values are expressed as rates of return, are 
indicated by negative rate-of-return cross elasticities of 
demand. 
{ 
The greater the absolute size of the coefficient of 
cross-elasticity, the closer the degree of substitution. 
- .: -Turning now to the empirical evidence, Foigo* and Loo**, 
using. U. S. A. data, 
*have 
estimated cross-elasticity measures 
of, the substitution relationships between commercial bank 
demand deposits, commercial bank time deposits, savings 
bank deposits, and savings and loan association shares. 
.:.: Feige finds demand deposits and time deposits, to be wcalt 
substitutes.. Moreover, tie finds savings and lonn association 
shares and mutual savings bank deposits to be oven weaker 
See Edgar L. Feige:. The Demand for Li uid Assets: A 
Temporal Cross-Section Analysis. Prentice-IIallt 19ºl Cli. 3. 
**, See Tong Hun Lee: "Substitutability of Non-Dank Intermediary Liabilities for Money". Journal of 'Finance September 1966. 
*** Although less work has been dolle using U. K. data the study by Barrett, R. J., Gray, I. I. R. and Parkin, J. N. ("The Demand 
for Financial Assets by the Personal Sector of the U. K. Economy" in Renton, G. A. (ed. ) ModollinR the Economy, 
London, 1975) suggests that the U. K. is no different from 
the U. S. A. in this respect. 
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substitutes for demand deposits. On the basis of his 
evidence, Feige concludes that the substitution relation- 
ships are too weak to justify defining monoy broadly. Foigo's 
study thus supports the conventional definition of money. 
Although F'eige's study is the most careful study that has 
been carried out on the subject it seems that there are 
some crucial problems which might load one to suspect those 
results.. ' These problems arise because of tho. data used and 
the method of measuring the rate of return on demand deposits. 
4 summary of those problems has boon provided by Laidlor 
(88, pp"52O-522). 
Lee's findings are rather different. In general, 
stronger substitution relationships are discovered. Savings 
and loan 'association share are found to be moderately close 
substitutes for demand deposits. Time deposits, on the 
other hand, 'are found to have no statistically significant 
substitution relationship to demand deposits, a result Which 
leads Lee to reprove the Chicago approach to defining money. 
While the Paige and Lee Studios are enlightening, they 
provide`no conclusive answer to the question of how to 
define money. Even if high cross-elasticities should be 
found, there would still be'the problem of interpreting. 
whether or not they are "high enough" to warrant a broad 
möney+supply definition. It seems, therefore that there 
can`be-no'final answer to the question of defining the money 
supply on the basis of the evidence produced by feine and 
Lee. 
Another piece of empirical evidence, which is more 
indirect than the one provided by Paige and Leo referred to 
above, centres on the stability of the demand for money. 
Different definitions of money are used and the stability 
of the demand for money is then investigated; that dofini- 
tion of money which provides a more stable demand for money 
is preferred. This approach rests, of course, on the 
contention that a "more stable demand for money" is precisely 
one'that"allows the consequences of shifting the supply of 
money to be more-easily and accurately predicted. A full 
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account of this kind of evidence is provided by Laidlor 
(88, PP"515-520), who comes to the conclusion that the 
evidence suggests that a highly stable demand for money 
function can be identified whether the narrow or the 
broader definition of money is used; there seems, therefore, 
little, if not nothing, to choose between the alternatives 
considered in'his paper. One, however, has to be very care- 
ful with those results, since they arc contradicted by 
Feige's above mentioned important study. If the Laidlor 
conclusions were to be'accepted, there would then be an 
important conclusion to follow: as far as the exercise of 
monetary policy is concerned, and which particular aggregate 
of bank and non-bank liabilities the policy-maker would try 
to manipulate is a question which could only be settled by 
applying other,, criteria, for example, which aggregate it is 
easier to control than the criteria discussed above. 
We, move on, now, to discuss the demand for money and 
supply of money. We begin with the former. 
3.1a The'Demand-for Nonev: 
Whilst few people would dispute the existence of 
fundamental' empirical arguments in the demand for money, 
there has boon considerable dispute over which arguments are 
the most'important and fundamental ones. This dispute has 
produced a massive empirical and theoretical worlc; Friedman's 
extension of the permanent income hypothesis to the demand 
for money suggests that wealth, or alternatively, the 
expected yield on wealth, which is approximated with perma- 
nent income, is the most important determining variable 
affecting the demand for, cash balances (509 51); other 
empirical findings have shorn that it is also a function of 
some rate of interest. A summary of all these findings may 
be. found in 62,68,, 
. and 90., 
The empirical work oni'the demand for money has boon 
concerned with "testing" a demand for money. In general, 
regressions have boon'run on equations which treat "money" 
as the "dependent" variable, functionally related to various 
66. 
"independent" ar, twients. The results hnvo usually been 
judged according to, tlhe following criteria: goodnoss of 
fit (R? ), a test for significance of regression coefficients 
(e. g. the` t-test ), and the extent to which the signs of the 
regression coefficients agree with expectations. Such n 
procedure, however, raises the related general problems of 
identification, simultaneous equation bias (least square 
bias), and specification error. Those of course are not the 
only statistical problems that one encounters when under- 
taking empirical work on the demand for money function; 
there are many other problems that arise in interpreting 
results, but these other problems are not so general as the 
above mentioned ones, and are best dealt with in context as 
they arise. 
We begin. with'the identification problem. The quantity 
of money demanded is not an observable variable; all that 
can be measured is-the quantity of money supplied, and it is 
only by assuming' equilibrium in the money market that the 
latter `concept may be. used to measure the former. There 
also exists a supply-of-money function, and questions must 
arise as to whether, in relating the money stock to various 
variables, one is not in fact measuring this supply function, 
or, tho combined effects of both the demand and supply 
functions, ` rather. than the demand alone. It follows that 
those studies which estimate a demand equation without 
specifying a supply function cannot claim to identify the 
resulting'-equation as a demand function for the true supply 
function may be of 
'a 
form which prevents identification. 
Graphically speaking, we draw the demand for money as a 
negative function. _of... the . rate of interest and the supply 
function as a positive function of the rate of interest. 
This last assumption is justified on the grounds that as 
the' rate of interest, g'o'es' up than the banks reduce their 
excess reserves thus' increasing the money-supply; similarly 
if the rate of interest goes down the banks increase their 
excess reserves thus decreasing the money supply. We show 
both functions in the following figure (13): 
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Now, lot the problem be to measure the relationship 
between-tho demand-for"money and the rate of interest from 
observations generated in, this market. This will only be 
possible if it is- alwaysthe money supply that shifts while 
the- demand function remains stable, as it is shown in the 
following figure (14): 5 
r 
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If only the demand function shifts, the supply curve Will 
be' what is'observed as it is shown below (15): 
'Sts 
rir. s 
t 
0f,. rl 
If both curves shift, yielding a set of observations 
that, if regression analysis is applied to them will produce 
a curve. such 
as 
FF-or hK', that is 
, neither a supply 
function 
nor a--demand function (see figure 16). 
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Now the problem is presented hero in a two-variable' case, 
but it arises just as much where more than one variable is 
involved -in explaining the demand for money. lie may demon- 
strate this difficulty with the use of a linear demand for 
money function as wall as a linear supply of money function. 
Suppose that our true demand and supply functions are: 
(I) DID = d1Y + d, r + dýW + u1 
(II) ms m1Y +m 2r + u2 
where Y =national income, r= some rate of interest, and u1 
and U2 are errors. 
Next, multiply the ND and 11S equations by the arbitrary 
constants 
)1 
and )t2 respectively. On the assumption that wo 
are observing equilibrium positions (N 
D=I. 1S), we can 
substitute 11D for 11S in equation (II). Having carried out 
these operations, we may add the two equations to -got: 
m +j me) (III) PID=( 
+22 
)Y+(X1d . 2-.! )r+(-1d3 )1j+(x1u1+ý2u2 
Suppose, now, that our econometric study establishes 
that a linear relationship between ND, Y, r, and 11 exists. 
In this case there is no way of determining whether the 
regression coefficients of that linear relationship are the 
coefficients of the true demand equation (oq. (I)), or of 
the mongrel equation (oq. III). If however, the estimated 
equation had a zero regression coefficient on If, it could 
be interpreted-as an estimate of equation (II), for there is 
no way to form a mongrel equation which does not include W. 
It, therefore, follows that whether a'demand equation or a 
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supply equation can be identified from an ostimntod oquntion 
depends on which variables enter the true demand and supply 
functions and, without specifying the supply function, wo 
cannot know whether an estimated equation roprosonts a 
demand function or a mongrel equation. * 
The above analysis suggests, ' then, that before one can 
take observations of the money supply, relate them to the 
level of income and the rate of interest, and call the 
result a demand-for-money function, one must be sure of two 
important matters: First, one must be sure that the 
Isis-function shifts independently of the AID-function; tihat 
the NS contains at least one variable that does not appear 
in the demand function. It is not difficult to establish 
that this is the case, for the level of reserves made 
available by the central bank to the commercial banking 
system, figures prominently in any theory of the money- 
supply and, does not appear in any theory of the demand- 
for-money. There is also ample evidence that this variable 
shifts around over time, permitting us to be sure that wo 
can get observations taken at different points on the 
demand-for-money function. Second, such observations must 
lie on the same riD-function. It is not sufficient to assume 
that Ms shifts independently of the demand-for-money 
function; it is necessary to assume that the latter stays 
put between observations. 
Certain techniques have been developed by some econo- 
mists when studying the money market, which overcome the 
identification difficulty by enabling supply and demand 
functions to be fitted simultaneously; we will o;: amino this 
kind of developments when we come to tasting our model. 
The second problem is the simultaneous equation bias. 
This results from estimating a demand function by the 
technique of ordinary least-squares regression (OLS), for 
the. coefficients estimated by OLS are unbiased only if the 
* See, for e:: onmple, Johnston, J. Cconomotric I1othods. 
New York, 1963, Ch. 9. 
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explanatory variables are uncorrolatod With the random 
disturbance term. In general, this condition is not uati3- 
fied by the demand function for money. -Explanatory variables 
are correlated with the random disturbance term because the 
explanatory variables are not truly oxogenous but are them- 
selves influenced by the dependent variable. The reason why 
the condition is not satisfied is that there is a two-way 
interaction between the dependent and independent variables, 
and this, in turn, arises because of the way "money" is treated 
as the dependent variable. Some studios have regressed a 
demand equation for money and have attempted to overcome the 
identification problem by asserting that the supply of money 
depends on none-of the arguments in the demand function for 
money and that the supply of money is more volatile than the 
demand'curve for money. But, if it were true that the supply 
of money depends on none of the same variables as the demand 
for-money, -then-it, 
, 
is wrong to treat money as the dependent 
variable in the'demand for money function. For each indivi- 
dual, -the demand for money is a dependent variable, but in 
the community's aggregate demand function the stock of 
money'-is given and, for example, the-rate of interest and 
Gross National Product are the dependent variables. The 
causal direction : being wrongly specified. in this way leads 
to biased'. estimates. In other words, if-one begins with 
the` ith individual, - then tho : demand for money is represented 
by the following equation - omitting the disturbance terri: - 
mi ." ao + blyi + b2r 
'The-individual takes the rate of interest and the level 
of his nominal--income as given and adjusts his nominal money 
balancos. - Forthe individual, ' therefore, nominal cash 
balances' äre the dependent variable. Very few studies, 
however, -have used individual-observations on households or 
firms. Most, -empirical works have used time series of 
aggregates, and there are obviously problems created with 
this aggregation. Clearly, for the economy as a whole the 
quantity of money cannot be considered as the dependent 
variable. If wo ignore for the time the rate of interest, 
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then the normal . a, grcgato monetary 
theory would arguo that 
the aggregate quantity of money in determined by the mono- 
tary authorities and that the level of noti+minal nrgrcgnte 
income is the dependent variable. Formally, thoroforo, the 
aggregate relationship is derived as follows: 
zmi 
_ ao + b1 
T-yi 
so that m= ao + bly, 
with in = 
Emi, 
y=2: yi, and writing the level of aggregate 
income as the dependent variable s"ro have: 
a 
yom 
b1 b1 
The regression analysis suggests that is the money multi- 
b1 
plier. One, however, could suggest that /U simply measures 
the reaction of'the monetary authorities to current income 
levels. The last equation assumes that the causal effect is 
from money to nominal income, not the other way around. If 
one wore convinced, however, that money as such had little 
effect on income and that the authorities were passively 
supplying money for the "needs of trade", then the measure 
b would give information only about the reactions of the 
Central Bank to current or expected economic conditions. 
If, however, it is not true that the supply of money 
depends on different variables from those in the demand 
function, then failure to specify the supply function-not 
only involves the identification problem, but it also leads 
to simultaneous-equation bias in the estimated regression 
coefficients of the demand for money equation. This is 
because the one-stage least squares procedure fails to take 
account of the whole model and the feedbacks that exist 
between the structural equations of the model. Simultaneous- 
equation estimation procedures are then required to moot 
this problem, e. g. two-stage least squares; this latter method 
and others have boon used in the empirical work on the 
demand for money to avoid these problems (116 for example), 
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and this empirical proceduro is followed in this study. 
The Specification error arises when ilia structural 
equations of the model are incorrectly specified and there- 
fore simultaneous estimation does not take full account of 
the "true" feedbacks between the structural equations. For 
example, suppose we specify a model whore 
IIID = 11 
D(r, Y, ... .)l and 
C 
1.1 = 11S(r, 00... 
). 
In this case, we should also specify a causal relationship 
between the rate of interest and income as a structural 
equation since otherwise we would have a specification bias, 
and also we would precludo using the model to analyse mono- 
tary policy. The rate of interest effect on money demand 
and supply does not record the effect of the money supply - 
and. the rate of interest - on the level of money income. 
An additional econometric problem, not mentioned abovo, 
is that of autocorrelation; in general, autocorrolation 
exists when the random errors of the demand for money 
function, to be estimated, are not independent of each other. 
The existence of autocorrolatiön is then, responsible for 
two 'kinds of problems: First, it leads to overestimates of 
the significance of the regression coefficients (see 211 for 
example). Second, where an attempt is made to estimate 
adjustment lags, the length of lag is likely to be wrongly 
estimated. * The problem of autocorrclation is tackled in 
rather a detailed way, in this study; ** the computing 
pro, ramme wo use for the estimation of the parameters of the 
demand for money and of the other structural relationships 
of the model tested in this piece of research, provide 
appropriate' statistics which enables us to determine whether 
* See DeLceuw, F. "The Demand for Money - Speed of Adjust- ment, Interest Rates, and Wealth" Staff Economic Reports, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, 1965. 
See Chapter 4, below. 
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the autocorrolzation problem is present or not. 
The Empirical Evidence: 
In the studies on the empirical evidence of the demand 
for money, the total. of money balances is usually related 
to the level of money incomes and the rate of interest 
prevailing on some alternative financial asset, for oxamplo 
on Treasury bills. Alternatively, the ratio of money 
balances to money income that is to say, the inverse of the 
income velocity of money, may be used instead of the total 
of money balances as the variable to be explained. There el' 
is, however, considerable controversy as to the precise 
manner in which those equations are specified. There is, 
to begin with, dispute over the form of the income (or 
Wealth) variable which should be related to the demand for 
money. The evidence here clearly shows that permanent 
income performs consistently batter than current real 
income (119,51, '89,123). Controversy also exists over the 
relative merits of non-human wealth and permanent income in 
an aggregate demand for money. Friedman (51) demonstrates 
that permanent income performs better, whereas Motwlor (91j)* 
finds that non-human wealth fits the data bettor than 
Friedman's permanent income. DeLeoutv's results** support a 
measure of non-human i"roalth as an explanatory variable in 
the demand function for demand deposits, but finds that a 
quarterly reconstruction of Friedman's permanent income data 
is a bettor explanatory variable for currency holdings, and 
that it is difficult to choose between the variables as 
affecting time deposits. Chow (22) finds that permanent 
income is preferable to non-human wealth (using the 1i1- 
definition), and Laidlor (86) finds that, when money is 
* The same result is reached also by 13runnor, K. and 
Hetzler, A. 11. : "Predicting Velocity: Implications for 
Theory and Policy", Journal of Finance, May 19G3. 
** See DoLeeuw, P. "The Demand for Ilonoy - Spood of Adjustment, Interest Rates, and Wonlth", on. cit. 
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defined ns TI?, -non-human wealth performs botter, whereas 
with M1 permanent income is bettor. A related problem is 
that of- they e:: tent of substitution between money balances 
and , other, financial assets. Evidence on this question is 
deduced, from the coefficient of-_the interest-olasticity of 
the demand, for money. * This(coofficient is calculated from 
the-estimated, demand for money equations, and it measures 
the percentage change., in money balances associated with a 
percentage change in-. interest rates. Nost of the econometric 
workr on,.. this, 
-, question 1has 
been done using data from the 
U. S. A.; the results of=similar studies using U. K. data 
tend, to, be. quite;, confirmatory, although in some cases the 
estimated --coefficient , 
for the intt-erest-elasticity of the 
demand. for money is-rather', lowor. A compressed selection 
of empirical-work on the interest-elasticity of the demand 
for money which covers studies using both U. S. A. and U. K. 
data is, provided by: Goodhart (62, pp. 183-189). 
Generally speaking, it seems that the empirical evidence 
has-ester lished that there is a significant negative relation- 
ship'between movements in interest rates and money balances, 
that is to say, the hi her"the interest rate, the lower will 
* Whether the demand for money is interest-elastic or not 
is a"moretimportant. question than appears at first sight, because it, is fundamental to many issues in both monetary 
theory and monetary policy. Clearly the question of the 
: interest-elasticity of the demand for money is crucial to the relevance of the Keynesian under-employment equilibrium 
trap. If it can be shown that the demand for money is not interest-elastic at all, then one is back with the classi-+ 
cal quantity the with a constant, or in Friedman's 
model a stable, velocity of circulation; and this implies that monetary policy must be tremendously effective, because by controlling the quantity of money the 
authorities are directly controlling money income- 
either real income and employment, or prices -. If, on the other hand, it can be demonstrated that the demand 
for money is very interost=clastic, expansion or con- traction of the money supply may not cause enough changes in interest rates, thus having no significant influence 
on the level of income. Consequently, the results of the attempts to fit empirical demand functions for money raise some crucial issues about the effectiveness of monetary policy. 
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be the quantity of honey balances associated with any given 
level of money incomes;, and according to Laidlor (90, p. 97): 
"whether one thinks of the demand for money function as boing 
constrained, by income, wealth, or expected income, whether 
one cares to. define money to include time deposits or 
exclude them, whether one chooses to ignore the idonti£ica- 
tion problem or deal with it, whether one uses a short rate 
of interest, a long one, the return on financial inter- 
mediariest liabilities or the yield on corporate equities, 
there is an overwhelming body of evidence in favour of the 
proposition that the demand for money is stably and nega- 
tively related to the rate of interest. Of all the issues 
in monetary economics, this is the one that appears to have 
been settled most docisevely". The interest-elasticity of 
the demand for money, however, appears to be quite low; it 
generally seems to lie within the range of -0.1 to -1.0 which 
is actually rather wide. This wide range, though, can be 
explained by the fact that different forms of demand for 
money relationships have boon tested, and that the estimated 
interest elasticities tend to vary depending on the particu- 
lar empirical form that the demand for money relationship 
takes. So if Ni.., rather than 1.11 is the variable to be 
explained, the interost-elasticity will be lower, because 
part of the effect of, say, rising interest rates will be 
to cause a shift from current to time deposits. If short- 
term rates rather than long-term rates are used, the estimated 
elasticity will also be loimr because the variations in 
short-term rates are greater. If quarterly data are used 
rather than annual data, the estimated elasticity tends to 
be lower, the reason probably being, that full adjustment of 
any changes in financial conditions will not be achieved in 
as short a period as one quarter. One, in fact, may 
generalise by saying that the econometric studios which use 
annual data with N1 as the dependent variable and a long- 
term rate of interest as an explanatory variable does tend 
to give an estimate for the interost-elasticity of the 
demand for money nearer to the top end of the range of 
results, and those with 2.12 and a short-term rate of interest 
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tend to give an estimate nearer to the bottom and. Although 
there are these differences in the results of various ocono- 
riotric studies, there is one important conclusion to be 
derived. The evidence on the elasticity of the demand for 
money provides conclusive contradiction toiho o:: tromo forms 
of both the Keynesian and monetarist theories. The strict 
monetarist form males the assumption of a zero interest- 
elasticity of the demand for money; on purely empirical 
grounds this is clearly a very unsatisfactory assumption. 
Equally unsatisfactory is the Keynosian o:: trcme assumption 
of an infinite interest-elasticity of the demand for money. 
The estimated coefficients for the interest-elasticity of 
the demand for money are far too low to support the e:: trome 
Keynesian view that even substantial changes in the money 
supply would merely cause a small and ineffectual variation 
in interest rates. At the same time the estimated coeffi- 
cients for the interest-elasticity are definitely not zero 
and consequently full 'adjustment to a full equilibrium after 
a change in the money supply would not have to take place 
entirely and directly via changes in money incomes; one 
should expect, always according to the evidence, that some 
adjustment would take place by way of interest rates 
variation too, a result that contradicts the extreme 
monetarist view. 
This conclusion, then, supports the proposition, mentioned 
earlier, that there, is a significant negative relationship 
between some. interest rate, and money balances. This propo- 
sition, however, raises a. further question, namely, which 
is the most, appropriate interest rate that should be included 
in the.,, demand for money function, some short-term rate or 
some long-term rate? Ono,, might indeed argue that it does not 
really matter which interest rate one might choose for the 
simple reason 
that time series data show that both rates 
move very closely together over time, and for the purposes 
of testing for tho. importance of the rate of interest in the 
demand for money, function one rate is probably, as good as 
"the other rate. It is argued, however, that the long-rate 
is perhaps better because it is more representative of the 
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average rato of return on capital in the economy at any, 
time, -and hence-it is a better indicator of the general 
opportunity cost of 'holding, money than is the yield on short- 
torm, bilils.: On the other hand, it is also argued that the 
short-term rates, becauso-of their short maturity, are 
closer substitutes for money than are longer bonds, so that 
the yield on them is particularly, relevant among the altor- 
natives. that. are foregone by, holding cash. This, however, 
amounts to saying that the rate of return on short-term 
bills is subject to very little uncertainty, and. it, ' 
therefore- follows that this'tonds to eliminate the impor- 
tance of the short-term rate in the speculative demand for 
money. The issue, though, 'is an empirical one for there 
is 
noway of saying how . much uncertainty constitutes a 
"little". 
On 
., 
the empirical front, 'Metzler (911), and Chow (&22), for 
example, use -a: long-term rate of'interest, whilst 
ßronfenbrenner and Mayor (18)- Laidler (86), and Teigen 
(116, - 117), for, e:: ample, use'a short-term rate. In an 
attempt, toTsolve-this issue, Laidlor (87), finds some 
evidence to support'the'theory that the demand for money 
is better related-to short-term than to long-term interest 
rates. - LaidlerIs test is based on the following proposition: 
if the, demand for, money is stable, the 'right' interest rate 
would be expected to show the same relationship to the 
demand for money., in different time periods while the 'wrong' 
one need not. , 
Laidler 
, 
finds that using the wido definition 
of money , 
the coefficient, of determination- is much greater 
for short-. term rates-than for long-term rates; he also 
finds that when the data are divided into sub-poriod,, the 
estimates for the coefficient of intorost-olasticity are 
much more stable with respect to short-term rates than to 
longer-term rates. Heller (71) confirms Laidler's results; 
using quarterly data for the post-war period, he detects a 
significant coefficient of interest-. elasticity for short- 
term interest rates but not for long-term rates. Loo(93)9 
using differential rather than absolute rates, finds that 
the yield on savings and. loan shares c:: plains the demand for 
money, under either a narrow or broad definition, bettor 
7a. 
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than the yield on longer-term assets. Tobin (119), liottovor, 
derives .a different set of conclusions. 
His results suggest 
that there is very little to choose between long-term and 
short-term rates, with long-term rates being marginally 
more successful in explaining the demand for 'narrow' money, 
whereas the demand for 'wide' money is slightly bettor 
explained by short-term rates. Goodhart (62) also reports 
that there is nothing to choose between long-term and 
short-term rates. Long-term rates are marginally more 
significant when the definition of money is restricted to 
currency plus clearing bank deposits, whereas the short- 
term rate appears slightly more significant when money is 
broadly defined - as in the Contral Statistical Office's 
Financial Statistics. The short-term rate used in Goodhart's 
study is the local authority rate; he argues that the 
slightly bettor performance-of this rate in the 'broad' 
demand for money may result from the deposits of the 'other' 
banks being more directly competitive with rates in the 
local authority market. These results arc obtained when 
levels are used; when the same equations arc estimated but 
with first differences, the short-term rate performed 
considerably better than the long-term rate. 
The predictability of the demand for money function is 
another aspect of this function which has been debated and 
a number of empirical studies dealing with this problem has 
appeared in the literature. Keynes' work on this topic 
suggests that the demand for money is predictable enough, 
except, of course, at very low interest rates. In the 
post-war period, however, many Keynesians started questioning 
this contention, arguing that the availability of money 
substitutes would tend to weaken the predictability of this 
relationship and in particular it would male the money- 
income relationship very suspect and therefore it would not 
be of much practical use for economic management or fore- 
casting. * This view has been challenged by the monetarists; 
* The extreme view on this question, is the one expressed in the Radcliffe Report (75, especially pangs. 392 and 397). 
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Friedman and Schwartz, for o:: amplo, in their study on the 
monetary history of tho United States (56), have shown that 
there is a strong relationship between real income and real 
money balances, and that this relationship was reasonably 
predictable over the period 1867-1959. Since than, the 
studios by Metzler (911), Chow (22), Laidlor (87), and 
Courchone and Shapiro (21k), among, others, have demonstrated 
that the demand for money in the United States is fairly 
well determined and predictable over ilia long period, with 
coöfficients of determination in the range of 0.90 - 0.99 which 
is very high indeed. In the United I: ingdom the study by 
Kavanagh and Walters (811) covering the period 1877-1961, 
produced the same results with a coefficient of determi- 
nation equal to 0.98 in the demand for money function. 
Those studios, however, suffer from a fundamental woaknoss 
in that the data used on both the dependent and independent 
variables to establish those relationships arc trend- 
dominated; in this case it is easy to see that close 
relationships and high coofficients'of determination arc 
in fact inevitable, but these relationships are bound to be 
false because`of the appearance of the time trend. One way 
to roduce'this danger is to use changes in, rather than 
levels of, the data. This fray is c:: pectod to eliminate the 
trend and-consequently it can be considered as providing 
more reliable results in terms, of the strength of the demand 
for-money relationship in its predictability. When changes 
are used-there occurs a- dramatic' reduction in the coefficient 
of. ' determination. For, e:: amplo, in Laidlor'a study (87) the 
coefficient of- determination in a typical equation is 
reduced from, 0.99 to 0.51 When, tho data are transformed 
from levels into changes. . Similarly, in the study by 
Kavanagh and Walters (81i) the coefficient of determination 
is reduced-from 0.98 to 0.49. In general all empirical 
studios., that have reported results using both levels and 
first differences (i. e. Changes) do come to the same 
conclusion, that is, there is always a significant reduction 
in the coefficient of determination when this transformation 
is~employed. mouse of lagged dependent variables as 
Co. 
explanatory variables is another way to reduce the clangor 
of establishing folso demand for money rolntionsliips when 
the variables are trend-dominated. Those studios that have 
introduced explicitly lagged dependent variables in their 
tests of the demand for money have ostablished significant 
coefficients for the lagged variables while the explanatory 
power of other variables has been corrc: 3pondingly lowor. * 
Possible explanations of those results can be the presence of 
time lags in the adjustment process of the dependent variable 
to its equilibrium position, ** and tlio existence of first or 
higher order autocorrolation in the residuals.. We carefully 
examine these problems in our empirical analysis, where some 
important results are reported. 
We may summarise the evidence on the predictability of 
the demand for money by quoting Goodhart (62, p. 1ß2): **" 
"The' empirical evidence suggests that the demand for money 
is more predictable than, say, the Radcliffe Committee would 
have imagined, but probably not predictable onough to be 
used as an instrument of short-term policy. Furthermore 
the predictability of the relationship in a period when 
control'of the money supply was not a major feature of policy 
will not-necessarily be a good guide to its predictability 
under conditions when it was more actively used". 
The inevitable overall conclusion that emerges from the 
empirical investigations on the demand for money is that the 
range of possible disagreement has been reduced and conse- 
quently'some movement towards consensus has boon brought 
about.., It is no longer possible to argue convincingly 
that. the interest-elasticity of the demand for money is on 
the one hand, so largo as to make monetary policy completely 
impotent, or on the other hand so small that it is necessary 
and sufficient to concentrate entirely on the direct relation- 
ship between movements in the money stock and in money 
incomes, 
. while, ignoring intor-relationships in the 
* See Goodhart (62). for an example. 
**. See Feig© (42) 
*** We note that our analysis of the empirical evidonco on the demand for money draws heavily on this study. 
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financial system. Instead, one can safely argue that there 
is some significant interest-elasticity in the demand for 
money relationship, and that the appropriate interest rate 
to be included in this relationship is the short-term rate 
of interest, although the evidence is not quite unanimous 
on the superiority of the short-term rate over the long- 
term rate. This conclusion, than, supports a demand for 
money function of the type: 
'tt _ PID(rst, Yt), where rst = some short-term rate of 
interest, 
DD 
with 
rlt>o 
and 
ar 
t <o; writing this function in linear 
`; Yt arst 
form we have: 
(i) DID =ao+ a1Yt + a2rst + ift 
D* 
where Mt = desired (or equilibrium) money balances, and 
i, rt error term. 
We noteýthat"current income is used in this equation 
than permanent income or wealth. This is justified on the 
grounds that although in a long-run context one of these 
latter variables is probably more useful, in short-run 
models there is some evidence that current income dominates 
either permanent income or wealth in explaining the demand 
for money. * 
Following Feige (1i2), we assume that an individual, given 
his expected yield on wealth and the rate of interest, chooses 
a long-run desired level of cash balances (1-1t ). A particular 
cash-balance position(ND) involves certain costs which can 
be broken doz-m into two components: (a) the cost of being 
out of long-run equilibrium, and (b) the direct costs of 
portfolio change. The cost of being out of equilibrium is 
assumed to depend, upon the gap between the individual's current 
cash position and his long-run desired position. If his 
current cash position exceeds his long-run desired position, 
* See Chow (22,, Table 2, p. 122). 
G 
the individual suffers the cost of foregone incomo. 
Alternatively, if his current position falls short of his 
long-run desired position, he suffers the costs of increased 
risk: and inconvenience. Wo can represent this cost by the 
expression, 
ý1 = a(AIt - rig ) Z. 
The second kind of cost incurred represents the brolcerage 
charges and other transaction costs associated with changes 
in the portfolio, and these costs are assumed to depend 
upon the-change in the current cash position. Thus, 
2 
c2 =b (1It - 11 t-1) " 
The total cost function, then, can be written as: 
c= cl + c2 = a(MD - Mt )` + b(Ilt - PIý-` t 
The problem, now is to choose that cash position (M ), which, 
D* t 
given the lonS-run desired position U lt and the previous 
cash position (N 
-1) 
minimises total cost. Differentiating 
c with respect to Mt and setting this derivative equal to 
zero we. have : 
Da D* bD ýIt = a+b 
ýTt + 
a+b 
2Lt-1 
and if we lot 
-Co aab' 
then, 
D= 
cö 1D* + (1-c 
o) 
lift-1 
or, 
* ý= Mt-1 + co (mD - rýD-1 
Adding a', disturbance term we have: 
(ii) r2t = rit_ + co (1+1D*. r, 
D )+v 
1t t_1 
This last equation relates current effective demand for 
real cash balances to the long-run desired stock. In its 
final forni, it simply means that any discrepancy between Dt 
and 11D* is not made up instantaneously but only is fraction, 
and initial co, of the-difference between the desired level lit* 
level Pit-1. 
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Coi. ibinin- equation (3. ) and (ii) the got : 
(iii) iID coax + coa1Yý + coa2rst + (1-cp )IiD-1 + ut 
where ut = coITt + vt, a composite error term. 
Equation (iii) is written as: 
(iv) 11D =d+dY+ der + d,. ND +u t t01t st 3t -I 
where, da = coax, d1 = co a1, d2 = coat, and d3 (1-co). 
j. lb The Supply of Money: 
Wo now turn from the demand for money to the supply 
of money which is amajor feature of this study. The 
problem of the formulation of the U. K. money supply is a 
very important one. For one thing, since the intention of 
the "Competition and Credit Control" now system of monetary 
techniques in the U. K. is to move away from control of bank 
lending, which was of major concern in the 19601s, to 
control of one of 'the broader money aggregates' such as 
the money supply, it follows that the precise process of 
the money supply determination becomes very crucial. For 
another, over the last twenty years or so the analysis of 
the U. K. money supply determination has been both neglected 
and confused. Neglected because of the belief that since 
the introduction of a fle:: ible monetary policy in 1951, 
the price of government debt rather than the money supply 
has been the instrument of monetary policy; and confused 
because among those who have-dealt with the problem of the 
determination of the U. K. money supply, there has been 
continuous disagreement as to whether the liquid assets 
ratio or the cash asset ratio has boon the main determining 
factor (see for example, 23,279 33 and 101). 
In a general sense, the usual analysis of the determina- 
tion of the money stock is firmly based on a mechanical 
relationship. The rationale behind it may be put forward 
as follows-: 
8t. ß. 
The money stock (M) is defined as currency hold by the 
public (Cr) plus the total of bank deposits (D). It is, 
therefore, possible to write the following identity: 
(i. ) rI = Cp +D 
which must hold exactly by definition. Similarly it is 
possible to define the stun of currency hold by the general 
public, and the cash reserves of the banking sector (R) as 
'High powered money' or simply 'nmonetary base' (B). Wo 
thus have an additional identity: 
(ii) II Cp 
It is also postulated that the public desire to hold 
currency as a constant proportion of the total money stock, 
so that 
(iii) cP = C11 
vthera Cp is desired currency holdings and c is the desired 
currency to total money ratio; N, of course, stands for the 
total money supply. 
Furthermore, the total of bank reserves is a constant 
proportion of the total of deposits, so that: 
(iv) R= rD 
where 'r is the cash reserve ratio. 
Substituting (iii) into (ii) and solving for R wo have: 
(v) ß 13 - cri 
Next, substituting (v) into (iv) tie have: 
B- cN = rD or 
(vi) D_ß- clýi 
r 
Substituting (vi) and (iii) into (i) ire get: 
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2I cMI +B c1l or r 
ri"I = rcrl +ß- cNI or 
11(c +r -rc) =B or 
(vii) rI = cý. rý1-c 
13 
The fraction by which the monetary base is being multiplied 
in equation (vii) is usually referred to as the monetary 
multiplier and denoted by the symbol m. Thus tre have: 
(viii) If = m. 13. 
According to this explanation, then, the money supply 
depends on only three things: (1) the public's currency 
ratio, (2) the banks' cash ratio, and (3) the monetary base. 
By assuming that the two ratios are constant, changes in 
the money supply depend only on changes in the monetary 
base. If, then, the monetary base is under the control of 
the monetary authorities, then the authorities have control 
over the money supply, making it exogenously determined, if 
they want to. 
This' explanation' of the money supply determination, 
therefore, depends'crucially on a mechanical relationship 
sununarised in the form' of an identity (viii), which, it 
must be stressed, does not in any sense provide a behavioural 
theory*of the money stock determination. * Not only does it 
not provide 'such a 'theory, ` but it also suffers from a serious 
weakness, in that the use of the above mentioned identity to 
show the definitional relationship that must hold between 
assets'as tho'basis for analysis, tends to obscure the key 
role played by' relative price (yield) chann; os in the adjust- 
We Je note that' one does-'come-across in the literature of 
studies, that regress changes 
, 
in the money supply on 
changes in, ' IIigh powered money', the banLs' reserve- deposit ratio, and the. public's currency-deposit ratio, 
and interpret the resulting statistically successful 
fit as providing enough evidence in favour of the 
money multiplier theory (31,31, for example). 
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merit process. The latter, as it must be obvious from the 
analysis of the money multiplier, is supposed to be a purely 
mechanical process whore the relative yield movements are 
completely ignored (59). Thijs weakness is aggravated by a 
general failure to c:,, amine the factors determining the level 
of, and changes in, the monetary- base. IIigh powered money 
is assumed to be passed from hand to hand, and the portfolio 
adjustments of the banks play no role o: copt in no far as they 
may seek to alter their reserve ratios. The public's asset 
preferences arc also assumed to be irrelevant o:: cept in so 
far as they sock to alter their cash-deposit (or money stock) 
ratios. Such treatment is indeed a very incomplete way of 
describing the process of the determination of money stock. 
To be sure with the argument, though there are some studies* 
-which have taken into consideration the effect of relative 
price (yi'eld) movements on the desired values of reserve- 
deposit ratio, and currency-deposit (or money stock) ratio, 
but there still'scemssto be no study which treats the level 
of the monotary base as ondo; enous (title the e. '-ception of 
gig). - The usual, treatment of the monetary base is to take it 
as given, fixed by the monetary authorities, thus being 
completely-ýe:: ogonous, wand no further attempt is made to 
c amine the behavioural factors that can influence it. The 
study by Goodliart (59) provides a number of arguments against 
this: common practice and goes on to develop a model which 
treats'tho monetary base, and the money supply as endogenous. 
The-analysis by -Goodhartis in-line with a theory that might 
be labelled "The Portfolio Theory of Monetary Policy" 
developed in recent years, and has come to be widely accepted 
in the economics profession. Within this approach - whose 
architect is=J. Tobin; and, the Yale School, see for o:: ample 
118 - monetary theory is considered to be part of the 
broader theory of asset choice and portfolio management of 
economic units. - A_monetary disturbance such as an injection 
* -See for e.: ar7Plc:,,,, Brunner, K. and Metzler, A: "Some Further Investigations of Demand and Supply Functions for Monoy" Journal of Finance (1964). 
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of base money into the economic system is viewed as changing 
the existing; conditions under which wwoalthholdors are trilling 
to hold current assets. A policy-inducbd change in the 
amount of the existing 'stock of any one asset - such as the 
amount of reserves that banks hold - lead to a behavioural 
reaction on the part of economic units as they attempt to 
readjust their stocks of both real and financial assets to 
the amounts desired under those now conditions. The attempt 
by individual oconor1ic units - households, commercial banks, 
II onbenk financial institutions, other business firms, and 
government units - to reallocate their nonhuman wealth to 
a different set of assets appears in the real sector via 
a change in 'the quantity demanded of real assets - such as 
capital goods'and. consumer'goods - and thus affects real 
output and. prices. 
Ono of the consequences of this approach has been to viot'r 
the money stock as'being determined both on the supply and 
demand sides by the behavioural actions of economic units. 
Money is considered as only one of many assets that economic 
units hold. Via money stock is no longer considered to be 
completely e.: ogenously determined, but is viez"red as a quantity 
whose magnitude is partly determined by the policy actions of 
the central'- bank' and partly endogenously determined within 
the economic system by rational portfolio decisions of the 
commercial banks and the public. The determination of the 
money stock, therefore, involves a process of general 
portfolio adjustment in response to relative interest rate 
changes, 
_with 
the time path of the process depending on the 
various speeds of adjustment of the sectors to relative 
price changes. It is simply not true within the context of 
this approach that the only. way in which the banks and the 
public affect the process of the determination of the money 
stock is when they alter their reserve ratio and their 
cash-deposit (or money stock) ratio respectively. The 
process is not mechanical and as J. Tobin (118, p. 9) strongly 
argues: "There is more to the determination of - the volume 
of bank deposits than the arithmetic of reserve supplies 
and 'reserve ratios. The redundant reserves of the thirties 
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are. 1 dramatic reminder that economic opportunities ooinotimo3 
Prevail over reserve calculations. The si, (, -nific. inco of that 
e: cperience is not correctly appreciatod. if it is rc ardod 
simply as an aberration from a normal statu of affairs in 
which banks-are fully loaned ups and total deposits arc 
tightly linked to the volume of deserves. The thirties 
exemplify in e:. tremo form z phenomenon which is always in 
some degree present. The use to which the commercial banks 
put the reserves available to the system is an economic 
variable depending on, lending opportunities and interest 
rates". 
The central theme of this ? now' view iiay be illustrated 
with the aid of two simple diagrams, in which the e:: trerie 
version of the 'traditional' view is contrasted with the 
'new' view. In figure 17, the traditional view is presented 
in four stages. In 'Stao at wo plot different possible 
F 
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'Stage b' r . zage C' 
values of the rate of interest (i), say the Keynesian long- 
term rate, and the banks' cash reserve ratio (r). Now, 
the relationship between r and i is depicted with a vertical 
line, expressing the view that r is not affected by the rate 
of interest. In 'Stage b' we plot different possible values 
for m- monetary multiplier - and r; the relationship 
is 
inverse as one can easily deduce from equation (vii). 'Stage 
c' provides the relationship between m and 11 - money supply - 
which is of course positive - again from equation 
(vii), we 
can clearly see that with a given monetary base, greater 
values of m will give greater values for rI -. The position 
of 11 - curve will of course depend upon the size of the 
monetary base; an increase in the monetary base will mean 
a greater N for. given m and the 11 - curve will shift to the 
right. Finally, 'Stage d' shows the relationship between 
the rate of interest and the money supply. As the rate of 
interest has no effect on the size of the banks' cash reserve 
ratio it will have no effect on the values of the monetary 
multiplier and no effect on the total money supply. This 
lack of relationship between the rate of interest and the 
money is shorn in 'Stage d' as a vertical straight line 
emanating from the horizontal axis at a point along that 
axis determined by the size of the monetary multiplier and 
the monetary base. Whatever the rate of interest the 
money may be-regarded-as being perfectly elastic until it 
reaches the limit determined by the monetary multiplier and 
the monetary base. Suppose for example that the rate of 
interest is i1,, then the money supply curve would be ABC. 
According to the extreme form of the traditional view, 
the money supply will always be at the absolute limit set 
by the banlcs' cash reserve ratio and the monetary base. If 
the authorities expand the monetary base then this will shift 
the AI-curve in 'Stage c' and 'Stage d' to the right, and 
increase the, money supply. 
The now view is presented in figure 1aß again in four 
stages. 'Stage a' shows the relationship between the rate 
of interest and the banks' cash reserve ratio, which is now 
inverse reflecting the new view's assumption that the higher 
90 
the i, the lower the r for the higher the i is the higher 
the opportunity cost of reserves. The section of the curve 
that, slopes doi-miwrards . 
from loft to right; shows that as the 
rate. of interest rises to i1 the banks depress their 
reserve ratio. Holwrever, whoa the interest rate reaches 
i1 the, 
-banks are unprepared or utiablo to depress their 
reserve ratio any further. This may be because there is a 
legal minimum or a minimum which past c porionco has shown 
to, be the appropriate level. Both 'Stag ,a b' and 'Stage c' 
Iiii. 18 
'Stage d' 'Stage a' 
i D1 
C 
1 
-ý 
. L,, 
A- 
----.,... r. _. _------ i- - ... _ _ -.. _.. B 
ýý. I 
ýrs2 Nl Io1 r2 
II/(I 
. ý. _. .... ,....... _ mit 
i i. 
0 
4 
'Static c 'Stago b' 
r 
'm 
r 
91. 
are the same as in figure 17. 'Stage d' is derived as 
follows: starting in 'Stage a' and reading down to 'Stage 
b' we sea that at rates of interest of i1 and above, the 
banks' reserve ratio is r1. This gives a monetary multi- 
plier of ml. Reading across to 'Stage c' Wo Soo that with 
a monetary multiplier of m1 and a given monetary base the 
money supply is It,, In 'Stage d' then, at rates of interest 
of il and above, the money supply curve is vertical at 
1.11" 
Going back to 'Stage a' and 'Stage b' we can see that at a 
rate of interest i2 the value of the banks' cash reserve 
ratio is r4, which gives a. value for the monetary multiplier, 
of m2. From 'Stage c' we see that given the monetary base 
the potential money supply is 1,12. Doing the same exercise 
for all possible interest rates and cash reserve ratios wo 
trace the supply of money curve ABC - as opposed to A'13C - 
in 'Stage d'. The money-supply relationship is not a 
mechanical one anymore, and it does not ignore the impact 
of the rate of -interest on the supply of money. So far wo 
have been concerned with the supply of money relationship, 
but in the now view demand considerations are of equal 
importance. The demand for bank deposits is considered to 
be related to the rate of interest; to what extent the 
public is prepared to sell securities, say, in. rcturn for 
banks deposits, i. e. to what extent the demand for deposits 
can expand, should, surely, depend on the prevailing rate 
of interest. For example, the lower the rate of interest 
on. government securities the more willing the non-bank public 
will be to sell. securities to the banks in return for bank' 
deposits. Thus it seems likely that the demand for bank 
deposits will be directly and negatively related to the rate 
of interest. The position of the demand curve at any given 
rate of interest will depend upon a number of other factors. 
One of the most important factors, which is particularly 
stressed by the new view, is the importance of competition 
from other non-bank financial intermediaries. In fact the 
new view places a great deal of emphasis on the similarity 
- 
between banks and non-bank financial intermediaries and on 
. the resulting competition that prevails between them 
both 
as issuers of indirect securities and purchasers of 
primary securities: It is argued that the 
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existence and growth of the non-bank financial intermediaries 
implies the creation of liabilities highly substitutable for 
the liabilities of the banks, thus influencing the position 
of the demand for bank deposits relationship It is also 
recognised that the position of this relationship does depend 
upon the economic climate. Given the rate of interest, the 
demand for bank deposits is expected to increase during a 
period of general prosperity; this is the result of the 
business sector being keen to expand and the consumers 
sector being keen to spend in anticipation of rising incomes 
thus stimulating the demand for bank loans. Similarly, given 
the rate of interest a reduction in the demand for bank 
deposits is expected to occur during a period of general 
depression. In ''Stage d' two possible positions of the 
demand curve for bank deposits are postulated. In the case 
where the curve is in the position D1 the money supply will 
be 111 at the absolute limit.. detormined by the banks' minimum 
reserve ratio and the size of the monetary base. This is 
obviously a situation where the banks are fully loaned up. 
When,, the position of the demand curve is D2 the supply of 
money will be 112 implying excess reserves for the banks 
since they will be operating with a cash reserve ratio 
higher than the minimum necessary. Expansion of the money 
supply beyond Ale would require the banks to be able to persuade 
the public to exchange loans and securities for bank deposits. 
This could only be achieved if the banks were prepared to 
lower the rate of interest charged on the loans they provide 
to the private sector and increase the price, i. e. lower 
the interest rate, they would have to pay on securities. 
But whether the bankince" sector would be prepared to do all 
these is questionable, for according to Tobin (118, pp. 6-7): 
"The marginal returns from lending and investing, account 
* For a detailed analysis of this proposition see Tobin, J. 
and Frainand, N. "Financial Intermediaries and the Effectiveness of Monetary Controls", American Economic 
Review, Nay 1963. 
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tal. en of the risks and administrative costs involved, will 
not exceed the marginal cost of the banks of attracting and 
holding additional deposits" thus making it unprofitable 
for the bani: ing sector to undertake such an expansion of 
the money supply. 
The main conclusion, then, of the now view which lo, 
inevitably follows from the böve analysis, is that "the 
quantity of money as conventionally defined is not an 
autonomous variable controlled by governmental authority 
but an endogenous or inside quantity reflecting the economic 
behaviour of banks and other private economic units", * so 
that a complete theory of the money supply must start from 
the point that "Marshall's scissors of supply and demand 
apply to the output of the banking industry no loss than to 
other financial and non-financial industries". ** 
The empirical evidence on the money supply. - practically 
nonexistent in the U. K., but not as thick, as one might 
expect, in the U. S. A. - has not, on the whole, been very 
impressive, especially when one compares it with the 
enormous'number of published studies on the demand for 
money. One very interesting aspect of the money supply 
theory, from an empirical point of view, is the interest- 
elasticity of the money supply relationship. Any policy 
q action of the monetary authorities to achieve a desired 
growth in the money stock affects both reserve aggregates 
and interest rates; changes in interest rates, in turn, 
influence the portfolio decisions of banks and of the public, 
which in its turn can be a complicating factor in the 
achievement of a desired money stock. Thus. the higher the 
numerical value of the. interest-elasticity of the monoy 
supmly function the. moro difficult it may be to implement 
moneta;: y c9ntrol through the control of reserve aggregates; 
the lower the interest-elasticity of the money supply 
function,, then the osier it becomes for such a control. 
* See'J. Tobin (118), p. 8. 
**': See J. Tobin (118) , p. 11. 
911. 
For example, suppose that the Dank of England via open market 
operations try to reduce the volume of reserves available to 
the banking system; the Dank, in that case, would have to 
sell government securities, thus causing short-term interest 
rates to go up. If the amount of reserve-assets is very 
sensitive to changes in interest, rates, then this interest 
rate movement would induce the banking sector to hold larger, 
quantities of reserve-assets. This portfolio shift, than, 
frustrates the policy to decrease the money stock. To be 
sure with the argument, however, 'this does not mean that 
monetary control is absolutely impossible. The stronger 
the interest rate feedback, the larger the necessary magni- 
tude of the open market operation required to achieve a given 
change in the money stock and the larger the associated 
variance in short-term interest rates; the monetary 
authorities, however, may not be prepared to allow these 
required changes as the case has been in the U. K. for most of the 
post World-War II era. The empricial investigations-under- 
taken on the elasticity of the money supply function indicate 
that the interest sensitivity of this function is extremely 
low. This evidence, however, steins from studies undertaken 
in the U. S. A.; we know of no study that deals directly with 
this problem in the case of the U. K. monetary sector. The 
available evidence in the U. S. A. has been extensively 
reviewed by, Rasche; * it seems from this review that the 
long-run elasticity is less than 0.5 while the impact 
elasticity (one quarter) is no greater than 0.10-to 0.15. 
The evidence, therefore, suggests that in the U. S. A. the 
policy-makers should have little difficulty in their actions 
to control the money stock. There is of course another crucial 
problem here, that of the random fluctuations in the money 
supply relationship which can be a major factor in the-size 
of deviations of the money stock from its target-value. 
* See Rasche, R. II. "A Review of Empirical Studies of the Money Supply Mechanism", Federal Reserve Dank of St. Louis July, 1972. 
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In the U. K. Crouch (34) has tasted the trnditional money 
supply equation, 
11 =m. D 
as well as two models of the U. K. monetary sector in a later 
study (35), one involving total bank deposits and the other 
involving demand deposits only. In both studios the results 
suggest a money supply curve that in perfectly inelastic with 
respect to the rate of interest, thus supporting the 
! traditional view' as it is explained above in figure 17. 
A Money Supply Theory: 
We, now, develop a Honey Supply Theory; the resulting 
equation is empirically investigated within the conte: ct of 
a macro-economic model in the next chapter. 
We begin by defining the money stock as: 
(1) i is = Cp +D 
where Cp is the amount of currency held by the public, and 
D is the total amount of deposits. The Cp part of the money 
stock is a very small proportion of the total money supply, 
around 20? 5, the rest 8073 constitutes of deposits. We 
investigate first the deposits component of the 1is and then 
the-Cp component. 
We start by looking at some identities: 
(2) AwL 
where A= assets and L= liabilities; equation (2) simply 
states the fact that in the banks' balance shoots, assets 
are always equal to liabilities. 
(3) AýQ+P 
where Q, = claims on the government and P= claims on the 
private sector. 
(4) L2D+K 
0 
where Ko = capital which is completely e-ogonous. 
It than follows that: 
(5) 
'Q+ I' D+ I{ 0 
9G. 
Lot us now c;: amine Q and P more closely. 
(6) Q= it + TI3 + 13 ý+ 
11 L+ 
(cN )1 
where 
R= reserves i. e. cash in hand plus deposits with the 
Bank of England. 
TB = treasury bills plus local authority bills. 
Ds short-term bonds and short-turm local authority 
bonds, eligible to be included in the 12.1/230 reserve asset 
ratio. 
ßL = long-term bonds plus local authority long bonds. 
(CII)1 = money at call and short-notice with the discount 
market, backed by government bonds and treasury bills thus: 
(cMI)1 = a(cM). 
We may no'w develop the following assumptions for the 
R. H. S. variables: 
(Ga) R=\D or 
X=R 
D 
The ratio 
A is called the desired reserve/deposit ratio. 
One may suggest that for given values of interest rates and 
level of economic activity as measured by the level of 
national income, banks desire to hold R and D in relatively 
fixed proportions. If then R and D are held in fired 
proportions it follows that the ratio of R to D is a constant 
i. e. A is aconstant. According to Crouch (311), British 
banks never hold reserves over and above what they are 
required to hold. Their reserve ratio. therefore is always 
kept at its minimum even when interest rates arc very low. 
The probable reason for this is that the banks' liquid 
assets are virtually riskless and transactions costs of 
moving into and out of those assets are o:; tremoly low. This 
means that even when the yield on these assets is very small 
it will still outweigh the costs of acquiring them, and 
pay the banks to keep their reserve ratio at its minimum. 
V. Argy (4) argues that the bank reserve ratio has normally 
t1170 one element, the legal reserve ratio which 
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is made up of the special deposit ratio, determined by the 
authorities; the other the excess reserve ratio; which is 
determinod by_the behaviour of the bankjng system, is 
conventionally sot at 0.03. In fact, the banks have 
adhered closely to the 8 per cent cash convention, which 
means that this element of the oxcoss reserve ratio for all 
practical purposes may be treated as a constant. For tho 
whole banking system, however, there seems to be some 
variability in the cash reserve ratio (see for example 100). 
The % ratio becomes very important under the new 
arrangements for previously the banks did in fact hold a 
fi; ce_da zvhoreas now this is questionable. It is arguable 
that the historical relative stability of the banlcs' cash 
ratio was only sustainable because the banks were confident 
that they could always trade or obtain cash, directly or 
indirectly, at fairly stable market rates or at rates 
bearing a systematic relationship to Bank rate, which itself 
remained stable'over long periods. Now one of the implica- 
tions of varying the cash base to control the money stock 
is a willingness on the part of the authorities to permit 
greater variability in interest rates, especially short-term 
rates. The question then becomes 'Would greater variability 
of interest rates cause the banks to adopt a more variable 
cash ratio? In particular would the ratio % be a variable 
and not a constant, and if the answer is positive, what are 
the most important, determinants of 
A? The studies by 
Anderson-Burger (1), Neigs* and Morrison** - all those studies 
use U. S. A. data - have shown that % varies inversely with 
interest rates which seems to be quite reasonable for it 
becomes more profitable at the margin 'for *the banks to hold 
as low as possible R as rates rise: As interest rates fall, 
it pays at the margin to hold more It because the diminished 
return earned on those pounds, if left invested, is insuffi- 
* See Rloigs, A. J.: Free Reserves and t1le Money Supply 
** See Morrison, G.: Liquidity Preference of Commercial Danks. 
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cient to cover the risks connected with investment. It thus 
follows that: 
= (r) with jA. / o, 
so that 
R (r). D 
We do fool, however, that even under the new arrnngemonts 
for monetary control in the U. K., the constancy of 
N 
will be 
preserved. The reason, surely, must be the opportunities 
provided by the organisation and functioning of the London 
Money Narl: ot. This market provides so many investment 
opportunities to banks in terms of short-tern riskloss 
assets - money at call and short notice is probably the best 
e:: ample - that the variability of interest rates implied by 
the new measures of monetary control will not induce the 
banks to hold eNcess reserves. We are, therefore, able, to 
write the R-function. as: 
(Ga) R=. *D 
Next, we write the Tß-function as: 
(Gb) Tß = (tb) 0+tIrb 
where rb = the treasury bill rate. This assumption tells us 
that there is a fisted amount of TDs the banks would like to 
hold in their portfolios to satisfy their reserve-asset ratio, 
and also a Systematic part which depends on the going 
treasury bill rate. * 
(Gc) ßa = (bs)o + bars 
where rs = the short-term bond rate. The rationale of a 
equation (Gc) is exactly the same as that of (6b). 
(6d) DL = (bL)o + b2rL 
where rL = the long- term bond rate. The (bL)o part of this 
TB includes local authority bills also; these bills arc 
of course eligible to be included in the 12.1/2'ö reserve 
ratio. In this case r is an indes: of both the treasury bill rate and the loQ authority bill rate. 
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equation is Justified by the fnct that banks would always 
hold a certain amount of bonds without paying much attention 
at the Soing rL, to satisfy their diversified portfolios. 
The systematic part depends obviously on the profitability 
of bonds. 
Tlio (CM)1 - function is postulated in a similar fashion 
as the function for TDs: 
(60) (cIi)1 _ (cm)0 +d1rc 
where rc = the call money rate. The Justification of ((', e) 
runs orlon , the lines of the arCwuent of equations (GU) and 
(6c). 
Wog now, turn our nttontion to the P-component: 
(7) P CD + OL + AD + (CPI)2 , 
where, 
CB = commorcial bil1B, 
OL = other liquid assets, o. g. money at call with other 
financial institutions besides the discount houses, 
AD = advances, 
(Cii)2 = (1-a). CPI = money at call with the discount 
market backed by private sector claims. 
Again wo may develop the following assumptions for the 
R. TI. S. : 
(7a) C13 = (cb)o + h, r0 
where re = commercial bill rate. 
(7b) OL = (0'1) 0+1 1ro1 
whore rol = rate of interest on OL. 
The justification of equations (7a) and (71)) is the same 
with the one proposed for equation (GU). 
(7c) AD = (ad)o + nIrad + n2Y 
whore rad = interest rate on advances, and Y= national 
income. This equation may be justified as follows: the level 
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of advances would probably dopend on the liquidity of the 
banks and on the rate of interest on advances* rd ia9 
therefore, included in this equation as . tieroll as 
Y Which wo 
use as a good indicator for the liquidity of the banking 
sector. , 
The (002-function is specified in a similar tray as the 
(C101-function: 
(7d) (CM)ü ý (cm)ý + d2rc 
Finally, the following relationship should always hold: 
(bs)o + (tb)0 + (cm)o + (cm)' + (cb)o + (ol)o = 0.125. b 
i. e. the 12.1/2", o reserve ratio. 
Making use of 59 6, Ga, Gb, 6c, Gd, Go, 7,7u, 7b, 7c and 
7d, ure leave : 
X. D + (tb)o + blrb + (bs)0 +b1rs+ (bL)0 + bfrL + (cm) + 
1o 
+ d1rc + (cb)o + h1rc + (ol)o +1 lrol + 
(ad)o + nlrad + 
+ n., Y + (cm)' + d2rc =D+ Ko 
or, 
1- i1 "D = f(r, Y, B) 
i. e. wo have taken r as representing an indes: of interest 
rates, and B as the sum of all constants, which wo approxi- 
mate with the monetary base of the system; we have also 
written the function in an implicit form. It, thong follows 
that 
(8) D` f( Y ß) 
17o may, now, use (1) and (£3) to get: 
(9)' 1,, 'S _C+ 
f(r, Y II) 
P 1-N - 
and denotinG 1-X with k i. e. a constarit, wo liavo oquation (9): 
(9) l4n =c+ 
F_(r. ', II) 
p It 
The question, now, is whether wo can nay anything about 
101. 
C. It has boon su, (, -, gostod by Gibson and Thom* that for 
ivon values of intorest rat os and the lovol of economic 
activity, the public dosiros to hold money in rolativoly 
fixod proportions as between Cn and AI'. If then Cp and i, Is 
are domandod in fixed proportions it follows that the ratio 
Cp to 113 is a constant. Wo call. this ratio the desired 
currency ratio and donoto it as c, so that: 
C 
(10) c= -R = constant. 
III s 
The constancy of c, however, is based on the assumption of 
given values, of intopest rates and the level of income. If 
then income and interest rates arc not constant, one would 
probably expect c to be'a variable. Although there is not as 
yet conclusive evidence to suggest what factors are the most 
important determinants of this ratio, studies by Cagan**and 
Kaufman*** in the U. S. A. have shown that this ratio is 
inversely related to national income. The justification is 
that as income increases people demand more money, but they 
decrease the proportion of Cp relative to 11s because the 
increase in income is c:: pected to lead to relatively more 
transactions requiring payment by cheque than payment in 
currency. Similar studies using U. K. data tend to support 
this argument. R. L. Crouch in his study of the U. It. 
monetary contraction of, 1951-1956 (35), argues that the 
increase in the monetary base in that period would, ceteris 
paribus, have led to a 6.1/21,7ö c , pansion in the money supply. 
However, -the currency ratio changed to such an o:: tent that 
the money supply decreased by Crouch also argues 
that changes in the currency ratio have dominated changes 
in the money supply on several other occasions. In 194G- 
1947, for e. -: ample, the fall in the ratio more than offset 
* See Gibson, N. J. And Thom, D. R.: "Can the Money Stock 
be Controlled? ", The Rankers' Nagazine, November 1971. 
** See Cagan, P.: The Demand for Currency Relative to 
Total Ploney Supply. 
*** See Kaufrun, G. G.: The Demand for`Currency. 
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a fall in the monetary base and the money supply increased. 
Again, in 1951-1952 an increase in the ratio offset an 
increase in the monetary base and the money supply stopped 
rising. Crouch's conclusion is that the authorities tend 
to ignore t ho c ratio "at their perl. ". N. J. Gibson (58) 
comparing series of the ratio of. currency to time deposits 
with the interest on time deposits concludes that there 
does not appear to exist a systematic tendency to substitutes 
time deposits for currency as interest rates on the forrier 
rise. R. L. Crouch in a study of the, ü. 1.. monotary sector 
(34) estimated an equation for C, in which current and past 
levels Income e the explanatory variables. The main 
conclusion of these studies appears to be that currency is 
primarily related to an income variable than to an interest 
rate variable. 
In view of the above analysis and results wo may havo: 
(11) c= c(Y) with 
dc <O. 
It follows that (9) can now bo written as: 
11 s= c(Y). 115 +f 
(r, 
It 
Y, B) 
or, 
als _ 
f(r Y, B) 
- lc[1-c Y 
This last e,: pression for the 1.1 S- function can i3o written 121 
an c elicit form as follows: 
(12) N= M5(r, Y. D). 
This function states that a rise in income, other things 
being equal, will tend to increase the money supply as a 
result of the ratio Cp/M5 falling, and also as a result of 
the banks o:: panding their advances to the private sector; 
and the money supply decreases as the, level of income is 
squoe: ed. It also states that as the monetary base and the 
rate of interest go up banks increase their holding of earning 
assets Which is e:; pansionary as far as the money supply is 
concerned; and contractionary as the monetary base and the 
rate of interest go down. This last result follows directly 
from-our analysis of the determination of the money stock 
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discussed above acid needs no further o:: Planation. 
Sie fool, 
however, that some more detailed explanation should be 
provided on the proposition that aNs/NY>0. When income 
expands, ceteris paribus, the money supply Will increase. 
The increase in the level of income is accompanied with 
expansion of investment, and the, cxpansion in investment 
activity will require additional credit from the banks, 
which presumably will be provided mainly because of the 
upward pressure on interest rates and therefore the 
increased profitability of advances. The expansion of' 
income which goes along with expansion of investment 
(through the operation of the multiplier) will lead to an 
increased desire to hold money for use in transactions. 
Thus there is not only an initial temporary demand on the 
banks in order to finance the additional investment, but 
also a lasting increase in the stock of money to facilitate 
the lcItger flow of payments associated with a higher 
national income. 
At the same time there might be an opposite tendency. 
Higher incomes will lead to higher imports. Exports will 
tend to decline as more resources are absorbed internally. 
If the balance of payments was just in equilibrium before 
the expansion phase started, it will now show a deficit. 
The public will buy more foreign exchange. from banks than 
it sells to the banks, and, in the process, will reduce its 
holdings of money by an amount equal to the not reduction 
in the country's foreign exchange holdings. As the reserves 
of'the banking system decline, and the central bank takes 
no steps to offset this decline, the banking 'system Will 
Wish to have less money outstanding. This decrease, however, 
would tend to be contained through increased capital move- 
ments which arc induced by the higher rate of interest 
associated with the expansion in the level of income. On 
the whole', therefore, changes in the level of income Will 
be associated with changes in the money supply in the same 
direction. 
Equati, on(-12)w therefore, reduces the determination of 
the money supply to factors which are under the control of 
-i o4. 
the Central }3ank. i namely ß, and factors which arc 
determined 
by market forces, namely r and Y. The thrust of this -1,111010, 
analysis, than, is that the money supply is determined 
jointly by the behaviour 
__of 
the monetary authorities, the 
commercial banking system, and the nonbank public. One 
may ask whether one group can dominate over the size of 
the money supply. In other words, does the Central Dank 
dominate any movement in the money supply, or is it that the 
money supply is purely determined by the public or commercial 
banks? There are two views on this question: (a) the, 
traditional monetary view, and (b) the new view or as 
indicated above "The Portfolio Theory of Monetary Policy". 
The traditional monetary view holds that the behaviour of 
the central monetary authorities dominates the behaviour of 
the public and commercial banks in its effect on the money 
supply. According to this view, then, B in equation 
(1w) is 
a much more important determinant of the money supply than 
r and Y; in other words, the money supply boars a very close, 
consistent, and predictable relation to variables under the 
Central Bank's control. Income and interest rates do not play 
an important role in the money supply function. Thus, the 
money supply is partly an endogenous variable determined by 
market forces but it is mostly an e:, zogenous variable deter- 
mined by the policy of the central monetary authorities. * 
The 'new view' by contrast holds that the supply of 
money is primarily determined'by interest rates, the level 
of income and other market forces operating on the behaviour 
* Soo Phillips, C. A.: flank Credit, for an early e:: position 
of the traditional view. Tobin 113) is the architect of 
the 'new, view'; on the latter see also Gramley, L. F. 
and Chase, S. B. Jr.: "Time Deposits in Monetary 
Analysis" Federal Reserve Bulletin, October, 1965. 
Brunner, K. in "The Role of Money and Monetary Policy" 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, July 1968 
attacks the 'new view' and defends the traditional view. 
Moore, D. J.: An Introduction to the Theory of Finance, 
demonstrates that there is essentially no inconsistency 
between the two views (see ch. 6 especially). 
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of the public in allocating its money holdings botwoon 
currency and deposits and on the behaviour of the commercial 
banks in allocating their assets between non-interest- 
boaring reserves and intorost-boaring loans and securities. 
It follows, then, that if this view holds than in equation 
(12)r and Y are such important determinants of the money 
supply that there is no close, consistent, and predictable 
relation between the size of the money supply and the size 
of the variables subject to central bank control. The 
money supply is therefore, an endogenous variable determined 
by market forces. 
Nc:: t, vro tfrito equation (12) in linear forrm : 
(13) I, It = 00 +e 1Y + e2r + o, 
I; t + IT1 
there IIt desired money supply. Any difference between 
desired and actual money stock is not made up instantaneously, 
but it is assumed that only a fraction 11o of the difference 
is adjusted in any period. Thus wo got equation (111) 
(11ý) lit - I'It-1 = h0 (PIt - PIt-1) +V 
This approach is similar to the one c. cpounded on the demand 
for money. Changes in money stock induce a reallocation of 
assets (or liabilities) in the balance sheets of economic 
units which spills over to current output. Injections, say, 
of base-money modify the composition of financial assets and 
total wealth available to banks and other economic units., 
Absorption of the new base'money requires suitable alterations 
in asset yields or asset prices. The banks and the public are, 
thus induced to reshuffle their balance sheets to adjust 
desired and actual balance-sheet position; this adjustment, 
though, is not automatic and it is assumed that only a fraction 
110 adjusts in any period. * 
Next, wo combine equations (13) and (111) to vivo: 
* Sec the paper by Anderson and Burger (1) for a more detailed exposition of this argument. 
ioG. 
+ (1-ho )N 
_1 
+ vý 11 t= lio (oo +o 1Yt + oyrý + o3ßß +w) 
or, 
Pty hoop + 11 c yt + hoo2rt + lýoo3ßt + lýo1rt + (1-11 )1.1t-"1+ vt 
and finally: 
(15) ii: T. It = mo + m1Yt + ri rt + m3B + InlIN _1 
+ ut -tk 
where mo = hoed, m1 = h0e1, m4 = 110e2ý m3 = hoe,, mtk = (1-ho), 
and ut = liotvt + vt. 
This y of formulating, the money supply function is in 
complete contrast to the treatment received in the past, 
especially before the introduction of Competition and Credit 
Control in 1971. The normal practice, then, gras to treat 
the money supply as demand determined; the justification 
for such a treatment can be based on the behaviour of the 
monetary authorities in fixing gilt-edged prices. Although 
wo have analysed the argument in chapter 2, wo still feel 
wo must produce a short summary at this point: in a simple 
money-bond framework the setting of 'the' interest rate by 
the monetary authorities implies an infintoly elastic money 
supply function at that rate, and so long a r. the pe. ", is 
adjusted sufficiently from time to time, the data should 
reveal a demand function. It is the case, however, that the 
monetary authorities have not throughout adhered with uniform 
rigidity to a 'pegging' policy in the gilt-edged market; in 
particular, changes in dealing tactics were apparently under- 
tal; en from the and of 1963 onwards, culminating in what was 
intended to be a fairly major change of stance in 1971, in 
association with the introduction of Competition and Credit 
Control. Furthermore, not all variations in the money stock 
need come about from changes in demand; a shift from bonds 
to any other form of debt would, according to the pegging 
argument, involve an increase in the supply of money to 
support bond prices. But in this case, the increase in 
money supply would not have been called for by a prior increase 
in money demand and would, indeed, constitute an excess supply. 
The model also assumes that the adjustment of money demand. 
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occurs a. -, -elusively through the bond market, thus making no 
allowanco for the 'monotnrist' view that such an adjustment 
may also involve income adjustments in tho first round. 
Possibly of greater importance is the fact that because a 
rate is seen to be administered - in this case by the 
government broker - it does not follow that movements 
in 
that rate are independent of market forces. Indeed, 
it is 
possible that the adrsinistered rate may behave 'as if' 
it 
wore market-detormiiiod. Studies of the monetary authorities' 
'reaction function' - e. g. Fisher 
(ii) - indicate that the 
interest rate peg is raised in response to increase in 
income and' employment: much, the same kind of reaction as 
would be e: cpected of a market-determined rate with an 
e:: ogenous money supply. Thus, there may be n case for 
thinking that interest rates behave as if they were markot- 
determined. This, then allows us to postulate the following 
equation for the formation of the long-term rate of interest: 
(16) rLt =Fo+ ritt +fr ,t+ 
P3rLt»l + ut 
where, u., is the error term. The short-term rate (rs) 
influences the long rate (rL) through a stable structure. 
The rate of aggregato demand, as measured by the gross 
national product (Y), influences the demand for loanable 
funds and'thus the long-term rate. The lagged interest rate 
is included in order to capture any o:: pectations that may 
prevail; it may be, however, that the lagged interest rate 
arises as a result of"a partial adjustment hypothesis as in 
the case , of the money supply function. 
The inevitable conclusion fron the above discussion is. 
that the environment of the 1970's must be regarded as 
providing an inhospitable context for the view that 'money 
is demand-determined'; and, secondly, that there is sufficient 
room for doubt as to whether it is appropriate to treat the 
supply of money as endogenous in the 19G0's, as to justify 
experimenting with the alternative 'e:; tremo' assumption, - 
namely , that the supply of money should be regarded as 
exogenous. The question, however, is what it moans by 
exogenous money supply. It does not moan that the money 
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supply has been consciously detormined by the authorities 
in the same z-ray that they were assumed to not interest rates 
in earlier years: wo tako the view that neither intorost 
rates nor the money supply have been controlled in this 
rigid way in recent years. Rather wo moan that the money 
supply has boon partly controlled by the authorities and 
partly by other factors which are beyond the control o- the 
monetary authorities. And that this hind of thoorisinlC is 
more applicablo for the period 1963 to today. however, data 
limitations force us to assume that the 1960's provide 
sufficient experience of a money supply function of the 
type described above, when combined with the latter sample; 
if, in fact, a complete structural ch: an e of regime has OJI 
occurred it is apparent that we shall have to wait for more 
time to elapse before efficient estimates can be-obtained. 
Following Goodhart (59) and also our earlier analysis on 
the disadvantages of the mechanical relationship- 
Z"Sä =m. B 
we, furthermore, assume that B, i. e. monetary base, is not 
completely e: cogenous but is determined in tho following 
fashion: 
(17) Bb+bY+b (SP) +b (BR) +bB+ u11 to1t2t3t 1ý t-1 t 
where (SP)t is the open market operation instrument, (DR), is 
the borrowing requirement of the government, and Yt is income. 
Since it is the case that open market operations and changes 
in (BR) t affect the monetary base of the system and 
the latter 
the money supply, we introduce those variables in the B-equation. 
Base money, however, can also be affected by changes in the 
level of income; as the latter increases people would be 
reducing their holdings of base money in order to hold other 
assets, in particular earning assets due to the higher interest 
rates, and some of those assets are bound to be government 
securities. Nore importantly, perhaps, is the following 
consideration: some proportion of the increase in the level 
of income is likely to leak from the circular flow of income 
due to higher imports and the resulting deficit - or decrease 
in the surplus - in the balance of payments, implies some 
sog. 
loss of reserves which would be contriictionary as far as the 
baso money is concerned. Thus, wo would o:: poct bI to be less 
than zero, but both b2 and b3 greater than zero. Finally, 
the IItr1 variable is justified in o.: actly the same Way ns in 
the case of the inclusion of 1.1tr1 in the money supply 
function. 
I 
3.2 Tlio : lcal Scctor: 
Ile being with the ßtandard incoiio identity: 
(I) Yt = ct + zt + st + (ra)t - Qt 
With 
(m) 
t_ Gt + "'. " t- Tr, t' 
whore Yt = currant national product (al. factor cor 1; ) , Cl; = 
Consumption o:. penditure, It = Investment e: -, pondituro, St = 
Stockbuilding expenditure, Qt = imports, :: t = E:: ports, 
Gt = Government expenditure, and Tst = adjustment to factor 
costs which represents taxes on expenditure less subsidies 
at constant rates. 
Following Friedman and others (50,53,85,120) ire 
postulate' the following consumption function: 
(2a) Ct : ao + a1Yta + a2i"ft + a3rLt 
where 11t = money stock depicting the influence of liquid 
assets on Ct9 rLt = Long-term rate of interest, and Ypd is 
permanent disposable income which is estimated from the 
adaptive forecasting equation 
n (2b) Y9 d_ bYd + b2Yd_1 +..... + bni'a_n-1 +.... 
with o<b1. 
Next, qubstitute (2b) into (2a), lag one period, apply 
Koyclc's transformation, add a disturbance term to get (2): 
(2) Ct=co+c1Yt+c2Ct-l+c3rit+c4ýlt-i+cSrLt+c6rLt-i+ult 
there co = Z0 (1-b), c1 = ab, c2 = b, c3 = a2, C1 _ -bey, 
c5 = a3 , cG = --bai . 
Wo also postulate the following simply empirical relation- 
ship between disposable income and national product: 
110.. 
ý 3) Y, ý = a1; + n/, 
Yt_ 
1+ u2 t 04 
'The theoretical rationale of the inclusion of porcmanont 
income and the empirical validity of such ct hypothesis have 
been fully c: plorod by N. Friedman (50). The inclusion of 
liquid ascots is justified on empirical grounds (145 and 
128 for two recent e;: arnplos) I and on the following 
thoore- 
tical ; rounds. It could be argued that people have Cl 
desired level of liquid assets, and to the extent that 
actual liquid assets exceed their desired level, there is a 
savings-consumption readjustment in favour of consumption. 
It follows that a higher observed level of money stock is 
associated with a higher level of consumption. A second 
way of reasoning, that complements the first, is to regard 
the money supply as a component of total, wealth; a change, 
then, in the money stock, cotoris paribus, would involve a 
change in aggregate wealth which causes a change in desired 
consumption through the wealth effect. * A third approach 
is to treat the' money stock as a proxy for tho unobservable 
implicit rate of discount applied to stocks of consumer 
durables. An increase, say, in the money stock therefore 
serves to decrease the discount rate and induce an increase 
in, consumption, primarily through increased purchases-of 
consumer durables. We do, however, recognise explicitly the 
impact of interest rates on consumption. Since the publica- 
tion of Keynes' General Theory, it has generally boon assumed 
that consumption is insensitive to interest rates. Conse- 
quently, the only monetary variable that has boon included 
in the consumption function with any regularity ha boon 
liquid assets. The view taken hero is that monetary variables 
have a significant effect on consumer purchases of durable 
goods and that the most appropriate measures of these variables 
are interest rates (see for example 66,126,123). Empirical 
verification of this view Would cast considerable doubt on the 
*. It is, argued by many economists, especially Patinl; in (105) 
that only "outside money" should be included in not wealth. 
Others have argued that "inside money" should also be 
included (106). 
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the widely' accepted notion that consumers do not respond to 
changes in interest rates, and would also provide an 
alternative to both the I: eynosi. atl nlncl the C1'icago vie"' 
concerning the chtannols through which rmonetaryº policy 
operates. Contrary to the Keynesian income-o: cpondituro 
approach, they would imply that monetary policy has .a more 
direct effect on consumor behaviour. This more direct link 
is recognized 'in the alternative approach expounded by 
Friedman and Moiselman (53), but they argue that it is 
neither very useful nor illuminating to view the effects of 
monetary policy as operating through interest rates. 
Next, we postulate the following Investment function: 
(1ý) It = i0 + i1 (AY) t+ 12(&AI)t + 
13rLt + iitIt_1+ U3t 
where (AY)t = Yt-Yt_1'. (, &AI)t = AIt -Ait-1 = changes in 
advances to industry, and the other variables have their 
usual meaning. 
Equation (4) is derived by specifying desired investnment, 
It, as: 
(I1a) It = Yö + i(DY)t + y2(AAI)t +'3rLt 
with actual investment adjusting to the desired rate according 
to 
(lib) (It-It-1) = g(It-It-1) with 0 
<g 41 ; 
where g is the proportion of adjustment achieved during one 
period. Substituting (4a) into (4b) and rearranging we 
arrive at equation 44, where i g. y j, with 
j=0, It 2,3, 
G 
and ii4 
Equation ('Ia) is justified as follows: One component of 
desired investment is strongly influenced by changes in the 
level of income; w, ro, *thus, postulate the standard accelerator 
hypothesis. The justification of the inclusion of the rate 
of interest is well known as it is its poor empirical per- 
fornlance-chiefly the Radcliffe Report's virtual dismissal 
of the interest sensitivity of investment demand. Recently, 
however, Do Leowir and Gramlich (36) have shown - using U. S. A. 
data, - that there is a significant, but considerably lagged, 
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cost-of-capital affect on business fi: od investment. A 
recent paper by N. polstoin (1k3) strongly indicates that the 
use of nominal interest rates, when theoretical considerations 
suggest that the real rate is the relevant variable, results 
in a substantial bias towards zero of the coefficient, with 
frequent opposite signs of the actual coefficients. In view 
of the Folstein findings, it is important to note that some 
of the recent studios of fixed and inventory investment in 
this country have indicated a significant role for interest 
rates in explaining those categories of expenditure. The 
study by Hines and Catephores (73) on fixed investment finds 
an interest elasticity in the investment function of well 
above unity. Trivodi (120) is able to show that when 
relevant econometric techniques are employed in estimation 
procedures, significant interest elasticities are derived in 
both aggregated and disaggregated functions. This result may 
be regarded as particularly significant in having boon 
demonstrated for a sector which has traditionally been 
notorious for poor empirical results certainly for monetary 
variables. Finally, the variable Ait is included in order 
to capture any influence on Investment arising from the fact 
that during the period under examination there have boon all 
sorts of direct restrictions on tlho level of advances as a 
result of the policies pursued by the authorities. In this 
environment, then, it is more suitable to use changes in the 
level rather than absolute level. 
The adjustment, not', of the actual level of It towards 
the desired level, It, is not an instantaneous process, but, 
it is assumed, during a given period t, only a fraction g of 
the difference between the desired level It and the initial 
It_1 is made up. We thus got equation 4b, We may note, at 
this point, that statistically the estimate of il, becomes 
very important; if i1 is significantly less than unity, 
this suggests that gg o and that at least part of the adjust- 
ment to the desired rate of investment is achieved in one 
period. If i1 is significantly positive indicates that g< 19 
so that full adjustment is accomplished in more than one 
periods. 
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The Stoclcbuilding-function is postulated in the same way 
as the Investment-function with one difference. Instead of 
having the variable (4AI)t wo introduce-instead the variable 
(QM) 
t= Mt - Pit. _ 1. 
Wo thus have: 
(5) St = so + s1(&Y) + s2(AAI)t + s3rLt + s, 1St-1 
+ U/It 
The reason of having (AN)t instead of (A AI)t in this 
equation is that changes in advances will probably be 
directly used for investment and not for stockbuilding since 
the latter is, wo believe, more influenced by the liquidity 
of the industrial sector. The more liquid this sector is the 
more stocks are built up in anticipation of increases in 
demand. Wo use the (API)t variable as an indicator of the 
liquidity of the industrial sector, although we recognize 
the weakness of this assumption; in the absence of n batter 
indicator we are effectively forced to use (A PS) t. 
Government e: -penditure (Gt)r now is assumed to be 
exogenous. This may not be a satisfactory assumption within 
the context of a longer-run model, but for a quarterly model 
such as the present one, such an assumption is reasonable. 
Within the context of a longer-run model in which, say, 
annual data are used there is some reason to believe that 
government expenditure is partially determined within the 
macrosystem. That is, the annual observations on government 
expenditure may contain a component induced by the levels 
(orachanges in the levels) of endogenous variables such as 
stoss national product or consumption. This may be so 
because government expenditure can within the course of one 
year be influenced by the pace of economic, activity. BY 
contrast, the recognition and implementation lags between 
the time of a change in economic activity and an induced 
change in government spending are normally much greater than 
three months; thus in a quarterly model it is quite reasonable 
to specify government expenditure as an c: cogenous variable. 
Exports are also assumed to be an exogenous variable to 
the domestic economy. The level of exports in the short-run 
is determined chiefly by politically negotiated trade 
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agreements and'tho rate of economic activity abroad. Thera 
are also other reasons for treating e:: ports as o;: oSenous. 
Exports account on the whole for only n"stall proportion of 
gross national product. In a short-run investigation such 
as the present one, relative prices - which could be affected 
by domestic economic activity - are loss important than in a 
longer-run study. 
Imports, on tho othor hand, aro endogonous. As shown in 
equation 6, they arc "made a function of tho level of gross 
national product, some price level, and the quantity of 
money: 
(6)' Cat ea + olyt + C2Pt + o32"It 
where Pt = price level. 
Apart from the. -usual theoretical justification, of 
the 
above equation, the empirical evidence (see 97 for one 
example) seems to suggest that an equation of this type tends 
to give satisfactory results. 
Furthermore, as actual imports may adjust to demand 
, rith a lag, an adjustment is specified to the effect that 
imports change in period t according to the difference 
between demand for imports in period t and the actual value 
of imports in. period t-1: 
(Gig. (pQ)t = v(Qt -Qt+1) 
where (A Q)t = Qt-Qt-1, and v is the adjustment coefficient 
lying between zero and unity. As v approaches unity, the 
adjustment of actual imports to demand is almost instantaneous 
- in this case within a quarter -; as v approaches zero, actual 
imports are never equal to demand and there is always unsatis- 
fied demand in the market. Within these extremes, the 
adjustment is asymptotic. The specification of this typo of 
adjustment function introduces an explicit distributed lag 
into the import relationship. Substituting equation (6), in 
equation (6)" and solving for the value of imports, the 
equation to be estimated is derived: 
1 (C) Qt = q0 + g1Yt + g2Pt + q3Dit + g1,04t. 1 + Uzt 
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with qo = voos q1 = vo1, q. = va`, q, = vo3,94 = 1-v. 
3.3 Summary: 
In the following twolvo oquations We surunariso the model 
developed in this chapter: 
(1) Yt = Ct + It + St ,+ (TA)t -, 2t 
(2) (TA)t = Gt + Xt - Tst 
(3) Ct = co + c1Yd + c2Ct-1 + c3rit + c11Ait-1 + c5rLt + 
cGrLt-1 + Uit 
(4) yd = a1Ydt 
-1 
+ a2Yt + U2t 
(5) It = io + i1(AY)t + i2(L1 AI)t + 13rLt + it-1 + U3t 
(6) st = s0 + s1 (A Y) t+ s2(A TI)t + s3rLt + sitst-1 + 
Ullt 
(7) Qt = qa + g1Yt. + g2Yt + n311t + q4at-1 + U5t 
(8) rLt = Po + P1rst 
-+ 
f 2Yt + P3rLt-1 + UGt 
(9) 11d _d0+ d1Yt + d`rýt +d3 11dýi + U? t 
(10) 1It = mo + ni1Yt + m2r5t + inýB + m11AI3-1 + Ußt 
(11) NIt = IýIs I"It 
(12) Ißt = bo + b1Yt + bý(SP)t + b3(BR)t + bý}Dtý1 + U9t 
The endogenous variables are: Yt, Yu, Ct, It, St' Qt' 
rLt, I"It, Tit, lit, I3t, rst. 
The predetermined variables are: Ct-1, i`it-1 , rU-19 
Yt-1' Yt-19 Ait-i' It-1' St-1, Qt-1' lit-1' rtt-1' ßt-1' Ct' AIt, 
X, Tst, Pt (SP)t' (BR)t+ the last seven being exogenous. 
3.11 -Dynamic-Aspects of the Model: 
Given the above model wo would like to use it in order 
to find out the influence on gross national product of the 
individual policy instrunents. This i'nfluenco, l101-revert 
cannot be established before wo derive dynamic multipliers, 
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and this section deals with this problem. 
To begin with wo solve the structural equations to obtain 
the reduced form for gross national product. The coofficionts 
of this equation are tormed impact multipliers. 
Each of thorn 
measures the immediate - that is, first quarter - 
impact on 
gross national product of a change in the corresponding 
predetermined variable with all othor predetermined variables 
hold constant. The reduced form of the model can be written, 
in a gcnoral way, as follows: 
(1) Yt =a 0' + a1N1 + a0N2 
+ a3N3 +...... + b1E1 + 
+ b2E4 + b3Z3 +...... + c(SP)t + d(ra)t 
where Ni(with i, = 1,2,3, """" n) stands for all 
the 
endogenous predetermined variables, and Ei(with i=1, u, 
3, .... n) for all the e:: ogonous predetermined variables, 
except of course (SP) t and 
(rs)t"* 
The reduced-foren solution presents a clear picture of 
the immediate responses of G. N. P. to changes in the pre- 
determined variables and enables us to estimate the effects 
of the o:: ogenous variables given the immediate past history 
of all endogenous variables. An cconometrician who is only 
interested in forecasting does not have to go any further 
since his concern is with the future. For an analysis of 
the post, however, the impact multipliers alone arc not very 
illuminating. If our knowledge wore confined Ao the reduced- 
form equations, we would undoubtedly find that the main 
influence on the current values of G. NT. P. is its om immediate 
history, and the question of estimating the relative impor- 
tance of cumulative monetary, and other o ogonous variables 
would remain unresolved. The relevant solution for this 
problem is obviously one which would deterraino the time path 
* If, of course, rst is made exogenous. In section 3.3 
this rate seems to be ondogonous. Our evidence (soe Ch. 4 
below) clearly shows that rst is not statistically impor- 
tant in the'Alt-equation and the use of Trocisury Bill for 
rst in the rLt -equation enables us to trcet-rst. ns 
exogenous. See however section 5.3 belog'. 
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of G. N. P. in response to e:: ogonous forces alone. 
In other 
words: gross national product depends not only upon 
the 
exogenous variables, but also upon the bovoral lagged 
endogonous variables of the model. The latter arc 
themselves 
affected by the exogenous variables of the model and 
there- 
fore, since structural lags are important in this model, wo 
cannot isolate the not affect of an individual policy 
instrument by reference to its reduced form coefficients. 
So, what we need, in fact, is the final solution of the gross 
national product; that is to say wo must provide a solution 
for the gross national product in terms of past values of 
itself and exogenous variables (excluding other ondoonous 
variables). It. followsq therefore, that to determine the 
not influence of the policy instruments, all other lagged 
endogenous must be eliminated from the reduced form. This is 
achieved by expressing the lagged endogenous variables in, 
terms'of exogenous variables and substituting in the reduced 
form. The resulting equation is called 'the fundamental 
dynamic equation'. 
Lot us assume, for simplicity, t1int the fundamental 
dynamic equation for gross national product is: 
+...... + (ü) yt = Po + 11Yt-1 + 12t-2 + P3 y t-3 
+ i(SP)t + S2(SP')t-1 + 
(SP) 
t-2 +... 
+ 
+ ý71(r)t + o2(r. ) t-1 + 
(rn)ý-2 +...... + 
ýý.. 
+ other exogenous varizbles. 
Equation (2) can be put to two important uses: 
Firstly, it can be used to determine the characteristic 
stability of the system. In other words, since equation (2) 
is a non-homogenous difference equation, its solution can 
be used to determine whether the system is dynamically 
stable or not. 
Secondly, it can be used to solve for the dynamic 
multipliers. This can be done by using equation (2) to 
express cross national product in terms of initial conditions, 
1180 
which are of course given, and the current values of the 
exogenous variables. The time period can than be increased 
by one unit and gross national product in that period is 
expressed in terms of initial conditions and the current and 
lagged values of the exogenous variables. I3y making succes- 
sive unit increases in the time period a series of dynamic 
multipliers can be derived. 
Thus the dynamic multipliers of the money supply - 
strictly, the open market operation instrument is used in 
this case which affects the money supply via the monetary 
base- and the rate of interest can be computed and there- 
fore compared. It is on the results of this analysis that 
our conclusions, as far as the optimal monetary policy in 
the U. K. is concerned, will be derived. It is a prerequisite, 
though, that we should investigate the model empirically 
which will enable us to derive estimates for the P's, )('s, and 
C's in equation (2), and this is what the ner: t chapter is 
all about. 
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CI11 PTZR 4 
, 'hIPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
1I. I Introduction: 
'. Cho above tlieoreticnl model has boon tested for the 
period 1963 (2nd Quarter) - 19744 (3rd Quarter). The choice 
of this particular period has been constrained by the non- 
avlilability, of data on the money stock-before 1963 
(Ist, 
Quarter). * 
The procedure wo have adopted in deciding the final form 
of the model can be now auI unari3ed. 
Let tho structurnl equation (SF) be: 
(1) Y_ß:. 13+TU '0 
where Y±z . T:; 1 vector of observzxtions on tlio dependent 
variable +X is a T:; K matri. c of observations on the " roressors , 
D. is a K: t'1 vector' of parameters, and U is a T. -c1 vector of 
errors. 
There arc three types of regressors that can appear in 
the structural' equation: . 
(a) Current endogenous variables, 
(b) 'Lagged values'öf the current endogenous variablos, 
and 
(c) Current and lagged values of e:. ogenous variables. 
r" 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) can be used if current 
endogenous variables, are not included in (1); otherwise a 
more appioprietc method 1jas to be used, e. g. Two Stage Least 
Squares (TSLS), which is, in fact, the method we have adopted 
when currant endogenous variables appecr in W. Further- 
more, if U is autocorrolatod'both OLS and TSLS cease to be 
* The period starts from 1963 (2nd Quarter) because one period 
" is missed . by the computer program we have used, due to the 
appearance of lagged variables especially in-the Unrestricted 
0 Transformed Equation (See below). 
) 
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optimal, and cousequont'ly we have to allow for the possibility 
of, soy: 
(a) ut ý ? Utl oý; 
where e is a random (i. e. - serially 
r i-s the autoregressive parameter. 
The sub-model of U) plus (2) i, 
the *Rostricted Tran's'formed Lgtiation 
can be clarified by. considering, the 
defined by (3) -vill nKý3. 
independent) error, Mid 
s roforrod to below 1s 
(R. T. r'. ). This concept 
spocial cade of (1) 
>) Yt _ 1)0 + b1.1; t + b2Yt-1 + 
Ut 
Lagging- now equation (3) by one period we have: 
(1k) yt-1 = b0 + biXt-1 + b2Yt-2 + Ut-1 
Nont, we multiply (ti) by p and subtract it from (3) : 
(5) Yt pY, t-i b0(1-10) + b1Xi 
+ b^Y 
. -1 
U2Yt-2 +Ut-f ut-1 
ors using (2) and rearranging: 
ý6) Yt = bo(1-p) + bitt - pb1Xt-1 +f (1+b2 )1't-1 -f YYt-?. 
+ et 
The error terra et is noz-r a purely random variable but we still 
cannot estimate (6) directly by least squares since it involves 
five variables (constant, Xt, xt-1, Yt-i, Yt-2) but only four 
parameters (boo bI, b2, p ). There is, therefore, a non-linear 
restriction between the parameters and hence (6) is referred 
to as the I. T. F. One, lhowever, might prefer. to ignore the 
resl: rictjon by treating (G) as a lcgiti:, into relationship, 
in which case wehave: 
C 7) Yt co + c1f: ý cý: ýt-1 + c3Y. t_1 + c! lYt-2 +0t 
This relationship. is denoted as the Unrct trictcd Transformed 
Equation (U. R. T. F. ); tlºcpp. last tiro formulations (G and 7)', 
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now, permit one to toot the validity of the restriction 
in 
the R. T. P., which is, in effect, a test of the correctness 
of the dynamic specification in (1). The particular way one 
can test the validity of' the dynamic specifications in 
(1) is 
fully described by Sargen. *A test is ' employad with the 
hypothesis that ' specifications U. R. T. F. and f. T. F. are 
equally 'valid and, therefore there is little to choose between 
them. If, then, this hypothesis is rejected, at sonic conven- 
tional level of significance (say 51) , than the autorerestfive 
hypothesis is rejected in favour of the unrestricted equation 
7, This can often be interpreted to mean that a more com- 
plicated structure of lags, or a larger lag is required in 
the structural equation on at least one of the variables. 
The way, now, one can modify the structural equation can be 
indicated by the coefficients of the unrestricted equation. 
If one of tho lagged variables in the unrestricted equation 
has a much larger coefficient, proportionally, than the 
other lagged variables, it seems reasonable to introduce 
bho lagged value of this variable into the structural 
equation, . and to estimato the now fo. rri of the structural 
equation, týssuming as before a first order autoregressive 
equation for the eIror. This process of modifying the form 
of the structural equation can continue until to criterion 
ceases to be significant. It may be that at some stage il" 
the, process the autoregressive coefficient may not be 
significantly different from Zero indicating that its 
significance in the original, form of the structural equation 
was' clue to 'the vnrinbles in the equation havinS the sfron 
1£lßä, 
" 
The computer prozrcm wo have used (called GIVE**) allows 
one to choose Which of (1) and/or (1) plus (2) i. e. 6 and/or 
7, one1: )refers, including all three. We my note at this __ * See Saran, J. D. "ITages and Prices in the U. K.; A 
Study of Econometric Methodology" in Colston. Papers, 
Vo. 1.16, Dutten, *orths Scientific Pub]. icltions 59611). 
** For more details an GIVE see Hendry, D. P. "User's Manual 
for GIVE" L. S. E. (July 1973). 
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stage that (1) and (7) can Ise estimated directly whereas 
(6) 
requires an iterative technique to resolve 
the non-linear rostric 
tion referred to above. The procedure used in GIVE 
is. to, esti- 
mate the parameters of (6) by minimising 
the sum of squared 
residuals. First this sum is calculated for a grid 
of 
values off fron -0.9 to +0.9 in steps of 
0.1. This provides 
for a rough check for multiple minima and helps 
to make sure 
that the iteration commences close to the global minimum. 
This is, the. procedure we have adopted in order to 
tackle 
the. problem of autocorrelation, and of course this procedure 
enables us to decide the lag structure of the model too, 'as 
well cis the final form of the model. Another problem, not 
tackled by 'GIVE', is that of multicollinearity. Plulti- 
co]. lincarity exists when the explanatory variables are 
linearly correlated among them. If the explanatory variables 
are perfectly- linearly correlated if, in other words,. the 
corrclation'coefficients'for these variables is equal to 
unity, the parameters become indeterminate. It is impossible, 
in this case, to obtain numerical values-for each , parameter 
separately and the method of least squares breaks down. If 
on the other hand the explanatory variables are not corre- 
lated at all in which case the correlation coefficients are 
equal to zero, then the covariances are equal to zero, i. e. 
the variables are orthogonal, and there are no, problems 
concerning the estimation of the coefficients, at least as 
far as multicollinearity is concerned. In this case, of 
course, we do not. even need to perform a multiple regression 
analysis since each coofficiont can be estimated by a simple 
regression of. the dependent on the corresponding independent. * 
In practice neither of the above extreme cases is often 
met. The usual, cnse is that the simple correlation coeffi- 
cient for each pair of e:: plnnatory varinbles to have n 
value between zero and unity due to the interdependence of 
many economic magnitudes over time. This intordependoince, 
* See' Goldberger, A. Econometric Theory, p. 201" 
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then, can be quite serious because the rmulticollincnrity 
problem mýi impair the accuracy and stability of the 
estimated pararnetars , but the exact effects of collincarity 
have not as yet been theoretically estrhblishod; no conclu- 
sive evidence exists concerning the degree of - collinenrity 
which, i. f present, will affect seriously the parnmotor 
estimates. * Whenever the appearance of multicollinearity 
affects seriously our results we leave out the responsible 
-variable, if it. is judged not to be an 
important one. On 
the whole,. our approach to detecting the problem of multi- 
collineari. ty has followed Klein's sugges. -tion that multi- 
collinearity is not necessarily in problem unless it 
is high 
relative to the overall degree o. f multiple correlation 
among all variables simultaneously. ** In other words 
Klein 
argues that if: 
IAH 
Y. x1.:: 2.... Ic 
multi Coll incarity is not harmful; wo may note that r' is 
the simple correlation coefficient between any two, variables 
X and X, and R' is the mültinlc correlation coefficient of 
the relationship. We note, also, that the use of TSLS ma1: os 
multicollinearity, much loss of a Problem since this technique 
is, not as sensitive to the mult'icollinearity problem as'. other 
single-equation methods of estimation. *** However, it. is the 
case that "multi, collinearity is not a condition that either 
exists or does not exist in economic functions, but rather a 
phenomenon inherent in most relationships duo to the nature 
of economic magnitudes"; " but "it does not impair the theore- 
tical validity of the model; it is a 'decease' of the sample 
data and not of the construction of the model". **** 
* See Koutsoyinnnis, A. Theory of Econo: iietrics, PP"225-230" 
"** See Klein, L. 11. Introduction to Econometrics p. 611 &'p. 101. 
" *** See Evans, N. K. Macroeconomic Activity: Theory, Fore- 
casting,. and Control, P. 51. 
****Sce Koutsoyinnnis, op. cit., p"225 and, p. 2115. 
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We now turn to the discussion or the empiriccil ovidonco; 
before we do so, however, t ere . pro' some points worth 
commenting on. As wo have already mentioned the period wo 
cover is 1963 Und quarter) - 19714 (3rd Quarter); the 
period presents- a problem as far as the istimation of, Clio ' 
model is concerned, because of the 'Coiipetition and Credit 
Control' new measures introduced in 1971. The reason is 
that those new measures of monetary control might have 
introduced structural clinnges in the system. This problem 
we hope to tackle by splitting; the whole 19G3-19711 period 
into 1963 (2nd CQucirtor) - 1971 (lath Quarter) and predict 
the values of the endogenous variables for the period 1971 
(14th Quarter) - 1971 (3rd Quarter). lie discuss this problem, 
in more, detail after we have discussed the, estimation of the 
model for the whole 19G3-1974 period. 
The stability of the structural parameters is ex-11"iiiecl 
in every equation by, allowing one quarter outside the esti- 
mation period (i. e. 1974-3rd Quarter) and'prodicting the 
values 'of the endogenous variables for 19711 3rd Quarter; we 
use the x2-statistic in, order to test the stability of the 
structural parameters for prediction. It can be -argued that 
one should allow for more than one quarter for such as test; 
since, though, it is more desirable to have as many observa- 
tions as possible, given the large number of predetermined 
variables in the model l wo feel that wo .. ire 
justified in 
allowing only one quarter for judging' the. stability of the 
structural parameters. 
0110 pore point before wo turn to the cnpiricäl results: 
the data zee use arc all in constant 1963-prices, sc sonnally 
adjusted. We, therefore, introduce in the following oquntions 
a. price variable so that real and nominal changes can be 
di s-tinr, -, u3. shecl. 
The way wo present the empirical results is as follows: 
both the*OLS and TSLS estimates are given, with the OLS first. 
The reason for'providing the OLS estimates is to determine the 
lag structure - the TSLS estimates provided by GIVE do not 
provide enough information to tackle this j-woblem - of each 
A 
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equation. It is to be noted tlhnt if one aquntion does not 
include in its oxplanatoryv., riablos mi etidogonoits vnrinble 
wo are forced to use OLS only for that paarticulnr oquction. 
li. 2. Em ica1 Results 
4.2a Consumption Function (C 
t 
The final form this function took was: 
C. = C0 + c1Y-. 
dt 
+ c2( b, lip) t+c3Pt+ c111) t1+ '' crI. t-3 + 
+ c6rLt-, 4 + c7Ct-1 
where (A IIP)t = changes in 11P-debt, Pt an indes: of prices, 
and we use the retail price index; all the other variables 
have their usual meaning. 
This form of the Consumption Function differs from the 
one we proposed earlier, and tho reasons behind t his 
difference are fully explored below. 
ilia Correlation Matrix is as 'ollotw: s : 
CORRELATION MATRIX 
-- - 
Ct Yt (AIIP)t 13t Ot-1 rLt-3 rLt-/f I)t-1 
ct 1.0000 0.9913 0.4894 0.9715 o. 9856 o.. 8866 0.8861 0.9779 
Yt 0.9913 1.0000 0.11797 0.9688 0.9851 0.8803 0.8820 0.97117 
Wip) t '0-118911. 0.1179 7 1.0000 0.36113 0.111311 0.2931 0.3385. 0-3869 
Pt 0.9715 0.9688 0.3643 1.0000 0.9762 0.9397 0.9291 0.9989 
. ct-i 0.9856 0'. 9351. 0.41344 0.9762 1.0000 . 8913 0.8790 0.9388 
rL, t-3, 0.8066 0.8803 0.2931 0.9397 0.8913 1.0000 0.9804 0.9388 
rLt-1ý 0.8861 0.8820 . 3335 0.9291 0-8790' 0-9804 1.0000 0.9313 
Pt-i 0.9779 0.97117 . 3869 0.9989 "9791 . 9383 0.9313 8.. 000 
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" Now, the R`' ý 0.9901, and it follows that mu7. ticolli- 
n. earity is not really n problem except in that the correla- 
tion -cocfficient between 1' and , litly' 1: 
3 1ior V is slir 
than R2 but not high enough- to worry - about: it. 
We -turn now to the SIi estima tos: 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-VVnýJ"uc 
Yt 0.30068 0.10509 2.8611ýi 
(, ºlip) 0-47531 0.223üß: t 
P -17.11.1523 8.79664 1.97976 t 
Ct-1 0.29174 0.12217" 2.38792 
rLt 3 -10.03714 32.21930 
0.31153 
rL1: 
-11 -6.07717 " 
32.37553 0.18771 
t-1 26.02863 10.57223 2-46197 
*CNST. 1198-39213 295.91622 44.04971 
R2_0.99005 ** DX. =2.13122, *** S=55.611,56811 
One Period Aliend . 'Forecasts 
Actual: 669/i 
Forecast: 6902. 'i195 
Forecast Error: -208.1195 
2**** 
x( 
,)' 
(1)=11i. 02858 
CNST. ^ Constant 
** U. W. = Durbin-Watson . Stati: gtic 
*** S= Staiiciard Error of Estimate 
2 2_ *** x 
; 
ý1) (v) -1 test for post-sample parameter stability 
With (v) dc ; revs of freedom; where v in- 
number of olo ervat. i. ons retained for the 
post-sample parameter stability test. 
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Although the forecasting, j, o%rcr of thin equation 'does not t coni 
to be inadequate., the signi, ficanco of the : c8 -tent implies 
inadequate specification for predi ction g though some degree 
of simultaneity seems to be desira ble. 
The U. R. T. P . estimates `are an follows: 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 7____uo 
y (1 0.25521 0.19.805 2.161944 
CA I1ý)t 0.77309 O. 32ß31 o. 35ºi72 
" -15.7091}11 10.03G1111 1.56213 t 
Ct 1 0.277793 0.17250 1.61115 
- 
rLt-3 -29.18851, 36.72089 0.791488 
rLt-/1 55.81523 52.66708 1.05977 
P 18.31773 21.180114 0.86485 t-1 
CNST. 1207-72133 378.08632 3.191130 
i't 0.14696 0.11973 1.22737 
iQ 1113)t_1 -0.444878 0.33791 1.32811 
Ct. ý2 -0.10332 0.11898 0.69355 
rLt-5 . -53-92094 
37.10519 1.45319 
Pt -2 6.89823 111-88071 0.146357 
R2 = 0.99137, Delle' = 2.105441, S= 55.731907 
One Period Ahead 'Forecasts 
Actual: 66911 
Forecast:. 6899.3912 
Forecast Error: -205.3912 
='2 i 1) = 13. 53176 
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1? (5,32) = 0.9771::. This is nn I, '(V1, V2)-tost on the sigiii- 
ficance of the cxtra parammctars in the U. I2. 't. F. over the SF 
t: ith (V19 V4) degree of froedoi i where V1 NV-NR, and 
V2 = N-14L+1-2. (NV)+NR; the N's have the following, - tic using: 
NV. = nwnber of variables involved in the oquaati. on, NR 
nwnber of redundant variables, N= number of observations, - 
arid NL = number of lags set up by the computer. The F-test 
now being insignificant implies significant additional 
parameters. 
The R. T. F. estimates, are, now, given: 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Value 
Yt 0.296,11 0-11550 2.56366 
M III t . 
0-45875 0.21429 . 14080 
Pt -17.0293,2 8.75816 1.94439 
Ot;, 1 0.33165 o. 16967 . 1-95464 
rLt-3 -1j. 92732 31-76499 0.15512 
rLt-1ý -ß. 531G9 32-42852 0.26309 
2.4-78280 10.89502 22.27469 
CI"JST. 1091.95751 ' 350.873344 3.11211 
P -0.10535 0.23105 0.115599 
S 56.239359 
One Period Alhcad arorecests 
Actual: 669/i 
Forecast: 6885.0159 
Forecast Error: -191.0159 
2 (1) = 11.53608 
The comment about foreca , tjois poi-Tor and sl-ebilit: y of the 
1)aramc tcrs we made for the other two structural forms is 
applicable to this form too. Mint is rnoro il-.: portent Isere is 
In 1. ). 
tho :: (2) - 
0, ) 6.11600.7i' ipnrticulnr, thin in n (v)-toot 
or the velidity of the nutoroaroocivo roctrictionn in 'tho 
I2. T. F. ' equation, with v= : V-N11-1, and defined as twice 1-110 
log of t ho rntiö of the residual sum of squares of Vic 
U. R. T. F. to that of the R. T'. F. Looking at its vnluo in this 
equation wo-note that : since it is innignificenit: it in implied 
. that it is perfectly legitimate to use the ]t. T. I'. form 
instead of the U. R. T. F. Furthermore, since the value of p 
is statistically insignificant - i. e. there is no auto- 
1 
correlation of the first order - wo conclude that the SF 
form is preferrýablo to the other two. 
The Consuwiptioai function , to Iirnve chosen, following the 
above statistical procedure, differs frort the one tine 
suggested earlier, the one that is based on the theoretical 
considerations analysed in the last chapter. The notable 
difference is the absence of the Mt variable. The reason 
for the exclusion of the 11t variable is that it does not 
perform adc. quately at all at an empirical level; in all the 
equations ire tried, the 11t variablo had alt aas the wrong 
sign and it was dramatically insignificant. We tried current 
and lagged money stoc1 ,' first differences too, and in all 
cases the result on this variable followed the sarge pattern: 
insignificant with wrong signs everywhere. tie thus decided' 
'to, exclude it from the Consumption function. Another notable 
difference is that we have introduced three new variables: 
Pt . and '1't_1 1"711ose inclusion 1,7e, have already explained 9 as 
well as (A III))t; the latter variable may be thought of iris 
a proxy for the liquid ctssots instead of the 11t variable. 
Th e 1'tw1, variable is introduced to capture any price e:: pec- 
tation s that bay prevail in the system, especially in the 
inflationary environment of the latter part of the period. 
under. iilvestig; atio'rh-. 
"Tlie statistical Performance of this equation is very 
satisfactory. All the vnriables perforri troll: they are 
" significant mid all liavo the right sign. Tile e: -caption, i 
With the long-term interest rate,. The T-Value " for both 
rLt_3 and rLt_Il is very low, but one would probably not have 
130. 
o,. rectod any bcttcr resultu Car this vnrinhlo. 170 lmevo triad 
ra short-tcrri rc to too - L1. - t; rco jury bill rptc - but 110 
rcnults rroro not roelly rtn bo .: cr. The ro, '.. o"i for the poor 
pcrfori: innco of mi iiitcrest rtto vciriablo in the Conoutipt; ion 
-function can be found in the pcculioritico of the L3ritieh 
monetary c. npcrience and , the monetary policies the authoritios 
have pursued' 41ur±21g the estimation period. As it is obvious 
by now our estimation period covers the pro-1971 as grell ris 
the post-1971 periods. Now, before 1971 the interest rate 
was an acininistered rate, and if oiae were to accept that the 
'leaning into the wind' policy was successful, than, it Call 
U'o argued, interest rates had not varied enough und conse- 
quently one would not observe a significant relationtshi1 
between the level of 
. 
consumption and long; -term interest raate. 
If this argument is correct, then one should os: poet that 
after 1971 this relationship should be more significant at a 
statistical' "level, duo to the fact, of course, of . 
tlhc more 
volatile interest rates. The non-, avail4Uility of enough 
data, though. makes it extremely difficult to got consistent 
rind rolitiUlc. estimates for this relationship, and consequently 
it becomes very. difficult to see how such a proposition can be 
tested. 'Ho have, howevor, tried to test this propositiou oven 
with limited data in order to sec whether ire can spot any 
improvement in the relationship, and the results, undoubtedly 
very suspicious, , rc very encouraging. The period used is 
1971 ('ith Quarter) - 1974 ('tth Quarter), and the following 
remarks arc in order: the interest rate variable not only has 
the right sign but' its T-Value improves dramatically and in 
so; ne -cases it eveii becomes greater than ^. 
' Another vorinble worth commenting on is the Pt-I one 
which wo have included in order to capturo : any price o;: pocta- 
tions. We should e;: pect its, sign to be positive: c;: pectationns 
of price increases, say, would induce people to increase their 
corisucnption o; pcndituro in the current period but reduce their 
consu iption o:: pcndituro in' the current period if. Pt' incrcased. 
Those theoretical considerations are fully justified by our V 
empirical findings on the Connstuuzption function. 
131. 
The TSLS technique give us the following roeiultrs: as 
before z". c present the SF c. -,;. imatos first. ". 
Variable 'Coefficient Standard Error T-Vnluo 
ý'ý 0.1509 0.1? ßl71! . 52591. 
(Q IIP) -0.46511% 0.22859 . 2-03601 
-17-11-587 8.91020 1.92069 
0.28099 0.13208 C 2.12737 t-1 
r Lt-3 -3-75430 32.777112 
0.. ^, '6708 
. rLt-1l -6.925933 32.621155 
0.21: 2 9 
It_1 5.55010 10.80568 2.361! 69 
CNST. '1188.51771 299.544796 3.96770 
D. 1J. ' = 2.128049 S_ 55.65982 
One Period Ahead 'Forecasts' 
Actual: 60911 
Forecast:. 6904.2649 
Forecast Juror: -610.2619 
2 (1) 14-27085 
The 
.:, 
2 
1)-test 
is significant again which means that the 
stability - i. e. the 'post-sample one - of the parameters is 
questionable, when used for prediction. 
2 
xý3) " (20) = 27.39351 
This last statistic .sa":; 
2(v)-tost" 
which is designed to toot 
the validity of idontificntio]i/spccificntioll of the equation 
in question with "v degrees of freedom, where v= NI-NV +1t 
for NI = number of instruments used in the es timation of the 
equation. It is insignificant suggesting tha t the iaontifi- 
cation/specification of this equation ?s ndeq uatto. 
,. 
13ý. 
The U. Il. 'Cor, o estimates ctro: 
Variable Coefficient, Stn; tclard Error 
Yd 0.2769 0.13901 
(O 1113)t 0-72904 0.321186. 
I'r -. 17.63320 9.2/i398 
0 0.4993'! 0.172( ß 
rý. t^3 `30.30919 37-99424 
rLt-tý 57.52155 53.62532 
1't_1 . 26.119763 11.65311 
CNST.. l174-09905 405.07306 
yd 0.111531 0.12032 
(A iii') t-1 -0.43722 0.31,159 
C -0.12686 0.1112 99 
rLt-5 
.I -5'1.00901 57.39613 
rt-2 . -0.0075" 0.62473 
I 
D. l, ý. _ 2. OÜ07; ý ýS 55.9191k7 
One 
. 
Period Alload '; orecasts 
Actual: 669! i 
rorocctot: 6955.5058 
Forocaz L Error: -241.5058 
'(1) 
(1) 
- 1ü. Cý:: 1G 
2 
3(. 15) 211. 
'91765 
T-V. lu o 
1.93528 
1.90753 
1.733116 
0.79773 
1.07266 
2.27575 
^. 893,19 
1.6 0770 
1.27995 
0.80705 
1. ý1 !f ý1 N ýk 
0., 012011 
133. 
4 
'flic R. T. F. ct tinititos . ýr': : 
'Vctrinblc Cocfficicnt Stnnd: ird Error T-Valito 
. yd 0.31137 0.12336 2.1125ß 7 
AIII')t 0.117007. 0.23250 2.02177. 
Pý. -s7. ý ýý7G 9.02885 1. ß96G7 
c 0.27856 0.131i0. 2.07355 
rLt-ä . -9.89893 
3.3.73882 0.29340 
rLt-1ý -G. 05776 >j"3ý3'11? 0.1viifiG 
pt-1 25.70365 11.00196 2.33628 
CNST. 12Q9.57099 319-'04-597 3.791211' 
-0.00511 0.021112 0.21168 
S_ 5(. 588550 
One Period Alicad ' I`orecastu' 
Actual: 66911 
Forecast: 6905.14071 
Forecast-Error: -211.1071 
` (1). = 111.05758 
2 
"(3(19) = 27.311797 
We note that in all throe forms tile -; 
" test is -signifi- 
cant whereas the :; (3)-test is insignificant, therefore, the 
comments made' earlier in connection with those two tests apply 
in this case too. 
On the whole the TSLS estimates appear to be slightly 
poorer than the. OLS ones, a result that is always expoctod in 
this type of models duo to the simultaneity bias effecting OLS. 
The order of the autoregressive process used above is 
unity. We have,. however, allowed for second, third and fourth 
order and the results ore- summar isod in the following table. 
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The above results cleara. y indicate that they are not 
really very different from the ones we obtain when wo assume 
that the order of the autoregressive process is equal to. ono. 
There is, however, one very striking, difference in. the 
(v)-statistic. In all cases where the order is greater than 
one the xý,, ) (v)-statistic is very significant, and also the 4 
T-value of p is very insignificant. lie are thus obliged to 
accept order one as the most satisfactory autoregressive 
Process, and indeed the SF form. Our final Consumption 
function is, therefore, 'the following (T-Values in brackets): 
Ct = 11ßf3'. 51771 + 0.31509 Yd + 0. li65'i2 (AIIP) t- 17.11387 
I't 
(3.96770) (2.52591) (2.03601) (1.92069 
+ 0.28099 C-8.75e30 r-6.92598 r t-t (2.12737)t-1 (0.26708 )Lt-3 (0.21229)L 1 
+ 25.55210 Pt-1 
(2.36469) 
This' estimated'. Consumption function is the one that 
results from the application, of the TSLS technique; this 
technique is obviously more appropriate in this case since 
it takes into consideration the simultaneity bias referred 
to above. 
ti. 2b Disposable Income' Function (Yd) 
The empirical function 
dd Yt AIYt + a2Yt-1 
has been used for the disposable income variable, and gave 
us the following results. We begin by looking at the 
Correlation Matrix: 
Correlation Mtit. rix 
d Yt Yt d Yt-1 
Yt 1.0000 0.9507 0.9835 
Yt 0.9507 1.0000 0.91463 
Yt_1 0.9835 0.91163 1.0000 
137. 
The R2 = 0.97061E and it seems that some trouble might 
arise in this particular case as for as multicollinoarity is, 
concerned, since the corrcIntion coefficient botwoon Y and 
Yd_1 is greater than the R`" as one might expect. 
The SF estimates are: 
Variable 
Yt 
a Yt-1 
n2 0.9764, 
Coefficient 
0.14700 
0.82371 
D. W. '_ 2.07032, 
One Period Ahead 'Forecasts' 
Standard Error T-Value, 
o. OG113 2.40 48'G 
0.0762.0 10.80105 
S= 107.65740 
Actual: 7703 
Forecast: 7369.0376 
Forecast Error: 333.9621E 
x(1) (1). = 9.62292 
We may note again the significance of the x( 1) -statistic. 
The U. R. T. F. e stimates arc as follows: 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Value 
Yt 0.22 312 0.11489 1.911"d3 
Yd t-I 0.791,83 3.70509 0.211152 
Yt. 
-1 --0.107113 0.11755 
0.91387 
Yd t-2 0.077119 0.15515 0.1199,16 
n 
R` = 0.9711,9, D. W. = 1.950811, S =, 109.998&. 07 
One Period Ahead 'Forecasts 
Actual: 7703 
Forecast: 738e. 8963 
Forecast Error: 318.1032 
Z (1) = 8.36304 
F(3., 40) = 39645 
It is worth noting the significance of the :: (1)statistic, ý 
and the insigni. ficance'of the F-statistic. - 
138. 
The R. T. F. estimates arc: 
Variable Coefficient 
Yt' 0.13151 
Y 0.84306 t-1 
-0.068114 
S= 108.7Go75 
One Period Ahead 'Forecasts' 
Actual: 7703 
Forecast: 7375.1459 
Forecast Error: 327.8541 
I 
x(1, ) (1) = 9.08692 
X(2) (2) _ 1.17728 
Standard Error T-Vallic 
0.06752 1.. 9'i786 
0.08426 10.0011911 
0.17721,0.38613 
i 
'These'results suggest that the SF equation is preferable 
to the other two. The . c(2)-statistic is insignificant as 
well as the T-Value of the coefficient. The same conclusion 
is reached when TSLS is employed, as it can be seen fröm the 
estimates we cite below: 
The SF Estimates: 
Variable -Coefficient Standard Error T-Value 
Yt0.14707 0.06113 2.40597 
Y 
-1 
0.82362 0.07626 '10.80011 
D. W. = 2.07011, S= 107.657445 
One Period Ahead'Forecasts 
Actual: -7703 
Forecast 7369.0366 
Forecast Error: 333.96344 
. c(1) (1) = 9.62298 
X(3) (24i) = 37.99877 
, 
T1Wc ': 
(1)-statistic 
continuous to be significant implying 
inadequate stability for prediction, whereas the c(3)-statistic 
139. 
is insignificant implying adequate idontification/sPecification. 
The U. R. T. F. estimates: 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Value 
Yt 0-23460 0.1114114 2.05541 
Yt-1 0.07901 3.71430 0.02127 
Yt 1 -0.11048 0.11969 0.92,307 - 
Yd -0.00071 0.02126 0.03356 -2 
D. W. = 2.135311, S =. 110.33917 
One Period Ahead 'Forecasts' 
Actual: 7703 
Forecast: 7375.9161 
Forecast Error: 327.0859 
8.787118 
x(3) (21) = 37.83698 
ry Note the significance of the :: ý3)-statistic, implying 
inaidequate'identification/specification. 
The R. T. F. estimates: 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Value 
Yt 0.111785 0.06221 2'"37655 
Ytd 
-1 . 
0.82257 0.07763 -10.59595 
0.00580 0.02496 " 0.23250 
S= 108.861117 
One Period Ahead 'Forecasts' 
Actual: - 7703 
Forecast: '' 7367.9969 
Forecast Error: 333.0031 
( (1) = 9.46999 
2 
ý (23) =. 37.988119 '(3) 
1110. 
4, 
'lie may note again the prior results as far as the x 
statistic"s are concerned, and also the insignificance of 
the' autoregressive parameter implying; that the SF form is 
preferable to the other two. 
We proceed now to, allow for higher order autoregressive 
process. The results appear in the following table (pp. 11i2-11i3). 
Inspection of all the results fro have cited for this 
function implies a final form that is Written as follows: 
t 
Y=0.111707 Y+0.82362 Yý t (2.1! 0597) 
t (10.80011). 1,1 
As in the case of the Consumption function, this final 
form for Yd is the one that results from the application of 
the TSLS-, technique. 
1ýi1. 
4 
Y 
S. 
F LA 0 0 F to O 0 Q vt O 0 a H ý " ff 
. ~ N r .4 a H 'e H +1 H .e x 
1 M +1 0 .4 0 " +f O 
r? NO NO > r0 NO NO NO 
" " 
Np 
" " 
NO 
" " 
Y 
ý 
NO 
"" 
1.10 
" . 
ta0 
"" º1 
^ C 
014 VN 
p 
"p r 
W 
'"1 
0 
r V 
W 
W. 
"W 
ýA 
r º1 W r UI 
' 
r ! . f ý"f to n W wr r 
b C, ýO 1.4 .O i" ^ 1 
O 
ýO tP 
, d 
k" O. 
O" t 
VV 
0 Tc1 
t 
A r/ W in A 
p 
O f'1 to 
' ýP . ' 
. ý U "O V O ý7 Aq 6 "N 
v 
O 
C'ýý 
r 
ýf 
y .. .. O r -1 WO "" It oo o t 00 00 
1 
: 
1 
I 
I 
ý 
T 
"1 : M 
1i 
ý 
I 
ý" iII ýT C O rp COW Vr Vt 3 t". "" :J 
iE p 1 
Wta WW WtYI 
1 
Or ('1 Ný 
1 
f11r1 
ýO "tr w a W vt t4 "J". n 
- 
A 
O "Or O 
A 1 14 
Or N b C4 
AN 
t*l Vts 
N 
. 
tsP V. 
M (A n in .. W .ý 4n O r 0 " O : ýý w 
1.. 
o. 
  
w 
. 
i" r 
OU 
1 
w 
: 
. 
r. 
%A to 
r 
Ia 
rr 
rr M 
s 
11 
C "P "a".! M 3" 
MO P. . ". M -. 4. 
n 
H r 
rN 
1 
W 
i" 
NN 
II 
I 
r 
.O 
0N 
r :IP .' S t1 NN rO 
O Go 
A 
v V 
N 
.. + i" 1 r rr 
-O 
' . ". r. 0 ö n r0 .4 NO - 
1 
O R A rr NO " wW 4 
C, r C *-%D t' """w N to 10 rr N NN r0 A 
r 
% b b "O 'O .O b P "O 
in t1 N .O -' to 
U V W M rr Cs 
v 
to 
P 
V1 
V 
UI N W W H "O 0p W ý+1 vi 
.1 
V1 
H O" .O 4' tj w N P y 1J u : - 
h 
f/l 
" 1/1 PN t'1 Vt N v %Aý V1 rý ä 
W 
W^ 
W 
WA 
W 
r; 7 ^ 
w 
N 
%A 
W P -"1 N N 
r rd 
N 
N 
4 
rv W OJ º1 r 
v 
r J" 
_ O 1.5 N Cs N 4' t 
O O O O 
l d d U "O O bp O 
6" N 
to ?a "r %A 
b 
N N N N r ýJ Im 0 N 0 "O 9 ý 0 r 03 T t O V t N P V " 
r r r r r r r r r r r r+ 
M b "' Q r N 01 V 0% Pa N N 
. W- 
p 
p. P 
w W 9 Ci W C% 
W :P V1 
ö" 
%A 
W 
V V P 
0 P 
\1.1 
V 
*O 
Of. 4 
' % 4W V 4W r 
,O Vv 4 
N 
+oro> M i). "a1> +1 +7> +1M). +1 +e>" ero> 'O . OS 14> 11 s '9.1> 1e> O 
Q9 
l7 W : 
" "rr .rw rr rr 
N 
rr " rr 
s1 
rr " rr 
bl 
.rr 
"rr .rr "rr ° 
ý 
rvv rvv r-1.1 rýl. l rvv rvv rvv rvv rvv rvv rvv rvv 
, ,. Os W-1 
WPO 
w-1 
Uc%O 
" 
%A 
UPO 
wv 
wv0 
wv 
"'10 
%A I 
uPO wV \A .O 
9-4 
Nro 
Wv 
Wt'O 
wV 
w+0 
w 
wNO 
V-4 
Wno er" % 
1 
. ". fw W WOw U1TW a. qVw Uf? W C"Ow VCW U0ý7M AO 4 " 4" ~ Ný " N. 0%. r" " , R" N" P " " 
t O6 
r 
to -1 
"1 
'aN 
C3 
ýO 
O01 
- 
"w 
PV 
O 
X71 Ga 
"rr 
ON 
I " .O 
Oc. 
N 
J 
r 
NN 
N ;, \t 
W 
;I Y 
rGi -^O 
4 
NW W 
O V! rP .W VVI VW rO a 
N r V 
V Nca $O 0% %04r CO »CS NOS ö 
o a 
Hy 
{I C 
ý. 
r 
t 
M 
iý 
cl 'A p 
H ýJ H ý0 +e gi 
NO NO NO Y m0 NO NO Y 
~ NCO V is e%A . PV %R"n 
ii 
C "ON V CO . PN 
l l 
rW ý4 OV r 
r. n M ý n 
n 
ýr"" 
BOO VO 00 
ý . 
i 
"0 0 t0 - 
;O 
r"Ö 
r 
!/ ý . 4v ^ 4. Cl VI M. t ". 7 VI 7J " 4VJ 
"O VIW 
N-J 
~ 
h 
u 
p VIC 
to ý 
(ý 
30. 
"" OO ""1 '" 
4 . C ~a 7 
0 ° 
p l 
n 
n 
N 
Üä 
v 
tn 
. X (n V. 
rO 1 
M 
. 
1 0. 
n 
C% VI (J ý2 
rp r a 
o 
' 
~ 
e 
ö 
r 
r NN ± . M1 
t 
r 
1 ý+ 1 MQ MQ 
IJ t N 
Vr " N 
o NJ 
WQ Or " to ? 
t,,, rn 
" M UI M X 
b w %D to m 
'. O O" W M 'O V .A 
v 
.4 N % M Il CJ "O O y w 
MN to 
r 
W M W 
G, '- ýn n. : 1w 
a- 
(J 
' "N "N 
M 
v 
O 
d b 1 
V "i 
N to to 
" " O N 0 
Cl 
. c 
N i' 
" 
ý0 
M M M "" * M 
S 
" 
O O O O N 
V Pf W V Cl 
V" 
M ý1 r/ 0 N W V V1 4 - s ca s 
^ Ö 
u 
^ 
rv N 
ý is " . " 
" rr rr Mr M  " rr rV "y 
rVv rV. 1 r. 4 .t rv. t r 1. l . *4 r 0e WV WV WV WV ý4 V W O '1 1 WV0 W 140 W CS 0 WV0 W tJ O W C'%4 O0 
NV1W .4 V? W WcýW N. lW Wý AO 
V" 
ZN 
G" 
"W 
" 
N 
Cl. 
"N 
fl 4" 
"d 
C' 
" W 
Oi 
" 
. 11 tV -JD DIW OV ý NCO OW n"p N: 8 " C. ý ~ N p 0 ß Iý ýý 
"O n " O" 
y 
rg 
i% N 
N 
Tý N 
_ Cw 
H 
7ý I 
v N 
wý 
46 
11'. 2c Invcotmont Function (It 
The final form that this function tool: was: 
It - io + i1(AA1)t + is. (AY) t+ 13rLt-. + i4rLt-4 
+ 51t I 
As before wo begin by Providing the Correlation rtatri:: 
Cnrrnl ri-i nn Tlni ri-ý 
0 
It (AAI) t 
(AY) 
t Jt-1 rLt-3 rLt-! 1 
It 1.0000 0.38511 -0.0441 0.9552 0.8191 0.8150 
(4AI. )t 0.3851, 1.0000 " -o. 011G9 0.3383 0.6665 0.111,13 
(AY) t -0,0011111 =0-01169 1.0000 -0.1701, -0.0539 -0.01,83 
It-1 
. 0.9552 0.3383 -ö. 1701" 1.0000 0.83.55 0.8.036 
rLt., 3 ' 0.8191 . '0.4665 -0.0339 0.8355 1.0000 0.9804 
rLt-, 1 
0.8150 0.111113 -0.01183 0.8086 0.9804 10000 
The R2 = 0.94469; multicollincarity, therefore, can be 
a problem b ecause in one case the correlati on coefficient 
between rLt 
-3 
and rLt 
_11 
is greater than the R. Otherwise 
no serious multicolli nearity problems seem to prevail. 
The OLS estimates are noi, " provided; we note that, TSLS 
for this furction, can. not be applied becau se all the 
e:. planatöry variables are either o:: ogenous or predetermined. 
The S? estimates arc given first: 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T Vnlue 
(AAI)t 0.05152 0.02626 1.96102 
(ay) t 0-13481 0.04258 3.16573 
0.87607 0.06349 13.79821. 
Cont. 
111 fi . 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Va duo 
rLtr3 _614.58792 21.99007 2.93711 
rLt 
-ýi 
65.79097 21.2 9003 3.090 2 
CNST. 203: 84420 67.88130 3.00295 
R=o. 94469, D. W. = 1.933039' 5 41- 41"77 
One Period Ahead '%'orocnst' 
Actual:, 1796 
Forecast: 1743.5441 
Forecast Error: 47-4559 
ý1) (1) = 1.313111 
The "t4 (1)-statistic is insignificant, Zwwhich , of course, 
uic. an: that the equation performs very well as far as pro- 
diction is concerned. This is no surprise given the sriall 
forecast error. 
The U. R. T. F. asticncttes are: 
Variable 
(&AI) 
t 
(4Y ). 
ß 
It-1 
rL. t-3 
rLt-, l 
CNST. 
(AAI)t_1 
(AY)E-ý 
It 
-2 
CopffiC3. ont 
0.0757tß 
0.12729 
0.53447 
-66.10760 
77.1i2619 
187.68909 
-0. O3ß72 
o. o8611i 
0.36598 
Standard Error 
0.02569 
o. 0 40714 
o. 16o4G 
^0.95523 
34. 'k12161 
G2.1oli10 
0.02679 
0.0511 71 
0.15601 
rLt-5, ' -13.02169 . 
22.20985 
fl.,. 0.959644, D: W. = 2.07715, 
One-Period Abend 'Forecasts' 
Actual: 1796 
Forecast: 1820.14689 
Forecast Error: -244.44689 
2 
0.112939 
N11,35) = 3.2112 22 
1115. 
T-Value 
;:.. 91ß1h 
x. 121117 
>"_")093 
3.15500 
2.21k9&. 1 
3.02217 
1.111,515 
1,71L 37 
ß. 3,1586 
0.53630 
ä 37. >4107 
0 
Note the adequate, stability of the equation for predic- 
tion and also, the adequacy of the additional parameters. 
The I. T. F. estimates are now provided: 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Value 
(AAI) 
t 0.03718 0.02121 1.75291 
(QY)t 0.14 1193 0.011282 '2.91766' 
=t-1 0.92218 0.0'A /1 20.76051 
rLt-3 ... -45-09777 18.1407114 2-45001 
` rLt--t} 113.95671 17.91798 2. 
! 15322 
CNST. 'V15.221103 . 117.60746 3.05045 
f -0.40329 0.16211 2.51370 
S 39.5534. 
One Period Ahead 'Forecasts' 
Actual; 1796 
Forecast: 1316.8919 
Forecast Error: -20.8919 
2.1) (1) = 0.27899 
: c(2) (3) = ß. 8809/i 
The important statistic in this case is the x(2)-one, 
Which is just, significant at the 5'j level, but comfortably 
insignificant at the 2.5%1 level. 11cmay, therefore, come 
to the conclusion that the dynamic specification of this 
equation is adequate, and that we can use the R. T. F. and 
U. R. T. F. indiscriminately. Furthermore, since the 
coofficiclit' is significant it follows that the R. T. F. 
form of the function 
, 
is prreferable to the SF form. As we 
have already noted no TSLS estimates are provided for this 
function since it does not include any endogenous variables 
as arguments. We do,, however, "provido estimates that arise 
from usin higher order autoregrossivo process; those arc 
given in the following table (p., 1118). 
Looking at the x(2) (v)ºs and the 's, it is obvious 
14G. 
" that the final form of 'the I-function is* 
I= 145-. 22408 + 0.03718 (6n) + 0.12495 (QY ) t (3.05045) (1.75291) It (2.91766) t 
+ 0.92218 I- 45.09777 r+ X43.95671 rLt-1i 
(20.76051)t-1 (2.45001) Ltý3 (2.45322) 
This form is the R. T. F. one with the order of auto- 
regressive process being equal to one. All variables 
have 
the right sign,. except rLt-, k, and all of 
them, 
. 
including 
rLt-1j, are significant, at the 5% level, except in the case 
of (QAI)t which is-significant at the 1/ level. The sign 
ofýrLt_Ll seems to be the wrong one, at first sight; there 
is, however, an explanation as to its positive sign. It 
can be argued that expectations of further changes, say 
rises, 
in interest rates induce, after a while which is a quarter 
in our case, an expansion in'the level of investment follow- 
'ing the initial contraction in quarter 'three; these 
expectations, however, are expected to be short-lived and 
in-the next quarter the expected contractionary impact on 
the level of investment materializes again. Thus, the 
negative sign for the third quarter, the positive"one. for 
the fourth quarter, and the negative again in the fifth quarter 
which we have omitted, though, duo to its insignificance. 
See, however, the U. R. T. F. (p. 145 above) for a*confirmation 
of this result. 
One more point on the I-function is that we tried some 
other variables too, but failed to perform well, and conse- 
quently were left out. Notably the variables Pt and Mt 
failed completely to provide the right sign. ' Whenever they 
were tried not only did they have'the wrong signs but their 
coefficients were completely insignificant too. 
Finally, we note that the coefficient of It-1 implies a 
very slow adjustment. In fact it is only about 8% of the 
discrepancy between desired and actual Investment that is 
made up in the first quarter. Lags, therefore, in the 
Investment function are very important indeed. 
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14.2d' Stock-IIui. ldin`. LFunction 
(St 
The final. form of the function tested took tho folloll- 
ing form: 
e 
St so +s1 (cri) t+ s2 
(Ay. ) 
t+ S3rLt-3 + shrLt-! i 
s5St 1 
The Correlation Alotri: c is as follows: 
Cnrrnlnticnl fntrix 
s (AT"f) 
t 
(Ay) 
t 't-1 rLt-3 rLt-, 1 
st 1.0000 0.0076 0.2725 0.1900 -0.2313 -0.3063 
(All)e 0.0376 1.0000 -0.0155 -0.31161k 0.218110 0.2939 
(AY) t 0.2725 -0.0155 1.0000 -0.11590 -0.0539 -0.01183 
St-1 0.1900 *-0.3464 -0.11590 1.0000 -0., 181 -0.3273 
rLt_3 . -0.2313 0.2340 -0.0539 -0.3181 1.0000 0.9804. 
rLt_4 -0.3063 0.2989 _0.0! 183 -0.3278 0.9304 1.0000 
As in the case of the Investment function similarly in 
the case of this function the only problem seems to be the 
correlation coefficient between rLt_, - and rLt /1 which 
is 
well above the R` = 0.1i1i776. t? e may note in passing that 
the low R2 should. not: be surprising; it is expected that 
when the variables involved in an equation are in first 
differences, the R`' is always well below the R" estimated 
using absolute values. In the case of the StocR Building 
Function all variables, e;: cept the rLt_3 and rLt-/I, are in 
fact in first differences, thus the relatively low value for 
the, R 
We turn now to the OLS estimates. - We note, auainq that 
no TSLS. estiviatcs are Possible because till the argwnents in 
the function are e. {otgenous or predetermined. 
1119. 
First, the SF estimates: 
Varinhle' Coeflicieftt Standard Error T-Value 
(hm) 
t 0.1'1893 0.05021 2.55828 
(AY) 
t 0.31139 0.09038 3.111,5113 
S 0.115415' 0.15743 2.08396 
r Lt-3 115.61283 37-04920' 3.1052 
rLt-r1 -135.51293 39.17200 3.4133144 
' CZST. 132.191159 69.443672 1.90381 
R=0.1}4776 2 , D. W. - 2. 32491 S 76.97734 
One Period Ahead 'Forecasts, 
Actual: 205 
Forecast: 15.7 
Forecast Error: 147.4737 
'(1)'(1) = 0.33031 
ZJe note the insignificance of the : 1ý-statiotic 
implying 
adequate specification for prediction. 
The U. R. T. F. eytifIFttes follow: 
Var,. Ab1e Coefficient Standard Error T-Value 
(L12i)t 0.113446 0.06240 1.398111. 
(AY. ) 0.33562 0.03313 '4-37236 
St-1 0.21736 
. 0-17601k 1.23474 
rL. t-3 58-79492 141.2406" . 
1.42566 
rLt-t4 -1111.95326 68.83711 0.65304 
CNST. 53.75821# 75.620314 0.71039 
(el'i) 
t-I 0.01551 '0.06290 0.211667. 
(4Y)t-1 0.32381 " o. io605 3.05335 
2t-2 0.49703. 0.19551 2.54251 
rLt-5 -21Y. 34659 115.1162 71, 0.60152 
2 R 0.57531 9 D. 11. = 2.18159, S= 71.25334 
150. 
I 
One Period Ahead 'Forec ; Q_' 
Actual: - 205 
Forcc7st: 86.1247 
Forecast Error: ' 118.6753 
': (1) (1) = 2.77359 
F('i, 35) 2.62781 . 
Ne; zt, the I2. T. F. estimatos : 
Variablo' Coefficient Standard Error 
(AAI) 0.122t11ý 
. 
0. OýG^ýi 
(AY) 
t 0.414178 
0.08318 
St-1 I 0.851,33 0.12 30 
rL-t-3 59.30335 30.279511 
rLt-1} -70.01728 53.01810 
CNST. : 145.27589 115.33239 
I -0.64490 0.17215 
s= 70.97051 
'r-Valuo 
2.175311 
'1.98662 
6. ß221a. 
i. 95ß511 
^. 11993 
0.99875 
3.74614 
One Period Ahead 'Forecasts' 
v 
Actual: 205 
Forecast: 75. G402 
Forecast Error: 129.3518 
2 
x(i) (1) = 3.32192 
The last . ': (1)-statistic is. insignificant, Which norms 
that this equation is stable onough for prediction. 
(2) (3) = 3.33582; this is comfortably insignificant 
su, Sosti, ng that the dynamic specification of this equation 
is adequate. 
As in the case of the Investment function similnrly in 
this case, since the . c(2)-statistic is insignificant, and 
since the f- coofficiOnt is comfortably significant, it 
follows that the R. T. F. estimates are preferable to the othor 
two. 
. 
Next wo look at the table (p. 153) providing higher order 
autoregressive processes. According to our standard, by now, 
staff. istical criteria the choice of the rippropriate function 
151. 
is, {: lion: 
+ S=t 45.27589 + 0.1.2127151131 (4101, + 0.1111178 
Guý 
(AY )t 
(0.99875) (2 
0.63433 ;" 
-1 
+`59.30335 r1 t-3 - 70.017. ". i3 rLti-11 (G. 82218) (1.95854) 0.11993) 
The 'si ns and the T-Vnluos seem to be the right ones, 
o:: ccpt perhaps the sign of rLt-3; thin, however, should 
not be surprising when the two types of Investment are 
tnlcen into con'sidoration. When fi: cod capital formation 
is reduced in response toi sny, nt i. ncmctSe-, -. in the rate of 
intorost in. quarter three stocks scout to be piling up 
" probably to cotuiteract, so to spenlc, the reduced volu:: a 
of fi:: ed capital formation; and vice-voran in response to 
a decrease in the rate of interest' in quarter four. The 
positive sign of 'the rLt-3-variable can also be 'explained 
by taking expectations into consideration. Changes, say 
rises, in the rate of interest would induce people to pile 
up. stocks, initially, expecting higher interest rates in 
the future. Given the time lag involved, it is after the 
third quarter that the-usual contractionary effects of 
-higher interest rates start setting in. Thus, we should 
expect a positive coefficient for the rLt-3-variable but' 
a negative one for the rLt-! l-variable; those are the signs 
that we actually derive empirically. We note that the 
adjustment to the equilibrium position following a discre- 
pancy between actual and desired Levels is very slow; in 
fact only 17% of this discrepancy is made up in the first 
quarter. The Pt as well as Pt-1 variables have been tried 
but failed completely to provide satisfactory results, so 
we decided to exclude them from this function. 
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11.2e Imports Function (Qt 
The final function tool; the form: 
Qt = 
%o 
+ n1Yt + g2rit-1 + g3rt +, (1'} t-1 + g5at-1 
and the. Correlation Matrix spas: 
Corrolntion Aintrix 
Qt. Yt Pt Qt-. 1 . 
ß. 1i. 
-1 
Pt-1 
Qt 1.0000. 0.9675 0.9805 0.93117 0.9791 -0.9331 
Yt 0-9675, 1.0000 0.9456 0.96611 0,. 9323 0.9519 
Pt 0.9805. 0.91,56 1.0000 0.9833 0.9827 0.9989 
2t-1 0.9847 0.9664 0.9833 "1.0000 0.9775 0.98118 
?, It-1 . 0.9791 0.9323 0.9827 0.9775 1.0000. 0.9859 
pt-1 0.9831 0.9519 0.9989 0.9848 0.9859 1.0000 
The R2 = 0.98358; and it seems that multicollinearity 
can be a problem in this case since not all correlation 
coefficients ar, e smaller than'the R2. ' In particular since 
. 
the correlation coefficient between P is above and P 2 t t-1 the lt one has. to be rath er, careful wit h this particular 
esti mated imports function. 
The OLS estimates of the SF are: 
Variable Coefficient 
'Standard Error T-Value 
Yt 0.21596 0.05589 3.86394 
Pt 10.07122 7.54641 1.33457 
Rt_1 o: o8793 0.16322 0. '53874 
0.09373 .. ' 0.02941 3.18736 
-9.77732 9.21938 1.06052 
CNST . -804.72014 223.14911 3.60620 
2 
R- 0.98358, D. W'. _ 2.08129, S_ 119.31443 
1511. 
One Period Ahead 'Forecasts' 
Actual: 2697 
Forecast: 2752.8932 
Forecast E rror: -55.893" 
(1) = 1.28440 
The : cý 1 )-statistic 
is insignificant implying ndequnt e 
stability for prediction. 
The U. R. T. F. estima. tos are: 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Valuo 
Yt 0.2.0938 0.0.6383 , 3.28033 
Pt ' 14.1489314 10.59568 1.367e8 
Rt-1. 0.0ß97a 0.19955 ö. 44988 
11t-1 0.08852 0.03783 2.34019 
Pt-i -31.03891 17.72067 1.75157 
CNST "" -818.07388 344.65718 2.37346 
Yt_1 -0.00556 0.08354 0.06657 
ßt_2 0.03679 o. 19462 0.44593 
11t_2 -0.00229 . 0.008G5 9.2G4G! k 
Pt-2 17.06513 11.90220 1.43378 
Z R=0.984 889 D. W. ='2-15976, S'= li9.9551i1 
One Period Ahead 'forecasts, 
Actual: 
Forecast: 
Forecast. Error:. 
2 
:: (1) (1) = o. 95305 
F(4935) = 0.752944; 
predictive power of 
parameters are sign; 
2G97 
2 648.2314 
f48.768G 
both the 1rst two tests mean that the 
the equation is ndequnte, and the ndditionnl 
ificant. 
155. 
The R. T. F. estimate's arc: 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Valito 
Y 0.21867 0.05991 3. (+5020 
P 10.30332 7.711073 1.33101 t 
0.082119 (fi 0.16794 0.119119 t-1 
0.0911711 Ii 0.03036 3.12098 t-1 
Pt-1 -10.08300 9.. 0562 1.060711 
CNST" -815.50122. 2111.63280 3.37496 
0.00939 0.07299 b. 12062 
s= 119-'952157 
One Period Ahead-. 'Forecasts' 
Actual: 2697 
Forecast: 2751. 2875 
Forecaät. Error: -54.2 875 
(1) = 1.18109 
'`(2. ) 3' 69561 
The x(1)-statistic is insignificant implying adequate 
stability foi prediction. What, is more, however, the 
"-2 -; statistic is insigni "(2) ficant which means that the dynamic 
specification of the funct ion is comfortably adequate. Since 
now this function involves an endogenous variable amongst the 
e:: planatory variables we can use TSLS too, and the appropriate 
estimates are given below. 
As always. the SF estimates are given -first:, . 
Variable Coefficient' Standard Error T-Value 
Y't 0.21576 0.05589 3.86022 
t 10.05630 7.514645 1.33259 
Qt 1 0.0883 0.16322 0: 511113 
Mt'1 0.09368 0.02941 3.18562 
I t-1 -9.75828 9.21913 1.05845 
CNST. -803.93577 " 223.15233 3.60263 
U. 11. = 2.. 081749, S= 1ý9 . 3181ý11 
i 
156. 
Although tilc :; (1)': 3tati. ltic in illsir']1ificnnt , the 
x(3 )-statistic is significmi L implying 
inadequato npocifi. cn- 
tion/identification. 
I 
The R. T. F. estimates follow: 
Variablc 
yt 
p t. 
Q 
-"1 
CNST. 
Coefficient 
O. 18ß18 
.in 
. 96722 
0.: 11.1142 
Standard Error 
0.0569f! 
3.559'i0 
0.21008 
0.08287 
-7.11305 
-722.4f2514 
0.02639 
11-05234 
231.53985 
p0.190011 0.20372 
S 119.5Oß50 
One Period Ahead 'Forecasts' 
Actual: 2697 
Forecast: 27 2.0301 
Forecast Error: -5.5.0301 
(1) 1.23549 
r 21. :: (3) (20) = 31.25251. 
'1'-Valuo 
3.3O'i8 
I . 9577 
1.11,917 
3. i4013 
1.75529 
3.1^009 
0.91050 
We note that both 
2i)- 
and 
(3)-statistics 
. 
are insigni- 
ficant, with their appropriate implications. 
These results clearly indicate that the appropriate 
estimated egltation to be chosen from both the OLS and TSLS 
estimates is the SF form of the TSLS technique. Ule look now 
at the following tables(p. p. 160-161) where we provide estimates 
of the Imports function with higher order autoregressive 
processes. 
Careful eý, aciination of all these results clearly indicate 
that. the final form of the estimated Imports function should 
be the- following : 
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Long-Term , s' Interest ' Itai: c Function (rLt) : 
The ftulctioiz tosted ý: ook the form: 
rLt o+ 
riyt + ? 2rst + 
i31)t +f 'II)t-1 +/ 5rLt-1 
The 'Correlation I"Iatri:: is as follows: 
['nrrnl nff7 r% vs Ltn4. -t+ti "" 
I 
rLt Yt r, t rLt-1 1) t 
I t-1 
rL 1.0000 0.9091k 0.8113 0-9851 0.91480 0.9396 
y 0.90911 1.0000 0.70112 ii. 9: 07 0.91i5G 0.9519 
. rst 
a 
O. ß113 0.70112 1.0000 0.7671 . 
0.69117 0.6832 
rL. tw1 0.9351 0.9207 0.7671 1.0000 0.91190 . 
0.91i2G 
rt 0.9,180 0.91156 0.69117 . 0.91190 1.0000 0.9989 
Pt-1 Q-9396- ' 0.9519 0.6832 o. 9426 0.9939 1.0000 
At before nulticollinearity can be a problem since the 
correlation coefficient between P t, and I' t-1is greater 
than 
the R" ý 0.9C3114. 
I3efore we move on to examixne the OLS and TLS estimates 
we comment on sonic of the variables included in this function. 
Pt and . Pt1 are introduced in order to capture any, influence 
on the long-term' rate of interest of changes in, the curreiit 
Price. level (Pt and of 'any c : pectatioits of changes in the 
price level affecting the current level of "rL (r't_1) Teo 
may also note that r St , 
tands for the treasury bill rate which 
is assumed, as z: wo noted before, to influence the long-tort-. 1 
rate via'. a stable, and of course simple, term structure of 
interest. rates. 
162. 
The OLS tocliniquo gave us the following results: 
The SF estimates aro 
Variablo Coefficient Standard Error T-Vplue 
Yt -0.0000015 0.00029 0.00525 
rst 0.13505. "' 
0.0311113. 3,92273 
ý'Lt-1 . 0.72360 0.09427 7.67595 
P 0.10809 0.05158 2.09569 t 
P -0.09567 0.05569 1.71783 t-i " 
CNST. -0.39260 " 1.20550 0.32567 
R'ý = 0-9834 49, D. W. _ 1.73193, S= 0.28305 
One Period . Ahead 'ror ecasts' 
Actual: 
." 
15.30 
Forecast: . 11i. 76 90 
Forecast Er rpr: ' 0.53 10 
. ý) (1) = 3.51875 
We note drat -: ý 1)- statistic 
is just insignificant 
at the 51'o' l evel of signifi cance. 
The U. R. T. F. "estimates' are: 
V, ari. nblo Coefficient Standard Error T-Value 
Yt 0". 00002 0.00036 0.043111 
rst 0.12023. 0.06191 1.911209 
rLi; 
-1 . 
0.36917 0.17750 4.89678 
Pt 0.101F3ä 0.06209 1.68113 
Ptý1 -0.07110 0.101121 0.71107 
-CNST. -0.76552 1.39511 0.544372 
Yt-1 0.00009 0.00036 0.2 6036 
rst-1 -0.00620 0.07267 0.08532 
rLt-2 '" -0.17488 0.171413 1.02010 " 
pt-2 " -0.01920 0.07009 0.27390 
It2 = 0.9839 7, D. W. 1.9119311 S _ 0-2-93966' , 
1630 
One Period Alieod ' Forecct. ;: ^' 
Actual: 15. n 
Forecast: 11F. ý'ýý ý1 
Forecast Error: 0.11586 
21) (1) _ 2. t13k21 
F(1k, 35) 0.28935 
We note that both the 
(1)-statistic 
and the F-s1 a'L"iritic 
are insignificant. 
The R. T. F. estimates are now provided: 
Vzri. n11e Coefficient 
Yt - 0.00005 
rs 0.13769 
, Lt-1 0.68048 
Pt 0.11173 
I,. t-1 -0.09771 
CNST . -0., 66505, 
F 0.1G15o 
s'= o: ýa3O5 
One Period Ahead 'Forecasts' 
Standard Error T-Valuo 
0.00032 0.111607 
0.03876 3.55244 
0.12797 5.31738 
0.05309 2.101438 
0.05680 1.72081 
1.110750 0.47250 
0.29500 0.82317 
Actual: 15.30 
Forecast: 11s. G94G 
Forecast Error: 0. Go5! 
(1) 11.511922 
1) , 
2 (3) = 0.51,9116 
The :. ý 1)-statistic is significant, v; creas the 
2 
)- 
statistic is insignificanit. The insiCýiificanico of the latter 
statistic implies,, adequato dynamic specification of the 
equation, and with the beingp insignificant wo conclude 
that the SF form is rref1 orable to the 'other two forms. 
1Gt1. 
it e lool: now at the TS1.5 e: itirzates, bogiiin. ing with "tho 
SF ones : 
Varilblo Coefficient Standard Li. "ror T-Value 
Yt -0.0000014 0.00029 0.00507 
rst 0.13505 0.031,113 3,9X6,7 
rLt-1 0.72360 0.09447 7.67590. 
0.10809 0.05158 2.09530 
pt 1 -0.09568 0.05569 1.71795 - 
CNST. -0.59281 1.20550 0.32581 
D. W. = 1.73 192, S=0.2 8305 
One Period Ahead 'F'orecasts' 
Actual: 15.30 
Forecast: 14.7690 
Forecast Er ror: 0.53.10 
2 
'C1) (1) 3.51952 
'(3) (21) _ 24.09993 
Both -ics are insignificant iriplying adequate 
. specificati on 
for prediction and 'also ade quate overall 
specificati on/identification. 
Now the U. R. T. F. estinia'to s are given: 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T . -Value 
Yt . 0.00002 . 0.00036 0.06390 . 
rst 0.11930 0.06203 1.923111' 
rLt-1 0.38156 . 0.18029 
11.33962 
pt 0.10397 0. OG441 1.611133 
I' 
-a 
'-0.09221 0.070113 1.30916 
CNST -0.58933 1.60037 0.3 68211 
'ft-i 0.00003 0.00036 0.08195 
rst_1 -0. -00371 0.07278 0.05095 
rLt-2 -0.17379 0.17146 . 1-01355 
nit-2 0.00063 - 0.00551 0.178112 
165. 
D. Il. 1. 981108, S=0. ^91115 
One Period Alicricl ' Forecasto l 
Actual: 15.30 
Forecast: 111.7803 
Porecant Er`ror: 0.5197 
(i) (1) - 3.1220 " 
23) (17) - 23-113537, 
Both 0 , c"-s. tiatioti: co are in: iignifibant with similar 
implicati ons as in tile, Sr caao. 
And, the R. T. F. es-ti. uiate3" are: 
Variable Coefficients, Standard Error T-Vtilue 
YL -0.00005 '0.00030 0.154011 
rat 0.13520 0.035111 3.34739 
rLt-1 . 
0.73061# 0.0959" 7.617'19 
rt 0. -1.0189,0.05276 1.93130 
p -0.03356 " 0.05727 1.5'1631 t-I 
CITST -o. 196O5 1.301111 0.15095 
p 
0.01202 0.05754 0.32023 
s -0.2ß63G 
One Period Ahead 'Forecasts' 
Actual: 15.50 
Forecast: 14.8023 
Forecast Error: 0-11972- 
2 (1) = 5.01511 
(3 (20)'. = 24.044268 
Dotli 2-statistics arc insignificant; so is the 
coefficient which implies that the SF form is to be chosen 
at the e:: pcn ,e of the other two. 
, Comparing, the OLS estimates with the TSLS ones wo find 
that the. former are slightly better than the latter implying 
that some, very small though, degree of simultaneity is 
responsible for the bettor fit when GLS is used. We. now 
1G6. 
provide estimates for this equation, allowing for. highor 
order autoregressive process (see p. p. 1G8-169). 
Careful inspection of all the results we have provided 
clearly shows that the appropriate equation is the following: 
rLt -0.39281 - 0.0000014Yt+ 0.3505 rst + 0.72360 r Lt-s (0.32584) (0.00507) 
. 
(3.92267). (7.67590) 
+ o. 1o8o9 P 0.09568-P 
(2.09580) t (1.71795) t-i 
The main-point to note about this estimated equation is the, 
. sign of 
Yt which is completely the wrong one. We have tried 
to find out what happens to the sign of'this variable when 
prices are left out. The result was that an embarrassing 
improvement in the sign and size of the coefficient occurred; 
it became positive and the T-Value exceeded two. It seems, 
therefore, that the inclusion of prices knocks out Yt 
completely, implying that changes in-prices as well as 
expectations of such changes play a more important role in 
determining the long-term interest rate than income; ors 
perhaps, nominal income is more important in determining 
rLt than real income, although real income, if left on its 
own, does have a role to play, as far as the determination 
of this variable is concerned. We'also note the strong 
influence of the treasury bill rate, and that, of course, 
of lagged long-term rate. The coefficient of the latter 
implies a very slow adjustment, thus establishing some 
significance of lags in the formation of tong-term interest 
rates. 
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4.2g Demand for Money Function 
" The form 
IIIt clo a diYt + cl2rst + clI't + c14 t-l + d5I 
ti 
'leas been tested and has given us the following result. 
First of all, th ougli, we provide the Correlation Matrix. 
Cnrrn i (icon rintriti 
2jt Yt l+st 1't 1It-1 I't-1 
IIit 1.0000 0.9319 0.6342 0.9831 0.9931 o. oßGi 
Yt 0.9319 1.0000 0.70112 0.91,56 0.9313 0.9 19 
rst 0.63112 0.7042 1.0000 0.6947 0.6779 0. Gi>2 
Pt 0.9831 0.9'k56 0.6947 1.0000 0.9327 0.9939 
DIt-1 0.9934 0.9523 0.6779 0.9827 1.0000 0.9859 
Pt-1 0.9861 0.9519 0.6832 0.9986 0.9359 1.0000 
As in other cases where both Pt and Pt-1 appear'in the 
same equation, similarly in this case the correlation 
coefficient between these two variables is higher than the 
ß` = 0.99273; however, the difference between the two is 
not as great as in' some other cases discuosed above. 
The estimates are now given, startinge, as always, w . th 
the 'OLS technique and with the SF' : Corm: 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Value 
Yt 0.27397 0.168145 1.65635 
rst -99.16936 21.19930 796 
Pt 59.57826 29.66977 2.00305 
Cont. 
170. 
Variable Coefficient 5tancl, ýrdEr ror T-Vnlue 
1'iýr1 0.8371e 0.09503 9.33019 
t_1 -511.3111131[ 37.22900 1.45970 
CNST -1180.72041 635.64339 1.72206 
R2 ; . 0. 99273, D. W. = 2.83028, S1 70. 
'13151 
One" Period Aliead'Forecasts 
Actual: 15550 
Forecast: 13351-7023 
Forecast Error: 198.2977 
Xý1) (1) = 1.. 353711 
The x' -statistic is ins ignificant implying adequate 
specification for prediction. 
Next, , tue U. R. T. F. are presented: 
Variable Coefficient. Standard Error T-Value 
Yt 
. 
0.27832 0.19569 1.42226 
r st _109.541445 39.00838 2.80823 
t 92.77322 32-4396o 2.85938 
Mt-1 0.83632 "0.11780 7.52413 
Pt_1 -193.911004 56.52867 3.113083' 
CNST -11455.88119 753. 'i9166 1.93218 
vt-1 -0.01114 0.19690 0.05657 
rst_1 18'"1}389 2 145"471475 0.405113 
1.1t-2 -0.00574 0.02651 o. 21661 
Pt-^ 110.31992 36.65960 3.00930 
2 ` 0.9 911113, D. W. = 2.82381 S= 157: 5'11117 
One Period Ahead 'Forecasts, 
Actual: 13550 " Forecast: 12726. 1715 
Forecast Error: 823.32 85 
:. C1) (1) = 27.311537 
F(tk, 35) = 2.66076 
171. 
k 
'r1 e vor, ». aiCnificant in this ca so, but 
the F-statistic - "ia ju rt iilsi. ; nificrx: it. 
Now, tlho. R. T. F. estimntes : 
Variable 
Yt 
st 
Pt 
Ilt-1 
lP t-1 
CNST 
Coefficient 
o. 294Go 
-99.8722 7 
G-1. (6 i9 
0.88991 
-56.85286 
-1246.85854 
Standnrd Error 
0.18206 
21.614958 
T-Vc11uo 
1.61812 
11.66313 
2.004414f 
9.14352 
1.66^69 
1.66269 
0.23907 
30.66900 
0.09733 
33.65393 
7119.90250 
p 0.00722 0.0; 024 
S 172 "53201 
One Period Abend Forecasts 
Actual: 13550 
Forecast: 1331.1.1350 
Forecast Error: ^08.3650 
X(1) (1) = 1.46552 ( 
(3) ' -- 11 
£3 0 113 
The , -"(2, j)-statistic is, no., { comfortably 
insignificannt, but 
th e..: 
(3 
)-statistic is significant nt the 5'"- lovol, tllou, ýlh ' it 
is just so at the 1ýö level. Ideally, tlaereforo, one should 
introduce a more complicated lag structure in the above three 
forms; in particular the variable 1't-2 should be included in 
the original SF form. lie have not included it, however, for 
three very good reasons: Firstly, because the value of the 
(2 )-statistic is not very far from 'being insignificant, at G 
the 1''j level anyway. Secondly, because of a desire to rostrict 
the. number of predetermined variables given that we could only 
have !7 observations. Thirdly, it more complicated lag struc- 
turo i. considered below when wo allow for higher order, auto- 
regressive processes. 'There is one very important lesson to 
be derived from all these: it' scenes that the lag, structure of. 
172, 
the various estimated dcwnnd-for-money functions reported 
in the literature "L-end to 1n. unaccepttilblo; they are, in' 
: Crick s Lmilnr to the one reported hero, and therefore the lag 
structure. ns it' is tested by the ;: ý 2 )-stati stic of those 
functions., ' has to be more complicated than the one usually 
reported. 
Next, the TSLS c t-it; mtos arc - provided with the SF ones 
first: 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Vnluo 
Yt 0.27893 0.163143 1.6561io 
rst -99.16999 21.19935 14.67797 
Pt 59.57930 29.66908 2.00807 
M t-1 0.38714 0.09503 9.33020 
pt_1 -511-. 311581 37.23006 1.15973 
Cr1ST ' -1100.75867 685-G4985 1.72210 
D. 1. = 2.83023, S= 170-43151 
One Period Ahead 'Forecasts' 
Actual: 13550 
Forecas't: 13351 . 6937 
Forecast Error: 198.3 063 
="" (1)'= 1.35386 
u 
1(3). (21) _ 1111-997705 
The point to be made on those estimates is the value of 
tho :. 
"3 
statistics which is significant at both the 5" level . 
Eis well as the 1: ö level, s ignifying that th e specification/ 
identification of this fun ction is inadequa te. 
The U. R. T. F. estimates now follow: 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Value 
Y'1 0.18485 0.181117 1.01863 
Est -105.68970 36.88685 en-86524 
I' 64.46636 t 29.71165 2.16976 
Contd. 
173. 
Vari'nblo Coefficient :; talidnrd Error T-Vnluo 
Mt 0.49161 0.16080 3.05734 
-1 
1't-1 -37.10703 36.97600 1.00354 
CNNST -2472.53735 751.73381 3.28911 
Yt-1 0.41536 0.18100 2.29358 
r -44.959041 45.30311 0.99196 
lit-7. 0.55371 0.15194 3.64427 
,P t-2 -39.87612 10.52397 3.78927 
D. W. = 1. 7401119 S 148.83873 
One Period A. hend ' Forecasts 
Actual: 13550 
Forecast: 13055.5499 
Porccast Error.: 494.4501 
(1) = 11.0)00 
: 3) (17) = 
44.99569 
Doth : c2 -stati , tics . ire significant. 
The R. T. F. estimates arc as follows: 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Valuo 
Yt 0.53159' 0.03331 4.580.3 
rst -97.46049 10.23012 9.52682 
I't 65.151169 2-81532 23.111273 
I; t_1 1.01 
3 0.05376 13.95''"01 
P-L-1 72.39%311 5.00122 14.47533 
CNST -1571.47911 593.39375 5.99467 
)° -0.55295 0.13796 4.00811 
ä'= 146.6 9970 
One Period Ahead t F'orecasts' ' 
Actual: 13550 
Forecast: 13082.84401 
Forecast Error:. 4G7.1599 
174. 
r 
(1) 10.111030 
7'(5) (20) = 111.99567 
E:. 1mining, now, the tables (Pp"176-177) for higher order 
autoregressive processes, rind the results presented abovo, 
the conclusion is timt the equation: 
ýjct -11,3 9-01913 + 0.34787 yt '- 100.115359 r ,t 
65.33855 Pt 
(1. £13716) (1.79594) ý' (ýi. 63138) ý' (2-10573) 
-62.96615 i 1t_1 0.90228 N (1.59911ýi) t-1 (9.15380) t-1 
is chosen according to the statistical criteria that have- 
already been discussed. It is very. important to note that 
this final form is that one derived by using TSLS and allowing 
-for third order'autoregressivo process. This is so because 
it is only then that a satisfactory x(2)-statistic is 
'achieved, implying adequate dynamic specification of the Mt- 
function. The overall fit seems to be satisfactory, especially 
that of the treasury bill rate, but there'might be some 
objections as far as the x 3) 
is concerned which is signifi- 
cant at the 5% level but just so at the i% level. -We may 
note at this stage that we have also tried other interest 
rates apart from rst-the treasury bill rate- such as the. 
euro-dollar rate, the local authority rate and the long-term 
bond rate (rLt); the results are not really any, different, 
if at all, so we have decided to keep the rst in this 
particular equation. We also note the significance of the 
rit-1 variable, and the importance of its coefficient which 
implies that only 10°ö of any discrepancy between desired and 
actual money balances is-made up in the first quarter. The 
significance, therefore, of lags in the Mt-function is thus 
established. 
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Money Supply Function (N): 
The following form: 
DIt = mo + m1Yt + m2rdt + m3ut + mliP, it-1 + r15T3t-1 + mG(AA)t 
was tested and-Save us the following results. Before we begin 
our discussion of the empirical results it is imperative to 
note that the above equation differs from the one we suggested 
earlier, namely: 
Mt = nmo + rn1Yt '+ m`rt + m, Bt + mill'It-1 
In particular, the rate of interest used here is rdt which 
stands for the difference between the U. K. treasury bill 
rate and the U. S. A. treasury bill rate. The reason for not 
having just one rate is because no such rate has stood up Well 
at all empirically; treasury bill rate, local, authority rate, 
" long-term bond rate, all these have been tried and failed 
totally to give the right sign, and also in most cases the 
T-value was rdther disappöinting. The reason for such poor 
empirical performance of just a single rate in the 14ts_ function 
is obvious. During the period under examination the commer- 
cial banking sector was very much restricted in their policies 
" by the measures taken by the monetary authorities i. e. 
restrictions on advances, requests, etc., and consequently 
the banking sector was not- free to react freely, and pro- 
sumably according to the theoretical considerations 
discussed' earlier, to any changes in interest rates. We, 
thus, include the (AA)t variable, which stands for changes 
in the level of total advances in order to capture the 
influence on money supply of any restrictions on the level 
of advances imposed by the monetary authorities. Now, the 
rdt variable is introduced because of 'a belief that the 
monetary-authorities during the period under examination 
pursued a policy that aimed in controlling short-term 
interest: rates, and the treasury bill rate is used here as a 
good r. epro'sontative of short-term rates, in order to influ- 
once short-term capital movements. Thus, the difference 
between the U. K. treasury bill rate and the U. S. A. treasury 
-bill rate is used in order to capture any influences on 
the money supply of inflows or outflows of short-term capital. 
178. 
Finally, the variable ß., 
_i 
i. e. laggod base money, is 
necessarily included on. püroly statistical criteria; and 
it is necessary to include it in order to' got a non- 
significant 1(,, ), which is absolutely required so that 
proper dynamic specification of -thee. equation is achieved. 
Sie turn now to the empirical results, beginning with 
the -Correlation Ilntri::: 
(`nrrnl rl+i nn lein+º+i ýr 
"f 
Mt Yt Bt (QA) t rit_1 ßt-1 rdt 
lis 1.0000 0.9319 0.9776 0.7042 0.9934 0.9703 -0.2165 
Yt 0.9319 1.0000 0.9617 0.5571 0.9323 0.9668 -0.2338 
ht 0.9776 0.9617 1.0000 0.6273 0.9811 0.99511 
, 
-0.25115 
(AA)t 0.7042 0.5571 0.6273 1.0000 '0.6999 0.61148 -0.2199 
11 N t-1 0.9934 0.9323 0.9811 0.6999 1.0000 0.9767 -0.2480 
Bt-1 0.9703 0.9668. 0.99511 0.6148 0.9767 1.0000 -0.2557 
rat 0.2165 -0.2338 0.2545 -0.2499 -0.2480 -0.2557 1.00000 
n 
The I12 = 0.98936, and it seems that since the correlation 
coefficient between E3+ and IIt-1, as well as that between Mt 
and Mt-1, i s higher than the RZ wo do have to take into consi- 
derätion that cnulticollinearity can be a problem. 
The OLS estimates are now given, with the SP ones first: 
Variable Coefficient Standard *Error T-Value 
Yt 0.22955 0.19229 1.19375 
Bt 1.02413 0.49304 2.07719 
(hA)t 0.15105 0.10906 1.385011 
I'1t-1 
. 0.88349 0.10733 8.227112 Contd. 
6 
179. 
One Poriod Miand 'roroea s1 ' 
Actual: 1555() 
Forecast: ' 136115.1196 
Forecast' Error: -95.1196 
.. (i) (1) = o. 190G1, 
5,33) _ o. 55G9o 
Both the and the F-Statistics are in'significaiit. 
`ý 
- -": C 1) 
And, the R. T. F. estimates: 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Value 
Yt 0.23888 0.19798 1.20655 
13t 1.02 613 0.1197117 2.. 06272 
(AA) 
t 0.11950 0.11019 1.35675 
rIt-1 0.87907 0.11035 7.9t611-9 
13 t-i -o" 9ý71fo 0.50657 1.850119 
rdt 140.744297 20.55625 1.98396 
CNST -1048-85913 362. o0645 1.21676 
0.01237 0.03520 0.35113 
S 206. 29771k 
One Period Alicad* 'Forecasts' 
Actual: 13550 
roreca at: 13645.84418 
For c'cast Error: -95.8418 
2 (1) = 0.21533 
1ý2) (4. ) = 2.08552 
21 
, )-stati3tic'is insignificnnt suggesting that the 'fhe :( 
dynamic structure of the equation is adequate; given, then, 
that the P-coefficient is insignificant the SF form is 
Preferable, to the other two forms. The :: 
(1)-statistic is also 
insi ynificaiit, indeed it is so in all threo' forms, implying 
adequate specification for prediction. 
181. 
L' o turn now our attention to the TSLS estimatop, beginning 
ßrä. ý-11 the SF ones 
Variable Coefficient 'Standard Error T-Valuo 
Yt " 0.22651 0.19215 1.17701 
Bt 1.122113 0.51592 2.17510 
(AA) 
t 0.15251 0.10911; 1.397111 
211 
t 1 0.871109 0.10325' 
8.08131 
- 
D1 -1,. 01963 0.51366 1.9ß5O2 
rdt X41.10205 20.2/1143 2.03059 
CNIST -973.075811 8125 --45506 "1.178811 
D. W. 2 . 6G057, S 2204.02179 
One . Period Ahead .? F'orecasts' 
'. Actuni : 13550 
Forecast: 13662 . 3167 
Forecast Error: -112. 3167 
"'(1) (1) - 0.30306 
:: (3) (21) = 44-45329 
Altho ugh the ý: statistic is insignificant, - the same 
is not-tr ue for the 3)-statistic, so there some doubts 
about the identification/snocifjcation of this equation. 
The U . R. T. F. estimates arc: 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Value 
1't 0.15971 0.25723 0.62100 
13t 1.00079 0.58021 1.721436 
(AA)t 0.0953/ 0.13030 - 0.73171 
IIt-1 0.921191 0.111507 6.37580 
13 t-1 -1. li821 i 0.73991 2.00311 
1 dt " 39.13278 22.92380 1.70708 
CNST -1088.66566 984-14396 1.1062.1 
Contd. 
182. 
f 
Variable Coefficient Stnndard Irr. or T-Vctluo 
yt-1 o. oGo8G 0.26350 0. ',, =x1097 
(AA) 
t-i 0.00069 0.1204 1 0.00577 
11t-2 -0-01147 0. o3tt0O 0.336442 
nt-r 0.511935 0.58558 0.93314 
r at- ý. 10.68151 211-971G. -) 0.1j 775 
D. W. _, 2. 69830,. S .. 213.51,569 
One Period Ahead 'Forecasts' 
nciual: 13550 
Forecast: 13670.766" 
Forecast Error: -120.7662 
"Z(1) 
(1) = 0.31982 
2 
Ile no te arnin the inadequate s, ipecific atio: i/identification, 
as it is revealed by the significant "Z 3) -statistic. 
Next, tho R. T. F. estimates arc cited: 
Variable Coefficient 
. 
Standard Error T-Valtic 
Yt. 0.23585 0.19814 1.19030 
ßt 1.12389 0.52040 2.15966 
(AA) 
t 0.15088 0.11027 1.36329 
1It-1 0-87042 0.11121 " 7.826 i8 
13 t-7 -1.011119 0.52005 1.9'1716 
rdt 40.81079 20-54807 1.9.8611 
CNST -10311.78317. 862.79930 1.19933 
0.01256 0.03554 0.353311. 
S 20G. 1i0! 131 
183. 
One Period Ahencl 'Forecasts' 
Actual: 13550 
Foroca t: " 13667.6903 
roreczst Error: -117.. 6903 
3 3) (20) . rýli .4 iý933 
And the :. (,. )-statistic continuous to be significant, 
ns the x)-statistic continuous to be insi ; nificnnt. 
Wo now look at the tables (pp. 185-187) that provide 
estimates of higher order autoregressive processes. Careful 
examination of these tables, and the results provided above, 
point to the conclusion that the final form should be: 
-973.07536 + 0.22651 Y. +I. 1x2119 + 0.15^51 (AA) (1.173344) (1.17701) ." (2-17510)'t (1.597111) t 
+ 111.10205 r-1.019,63 ßt_1 + 0.374439 tit-1 
(2.0 059) ýt (1.98502) (8.03181) 
This is the SF form of TSLS chosen according; to our 
usual statistical criteria. The predictive power of this 
equation is adequate, as it is judged by tlio ýcýý)-statistic, 
but the' specification or identification as it; is tested by 
the :: 
2., 
statistic is rather shalcy as this statistic is 
sf. ; n3. ficant at 'both the 5', and 1iß levels. The variables 
Yt and (AA) t do have the right signs but their T-Value: are 
very low; the variables Bt and rdt have both the right 
sign and are significant, as well as the variables 1-1t_1 and 
ht-1 " The sign of. the latter, actually negative, is justified 
as follows: an increase, Say, -of base money in period t-1 
will increase the money stock in the same period and also 
the level of i"come. ' he increase in the level of income 
now Will crtuse the level of base money to decrease - since 
we postulate a noggative relationship betzeen Dt and Yt 
and if nothing else happens this rril1 have a decreasin 
impact on the level of money stock in period t., 
184. 
Tliese f. iiidins, then, , m-em to indicate timt if the 
authorities can control 11 and rýlt t ey can easilyº control 
the money stock. Now, rdl is obviously a very 'difficult 
variable to control, but whether il{, can "be controlled 
is not 
so clear, ' and this is actually the next variable whose 
empirical-perf. fommance we move on to investigate. Before we 
do this, however, it is important to note that Pt and 11t "1 
have also been tried in the 11s-function but their empirical I 
results were very unsatisfactory so we left the price. 
variables out of this equation. One more point is on the 
coefficient . of, the 
kIt_1 variable which implies a very slow 
adjustment. Lads, therefore., are very important as far as the 
DIt-function is concerned, as the case is with the DI 
d function 
also. 
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13asc IIlorioy Function (1) 
t 
The. forp» that, this function evotltueily tools wns: 
13t = bo +"b1Yt + b` (SP)t + b3 (AIM)t + bi}l't + 
br i t_1 + bGI3t_1 
with the following table being the Correlation Matrix: 
1n+4^ "n+i nr ? f, l-i' v" 
I. 
Bt Yt (AI3I0t (5P)t Pt Ißt-1 Ißt-1 
B 1.0000. 0.9617 0.0701 0.9380 0.9907 0.9954 0.9910 
Yt 0.9617 1.0000 0.051441 0.9104 0.91456 0.9668 0.9519 
(A13R)t 0.0701 0.05111, 1.0000 0.06,3/1 " 0.05118 0.0278 0.01125 
(5P)t 0.9380 0.9104 0.06311 1.0000 0.9090 0.9330 0.9043 
Ißt 0.9907 0.9456 0.05448 0.9090 1.0000 0.9891 0.9989 
Pt 
-1 
0.9954 0 0.9668 0.0278 0.9330 0.9891 1.0000 0.9899 
p 1: -1 
0.9910 0.9519 0.0425 0.9043 0.9989 0.9899 1.0000 
With an R" _ 0.99561 we do not seem to be faced with serious 
multicollinearity problems, except in that the correlation 
coefficient between Pt and Pt-I is slightly above the R`'. 
The OLS estimates are a s follows with the SF ones first: 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 'I'-Value 
yt -0.06062 0.05913 1.02528. 
(ADR)t 0-02957 0.00895 3,34293 
(sP)t 0.131119 0903426 3.91725 
Pt -12.65610 8.6144444 1.4.6917 
13 t_1 0.571123 " 0.11715 11.90151 
Contd. 
t 
188. 
Vnrinble . Coefficient Stý"xiidard 
Error T-Value 
p t-1 24-17743 9.46808 :. 553357 
CNST a26.92684 229.22185 0.98999 
R2 0.99561, D. W. '1 . 81961, S 51. '56871 
One Period Ahead 'Forecasts' 
Actual: 6017 
Forecast: 6020 
" Forecast Error: -3.9115 
Xý1) (1) = 0.00575 
The striking thing about this estimated equation is its 
terrific specification for prediction, as -it is clearly' 
slio, n by the very low value of the x(1 )-statistic. 
The U. R. T. F. estimates are: 
Variable Coefficient - Standard Error T-Value 
Yt -0'. 10565 0.07173 1.47-79 
(M3R) 
t 0.032211 " 
0.010'16. 
. 
3.08281 
(SP) 0.111127 0.03633 3.383117 t 
1't -1.36161 11.95687 0.11388 
B 0.69520 0.17228 ýk. 0552Il 
Ist=-1 
. 
8.3,581 21.98963 0.37862 
CNST -3.75162 . 261.12733 0.01137 
Yt_1 0.11329 0.06901 1.64162 
(Ai3R)t_1 0.00225 0.01382 0.162811 
(S1 ) 
t-1 -0.074190 0.04319 1.73413 
Bt-2 0 -0.08251 0.15167 0.53367 0 
ß't_2 0 2.8119113 13.78658 0.20668 
` R=0.99 62ßi, D. W. _ 2.09733, S= 51.21355 
. 189. 
ý4 
1a 
one Period Ahead '1'orecn:; ts' 
Actual: 6011 
Forecast: 5941.5.:: 86 
Forecast Error: 75.14714 
'%(1) 
(1) = 2.17160 
F(5,33) - 1.10578 
The ,., (, )-statistic although insignificant, its value 
is 
higher than the equivalent of the SF foam. 
The R. T. F. estimates are now given: 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Value 
Yt -0.08556 0.06609 1.29654 
(QUR) 0.02838 0.00833 3. l106ß8 
"(S11)t 0.14936 0.03451 
4.32049 
p. t -13.8575' 9.12735 1.51816 
Ot-1 
. 
0-485220 0.15408 3.14896 
p t-1 28.03038 1.0.14602 2.68850 
CNS"r 371.18654 273.81607 1.35545 
o. 24165 0.21109 1.1111177 
Sý 51.5111,88 
one Period Ahead 'Forecasts' 
Acton].: 6017 
Forecast: 6043.4320 
Forecast Error: -26.4320 
; (1) (1) = 0.26296 
(2(4) = 5.74 
034 
The 
. -,. '('l)-statistic 
continuous to be insignificant,; the 
x(,; )- statistic is insignificant too, suggesting that the 
dynamic 'specification of the equation is : adequate. Tli*e 
insignificance, now, of the p -coefficient l 
implies that the 
SF form is preferable to the other two form s. 
a 
Igo. 
The TSLS estimates are now presented With 
the S1' ones 
first, as always: 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T J_uo 
Yt -0.06059 0.05913 1.02'175 
(A mR)t . 0.02956 
0.00895 3.30ä77 
(SI') 0.13419 o. o3426 3.9171" t 
-12.65349 8.6111117 1.146886 t 
Bt. 
-1 
0.57420 0.11715 11.90126 
Iý 244.17 479 9.46811 2.55329 t-1 
CNST 2ý6. C1270 229.22379 0.98948 
D. W. = 1. 0i963., S5 1.56871 
One Period Ahead 'F'orecasts' 
Actual: 6017 
Forecast: 6020, 8999 
Forecast Error: -3.39 99 
(1) (1) = 0.00572 
ry 
x(, 0 (21) = 37.6.8161 
T, 2 x(1 )-statistic is very insignificant indeed, i: "hcroas 
the ý%(3)-statistic is only so at the 1%ö level. 
The U. R. T. F. °estimates arc: 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Vnlue 
Yt -0.11151 0.06706 1.66298 
(Qim)t 0.03232 0.01046, 3.09082 
(sP9 0.14177 0.03658 3.87555'-'* t 
pt -3.30260 10.78375 0.30626 
tat 0.69687 ' 0.16875 14.12968 -1 
t-i . 12.9£773' 11.934,19 1.08825 
CNST 31.00789 "'91-10134 0-1065P 
Y_ 
"t. -1 
0.11137 0.07052 1.58637 
Co]. 1td. 
191. 
Variable Coefficient :3 tandard Error T-Valuo 
Till) +` 0.00108 0.01252 0.08591 
(sr') -0.071126 0.011361 1.70277 
EI t-2 ýO. Oß023 0.15592 0.51455 
Pt 0.13998 0.61581 0.22732 
D. W. 2. 07031,51.2 0661 
One Period Ahead ' I'orecnst s' 
"Actual: 6017 
Forecast: 5958.5350 
Forecast Error: 58.4142 
12 
N (1) '=. 1.30132 
2 
(3)(1G) 
- 36. '151111i 
The x 
(1)-statistic 
continuous to be ins ignificant, but 
the -., (, )- statistic has now become significa nt. 
Final ly, the R. T. F. estimates' are provi ded: 
Variable Coefficient- Standard Error T-Value 
Yt -0.074455 0.06017 1.23888 
(ArR)t 
, 0.03018 0.00901 3.35005 
(s1') 
t 0-13034 . 
0.03159 3.999111 
I' -11E. 169o9 8.66865 1.631152 
ßt_1 . 0. 
'56260 0.11721 4.79997 
pt-1 26.23139 9.66582 2.71905 
CNNsT 292.73313 236.62067 1.23735 
-0.0: 170 0.02162 1.00358 
S= 51.56675 
One Period Ahead 'Forecasts' 
Actunl.: 6017. 
Forecast: 6030.3366 
Forecast Error: -13.3366 
"`(1) (1) = 0.06689 
"(3) (no) = 37. ý8'I22 
192. 
.  
Tile x f, -st. 1t3. stic is insi, nificnnt at 
the 1; ö love]. only, 
laut the xý 1) statistie 
is conifortably inrji"ni Cicazi. t. In fact 
the main point to note about all the estimates wo have pro- 
duced in this section (11.2i), is the powerful predictive 
pcr. Cormance, of the equation in question. It is obvious that 
as fnr as forecasting is concerned this equation perfbrms bettor 
thin any of the other equations so far pre en±od, according to 
the "x2 1)-st ntiýt3. 
c. Nc: t wo look at the f'ollowwinrS tnbles(pp. 191i- 
195)whore higher order autoregressive processes are allowed. 
Careful. e.; ai iination of the results depicted in these tables, 
" and the rest of tho results cited, above, we conclude that 
the proper equation to -be used 'Col' the '13t-function 
is the 
following: 
13 i.! '226.31270 - 0.06059 yt0.134419' 
(SP) 
.a0.02956 
(L1nn) 
(0.93943) (1.02475) t (5.91712) t (3.50277) 
- 12.65549 Pt + 21.171,79 1't-1 + 0.57420 r3t_1 (1.446886) (2.5532 9) 0.9012 ) 
All the signs are the e.: poctod ones, whereas the T-Vnlucs, 
are not always significant. The o: oenous arguments of this 
equation are all very significant, indeed; the cndo 5enous 
arguments, though, are mot really very insignificrint-including 
the 
, 
P, 
t Variable. 
just for 'simplicity- so the problem as to 
whether the base money is an e:: ogenous or endo maus component 
is not clearly solved. Vle believe, however, that the base 
money is partly e. =: ogeno'us and partly endogenous and we seem 
to be justified by. the results 'we have provided in this 
section. We 'note that the varinhie 061311) t 
is used here instead 
of (13R)t, and this we did simply to restrict the. number of 
-Predetermined variables, since it was found desirable to include 
sonic lag in the Ut-function as far, as the (13I2)t variable is 
" concerned. Finally, - we note that the coefficient of ß , -1 
iºnplies', not a very slow adjustment since -about 42Z of any 
discrepancy between desired and actual brise money is made up 
in the first quarter. 
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Summary of 1130nt L'st±mr tes 
in tliis section tro surimari:: o tho 'boat' estimtxtoo for 
each equation, so that they can be used for coiii'arison with 
other results that we will present bo]. otwr. 
(1) Yt = "Ct + It + St + (TA) t- t2t 
(3) Ct = 1.1Cä. 51771 0.31509' Y+0.1165112 WIP ) (3.96770) 01-52-591) t (2.03601) 
-1 7.11387 1't. + 0.28099 C ,_ -(3-75430 Lt-3 (2-12737) (O. ý16708) . 211,1419 
- 6-92.598 ( 0.21229 )1 Li-. -ý! + 25.55210 1 9 (2.36469) 
(4) Yd = 0.14707 y+0.02362 YCi t (2.10597) t (10. ß0011)t-1 
(5) I. c 1115,221103 + 0.03718 UA + 0-121193 (Ai ) t (3.050115) (1.75291) 1t (2.91766) t 
+ 0.922181 t-1 - 
115.09777 rL 
-3 
+ /13.9 56 71 r 
(20.76051) (, x.. 115001) .. 455''. 2) 
(6) s= 45.27539 + 0.122 ä1f (All) + 0.1111173 (NY) t (0.99375) (2.17534) 0 (4.9 3662) 
ý' 
+ 0.83h33) St_l + 59.30335 rLt- - 70-01728 rLt-1ý (6.02218) (l. 95ß511) ((:. 11993 ) 
(7) Qt' = '8ýý. GöSGý)+(ý. 8Gö7G)Yt A (o. 
o5GS9)zýt *(ö. 5fýi3)Qt'1. 
+ o. ö9366 I, t. - 9.75828 r (3.18562) i-1 (1.0504k5) t`1 
(8) rLt 0.39231 - 0.00000111 Y+0; 13505 r, 
(0-325845 (0.00507) t (3.92267) ''t 
+ 0.72360 r+0.10309 1, - 0.09560 11 (7.67590) Lt-1 (ý 
. 09 80) 
t (1.71795) t'1 
(9) II 
,. - 11189.01913 '4" 0.311787 Y 100-115I . 59 r (1.337146) (1.79394) ('i. 63108) ý 
65-35835 P -G2.9(G15 P. 0.903;: 1 It %? . 10575) 
t (1.. 59968) t-1 (9-15380). t-1 
196. 
('10) PIJ 'ý .- 973.0753A + 0. ' 2651 Y; +1.1^'; 13 13 
(1.173311) 701) (1'. 17510) t 
+ 0.15251 (AA) + ?t1.10^05 r-1.01963 Tý 
(1.39741) t (^. 030,9) Ott (1 9850"') t "1 
6.871189 ili 
- (3.031n1) t1 
' (11) TIC tI =Tip 
(12) 13t :: Q 6.31270 - 0.06059 ý' ý+0.1ýýi 19 ( P) 
. 
(0.989/13) (1.02117 5) (3.9171"") 
+ 
(3.00?? 7)(AllR, 
)t - 12.653r'ý9)rt y (1 '. 553799 ) 
+ 0.571120 Il 
(11. t-1 90126) 
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11.3 Eoti. tnntioi1 of* tlio rlodc]. U3iiir tho 113 Do"finit: ioit of T"Ionoy 
I-1 oll the results wo have produced so far, the c1Gf3. ýii- 
ti. on of - motley stock. ti. wo . have adopted is the 2,11 one. Ill. this 
section we provide the results when the 11, * clafiiiition of 
money is employed. Ile could not find published series for 
the M" definition for the . 1111010 period so no results are w 
provided for the Ur, dofintion of mornoy. 
The results of this section arc compared with the ones 
of section p1.2, s"o Vint some conclusions about the appropriate 
Aft variable uii, g-1it be reached. We note, however, that in the 
roll owing tables (pp. 202-212) some results are note given. These 
results are the ones for thoso equations where a money stock 
variable does not gppcai, and the OLS technique is used for 
its estimation. The -reason is obvious; those results are 
cactly the snr. ie with the ones we got when the N1 definition 
is cniployecl and since our aim in this section is to compare 
the two sets of results there is no reason to repeat them 
leere. So for c.: ample, no estimates are provided for the 
Investment-funiction in these tables; they are e:. nctly the 
same with the ones presented in section 11.26. 
The statistical criteria used to determine tho " rnoclel. of 
section 11.2 j, su gost that the. 'hest' estimates for each 
equation are the following: wo note that the 'equations 
cr. ierge from a close er: amüiation of tables (pp. 202-212). 
-(1) Yt = Ct + It + St + (TA). Qt 
(2) (TA) 
t= Ot + Xt - Tst 
(3) Cý = 1199.1.42656 + 0.29917 yd + 0.1176311 (AIIP)# (3.99013) (2.29512) (2.07095) 
- 17-114.600 1' A-. 0.29287 C- 10.17153 r3 (1.95083) t (2.16863) t-1 (0.30876) Lt- 
- 5.90325 r/+ 26.07355 P 
(0.13317) Lý'-ý (2.39792) t-1 
(1j) 1't = 0.111707' "Yt +-0-82 363 Yd-1 (2-40539) (10.79996 ) 
5.1 = 1115.22408 + 0-0371C, (AAI)t "i" 0.121193 (DºY)t (3-05045) (1.75291) (, 1.91766) 
+ 0.922110- ? t_ - 115.09777 r _.. 
+ 113.95671 rLt-tk 
" 
(. ^. 0.76051) 1 (2.115001) L-( (4 . 
11'532' ) 
198. 
(6) s 37.39003 + 0.007311 (AH) + 0. ßi2323 (AY) t (0.66789) (0-11129r)) t 83 092) 
+ 0.791152 st-1 + 'i ý . 131'18 'Lt-3 - 
49.63603 rLt-1i 
(1.35277) (1-113093) 
(7) n =-565.70033 + 0.16679 Y 5.68605 1' + 0.20862 Q t (2.19102) (2.85553) 
Y. 
(0.71333) ' (1.1ß6i4) -1 
+ 0.01153 rr t-1 + 10.5878: )P t-1 (1.52217) (1.25735 
(8) rLt =-0.39577 - 0.000001 Y+0.13502 
Q) 
r st(0.32880) (0.00251) (3.9219 
+ 0.72350 rLt-1 + 0.10817 I' t-0.09577 
I' 
t-1 (7.67435) (2.09737) (1.71967) 
(9)" I. l -p165.69067 - 0.13420 Yý - '0.9371! } r t (0.33580) (0-359811)- (1.08494) 5 
-1ä2.071f811 Iý + 184.32662 I' + '1.111691 1.1 
(3.73438) t (3.23391) t-1 (19.03660)t-1 
(lo) M =--1919.801195 +, 0.26505 Y+0.78154 u (1.51833 (0.71845) t (1.05356) t 
+0.59762" ( A) .+ 
34-17713r,,, - 0.831h30 is (11. iä651) t (1.10157) (1.04137) -1 
+ 1.022011 ' It 
(20.85631) 
(11) iii _ Ait = Att 
(1ý) Bt = 227.011i52 - 0.060611 Yt + 0.131119 (sP)t + 0.02957 (Mitt). 
I 
(0.. 99036)* (1.02 567) (3.9173.5) (3-30305) 
- 12.65811 P+ 211.179116 I' + 0.571125 D 
(1. ä69't0) t (2.55378) t-1 ('1.90169) ý'-i 
The two sots or results do differ significantly. The 
siZfiificant differences nppetir in four equations: in the 
Stoc1: -Düildinng equation, tlic imports eclunt±onn, the Demand for 
Honey equation and the Supply of Money equation. 
In tlio Stoc1: -Duildizi equation tue v-krinb1e (Af0j. becomes 
iftsignificant when tho N3-dofinition is employed, end- in the 
Imports equation the vc rinblo Mt-1 becomes ills ignificnnt when 
0r13 is used e:: cept in some cesos -whore it eppears to rotain . its significance. 
The reason that the (AM) t variable beconcs insignificant iii 
the S tock-Building equation when the N3 definition is used, 
i9, rrobably, because the wide definition of'money is not o 
good indicator of tho liquidity of the industrial sector,. 
199" 
at nny' rate it is not as ;; ood as the 1I1 definition. It is 
snore difficult -to e; p1nin Mic deterioration of the nt i - 
variable in the Imports equation when the H3 definition is 
employed. Surely enough, the deterioration as far as the 
'T' stntistic is concerned is not disastcrous and indeed 
: it does not dccrcrtso as . much as 
in the case of the 
variable in the Stock-Building equation. The following, 
e; -, planation seems reasonable. The MI definition of money 
is more appropriate when the 'medium of e.: clean e' function 
of money is stressed, whereas Iahen the 'store of value' 
function of money is stressed the N3 definition is more 
appropriate. Now, in the Imports equation the money stock 
stands more for the 'medium of e:. -change' function rather 
than the 'store of value' one and consequently the 11 
definition is bound to perform better rattier than the N3 
definition. Thi's' is e:: actly what our results have shown. 
In the Demand for Honey equation, both the rate of 
interest variable and the income variable perform very badly 
when the ti3-definition is. used. The bad pcrforma21ce of the rate 
of interest call be justified as follows: when Vic rate of 
interest changes people simply reallocate their rmone. y stock 
holdings between, say, time deposits and, demand deposits. 
Wasen, therefore, the AI, -definition of money is used- this 
reallocation is not captured and consequently the interest 
1.1 rate coefficient is bound to be insignificant. The 
definition, clearly shows changes of this nature and consequently 
the rate of interest coefficient should be significant. 
. Similarly, t"rhen the level of income changes, say increases, 
and the V01111110 -of transactions increases too requiring more 
money to finance it, people would, probably, demand a higher 
amount of demand deposits in order to satisfy the financing 
of the higher v. oluin"e' of transactions. G"ivenn the. money. stock, 
the higher demand for demand deposits may well be. satisfied 
by a lowering in the 'demand for time deposits. Therefore, 
the ill definition of money should perform better at an 
empirical level than the DI3-definjti o'n of money. 
finally, the Money Supply equation depicts. sonic. differences 
200. 
but not as significant and drastic as in the other three, 
equations mentioned above. The (Q A)t variable performs 
better when the 113 definition is used as one might 
expect, 
whereas the Bt variable performs better when the M1 defini- 
tion is employed, again as one might expect. 
On the whole, therefore, the model that makes use of the 
N11 definition of money performs much better at an empirical 
level, than " the model that. utilises the 113" definition. We 
thus adopt the model' summarised in section 4.2j for the rest 
of-our analysis, although some results are provided with 
} 
the 1-13 definition subsequently simply for comparison and 
justification of this'last 'result. 
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11.4 The Stability of the Modal: 
As we have already noted the modal wo have estimated 
can be used to determine whether the changes introduced 
in 1971 i. e. the ; Competition and Credit Control' measures, 
have caused any structural changes in the system, especially 
in the monetary sub-sector of it. What we do in this 
section is to split the period into 1963 2Q - 1971 3Q and 
allow the model to predict for the 1971 ! IQ - 1974 3Q. In 
doing so, we also examine the stability of the estimated 
model. 
The two versions of the model summarised in sections 
4.2j and 4.3 have, thus, been reestimated using the TSLS 
technique, with the exception of the Investment-and Stock- 
Building equation where we are forced to use OLS, anti the 
results obtained are as follows: 
We begin with the first version of the mode, i. e. we 
make use of the M1 definition of the money stock: 
W Yt ' Ct + I. + Si + (TA)t - Qt 
(2) (TA)t = Gt + Xt - T$t 
(3 ). Ct 716.99153 0.114153 Yt + 0.61979 (AHHP) t (1.. 69805) (2.25674) (1.75555) 
28.04329 Pt + 0.30076 Ct-i - 6.13357 rLt-3 (1.70127 (1.92438) (0.14666) 
+ 20.62014. rLt-4 + 31.62535 Pt-1 
(0.51265) (1.83308) 
(20) = 28.98715 D. W., ='2. '39601, S. = 53.99001, x(3) 
Forecasts: 
Ac'tuals: 6155. oo00,6222.0000,6338,000 , 61,57,0000, 
66oi. 00oo, 6762.0000,6687.0000,6716.0000, 
6718.0000,6695.0000,6611i. oooo, 6694.0000. 
For©casts: 6222.2290,6248.2779,64112.9665,6474.3309, 
6548,22419 6690.6113,6773.91114,6809.6577, 
6746.2609,6543.5058,6450.4948,6561.1561. 
213.. 
Forecast . -67.2290, 
Errors: 52"7759, 
-28.26,09, 
X(1)(12) 37"'3'i789 
(4) yd 
t 0.29342 
Yt 
(3.20306) 
D. ý, T. 1.68563, 
-26.2779, -1o4.9665, -17.3309, 
71.3887, -86.91111,. -93.6577, 
151.49429' 163.5052,132.81139. 
+ 0.6311711 Yd 
(5.1i6682) t-1 
S'= 79.08118, x(3)(2'1)'= 28.17257 
Forecasts: 
Actuals: 6776.0000,6765.00009'7162.0000, 7101.0000,, 
7288.0000, '7290.0000,7578.0000, 7589.0000, 
7570.0000,7379.0000,7320.0000, 7703.0000. 
Forecasts: 6693.2057,6705.5462,., 6736.1218, 6979.0160, 
7029.2033,7304.875,7232.2062, 7438.4838, 
" 7425.2199,73411.2063,7319.21311, 7319.9085. 
Forecast 82.7943,59.4538,425.8782, 121.9840, 
Errors:. 258.79679 -14.8785,3445.7938, 150.5162, 
144.7801,34.7937,0.7866, 383.0915. 
"(1)(12) = -93.54249 
5) It = t 99.2058.9 + 
0.06893 (AA ) +. 0.249 It ' 
58 (D. Y ) t (2.63232) (2.82832) (4.933 15). 
+ 
( 
0.92266 I- 38.42471 r+4 27.57275)t-1 (2.44418) Lt-3 ( 
2.91633 rLt-4 
2.69072) 
S 24.112 49, x(2)(3) = 4.46770 
Forecasts: 
Actuals: 1800. oooo, 1811.0000,1814. oooo, 1756.0000, 
1821.. 0004,1916.0000,1807-00009-1892.0000, 
1,892". 0000,1916.0000,1759.0000,1796.0000. 
Forecasts: 1820.7156,1786.5282,1891.2203,1841.98539 
1885.9285,1971'. 9151,1857.5518,1876.3590, 
1910.3708,1872.3590,1982.92511,1863.0914. 
21ý#. 
Forecast -20.7156,24.4718, -77.2203, -85.9853, Errors: 
.. 64.9285, -55.9151, -50.5518, 15.6410, 
-18.3708,43.6410, -223.9254, -67.0914. 
x(1)(12) 1110.02578 
(6) St 312.95877 + 0. io626 (AN)t - 0.06930 (AY)t (2.06682) ' (1-. 38364) (0.85341) 
- 0,25955 St-1 - 16.73595 r Lt-3 - 16.2 8016 rLt-, j (1.01259) (0.40750) (0.3 8902) 
S =. 57-92 9199 x(2)(3) 1.06244 
Forecasts : 
Actuals 42.0000, -146.0000, -102.0000, -107.0000, 
-60.0000, 247.0000, 194.0000, 90.0000, 
116.0000, -248.0000, 207.0000, 205.0000. 
Forecasts: -16.5108, +59.1798, -23.2293, -44.5479, 
-14.3226, . -87-1111119t 194.9015, -9.9812, 
107.5771, -6.8727, -59-1997, l. '6172. 
Forecast 58.67749 -205.1798, -78.7707, -62.4521, Errors: 
-45.67744, 334.4449, -0.9015, 99.9812, 
8.4229, -241.1273, 266.1997, 203.3828. 
x(1)(12) = 104.29861 . 
(7) Qt _ 661.44olo (2.25636) 
- 0.00918 ti 
(o. 16531) 
U. N. _ 2.01446, 
Forocasts: 
. +0.23225 yt 27.88265 
P+0.19149 Q- 
(3.07589)t (2.25633) t -(0.91945) 
t1 
- 24.45095 P t-i (1.89852) t-i 
S= 42.415731 x3)(21) = 23.25881 
Actuals: 
. 
2207.0000,2309.0000,2356.0000,2291.0000, 
2561.0000,2590.0000,2575.000Q, 2675.0000, 
2725.0000,2693.0000,2664.00609 2697.0000. 
Forecasts: 2203.3923,2166.0539,. 2236.2861,2237.7105, 
2344.7274,24477.3647,21188.07399 24491.0544, 
2570.6525,2595.7067,2798.21549 1966.5166. 
` 215. 
Forocast 3'-060779,1112-911619 119.7139,53.2895, 
Errors: 216.2726,112.6353,86.9261,183.9456, 
154.3475,97.2933, -134.2154, -269.5166. 
X(1)(12) = 11i5.8.5818 
'(8)r= Lt -5.14248 + 0.00147 Y t 
0,05351 *r + 0.88410 r st Lt-1 (2.78838) (2.78194) (0.72820) 
+ 0.09147 Pt - 0.13196 P t-1 (1.36972) (1.73352) 
D. W. _ 1.7 1487, S=0.25280, x(3)(21) = 26.23144 
Forecasts: 
,. 
Actuals 8.6600, . 8.4500, 8.9800,9.4600, 
9.6300, 9.9500, 10.3200,11.3000, 
11.8500, 13.3700, 14.4800,15.3000. 
'Forecasts 8.94449 8.1922, 8.1408,8.3587, 
9.1886, 9.7519, 9.8003,9.8059", 
10.5728, 10.6554, 12.497,13.6322. 
Forecast -0.2844, 0.2578, 0.8392,1.1013, 
Errors. 0.4414, 0.1981, 0.5197*9 1.49111, 
1.2772, 2.7146, 1.9303,1.6678" 
x(1)(12) = 317.78286 
(9) Md = t -1184. 72238 < + 0. ý22? 3 < Yt 101.65487 rst (1.19365) (1.61127) (1.77238) 
+ 60.1707 P' t -" 45.58656 P t-l + 0.62276 m t-1 (1"77238) (1.22728) (4.28084) 
D. W. = 2.1 7832, S = 116.544o6 , x( )(23)" = 31.893119 3 
Forecasts: 
Actuals 10910.00 00,11270.0 000,11750.0000, 
" 11930.00 00,12410.0 0009 12370.0000, 
13200.00 00,12860.0 000,13130.0000, 
12780,00 00,13200.0 000,13550.0000. 
216. 
S 
Forecasts 
Forecast- 
Errors 
10959.3969, 
11542.2399, 
12276.0919, 
12555.5805, 
-49.3969, 
3ß7.76o1, 
923.9081, 
224.4195, 
X(1)(12) 
= 196.79089 
11059.0234, 
11771.3321, 
12455.5806, 
12877.8503, 
210.9766, 
638.6679, 
404.41949 
322.1497, 
1'1366.885/1, 
12172.7636, 
12289,3231, 
13613-1459- 
383-11469 
2364, 
840.67699 
-63.1459. 
I 
A10) Ms = 3998.62926 + 0.69669 Y. + 1.66093 IIt (1.23o91&) (2.14069) (3.50644f4) 
+ 0.23268 (AA) t+ 
12.99598 rdt + 0.22767 II t-i (1.91775) (2.03895) 
+ 0.00731 M. t-i (0.25193). 
D. W. =, 1.8811117, S= 147.23799, x(3) (20) = 33.58877 
Forecasts: 
11270.0000, 
12370.0000, 
12780.0000, 
10710.8307, 
12641.1013, 
12811.7188, 
11750.0000, 
13200.0000, 
13200.0000, 
11772.6960, 
12498.31669 
1356 4.84949 
11930.0000, 
12860.0000, 
13550.0000. 
11561.9799, 
13691.1133, 
13708.3307. 
Forecast 79.1855,559.1693, -22.6960,368.0201, Errors: 
-113.1894, -271.1013,701.6834, -831.1133, 
275.5350', -31.7188, ' -364.8494, -158.3307. 
Actuals 10910.0000, 
12410.00001 
13130.0000, 
Forecasts 10830.811,5, 
12523.4894 
12854-4650, 
x(i)(12) = 90.38637 
(11) Mt Mutt 
(12) Bt = 393.77138 - 0.07480 Y+0.01558 (Ann) (1.19029) (0.82013) t (1.44514444) t 
+ 0.14893 (SP)t 2.43261 P+ 4}. 80001 P 
(3.66923) t (0.200! &6) (0.35246) 
t-1 
+ 0.67911 Dt-1 
(4.85537) 
217. . 
., 
0 
D. W. = 2.15413, S= 45.32278, x(3)(21) = 30.41612 
Forecasts: 
Actual 4509.0000,4455,0000,4693.0000,4816.0000, 
4980.0000,5001.0000,5243.0000,5426. "0000, 
5477.0000,5549.0000,5715.0000,6017.0000. 
Forecasts 4506.5132,4489.0429,4534.6647,4729.2072, 
4847.9193,11991.9025,5119.1375,5344.0685, 
5527.5228,5603.3064,5772.8949,5986.4164. 
Forecast 2.4868, -34.0429,158.3353,86.7928, 
Error 132.0807, ' 9.0975,123.8625,81.9315, 
-50.5228, ' -54.3064, -57.8949,30.5836. 
.. 
"(1)(12) = 40.47400 
We present, now, the model that utilizes the Dia definition 
of money. 
(1) Yt = Ct + It + st + (Ta)t - Qt 
(2) (TA)t' Gt. + Xt - Tst 
(3) C,, = 706.61541 + 0.45383 YA + 0.60782 (A1IP ), ý (3.06010) (1.72413) 
27.53132 Pt+ 0.29270 Ct_1 - 44.95655 rLt_3 (1.67232) (1.87824) (0.11865) 
+ 19.79918 "r 4+ 30.92698 P 
"(0.49260) 
Lt-ý (1.79602) t-1 
D. W. = 2.386429 S= 53'. 97198, x(3)(20) = 30.15069 
Forecasts: 
Actuals 6155.0000, 
6601.00001 
6718.0000, 
Forecasts 6220.5961, 
6518.2889, 
6717.2803, 
Forecast -65.5961, Errors 52.71119 
-29.2803, 
6222.0000, 
6762.0000, 
6695.0000, 
62115. '/1022, 
6687.8694, 
6543.9904, 
-23.4022, 
71, 
151.0096, 
6338.0000,6457.0000, 
6687.0000,6716.0000, 
"6614.0000, *6694.0000. 
6444.0304,6472.6027, 
6775.1631-, 6810.1223, 
6451.4793,6566.8900. 
-106.0304, -15.6027, 
-88.1631, -94.1223, 
162.5207,127.1100. 
x(1)(12) = 36.89462 
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(l1) Yd =, 0.29338 Y. +0: 631179 Yt-i (3.2025/1) (5.1i6723) 
n. t1.1.68577, S= 79.08118, x(3) (24) 27.96598. 
Forecasts: 
Actuals 6776.0000,6765.00009 
7288.0000,. 7290.0000, 
7570.0000,7379.0000, 
Forecasts 6693.2053,6705.5635, 
7029.2211,7304.88329 
7425.25209 7344.2477, 
7162.0000, 
? 578.0000, 
? 320.0000, 
6736.13289 
7232.22219 
7319.2296, 
7101.0000, 
7589.0000, 
? 703.0000. 
'6979.0506, 
7438.5122, 
7319.9157. 
Forecast 82.7947,59.1365,425.86721' 121.911944, 
Errors 258.7789, -14.8832,3115.7779,150.11878,. 
144.7480,34.7523,0.7704,383.08113. 
"(1)(12) 93.53192 
(5) I 99.20589 + 0.06893 (AA )+0.24958 (1Y) t (2.63232) (2.82832) It (}. 93315) t 
+ 0.92266 I 1`1 - 38.42471 rLt-3 + 42.91633 rLt-4 (27.57275) (2.44118) (2.69075). 
S 24.112492 x(2)(3) = 4.46770 
Forecasts: 
Actuals 1800.00009 1811.0000,1814.0000,1756.0000, 
1821.0000,1916.0000,1807.0000,1892.0000, 
1892.0000,1916.0000,1759.0000,1796.0000. 
r. 
Forecasts 1820.7156, 1786.5282, 1891.2203, 1841.9853, 
1855.9285, 1971.9151, 1857.5518, 1876.3590, 
1910.3708, 1872.3590, 1982.925119 1863.0914.. 
Forecast -20.7156, 24.4718, -77.2203, -85.9853, Errors 
-64.9285, . -55.9151, -50.5518, 
15.6410, 
-18.3708, 43.641o, -223.9254, -67.0914. 
x(1)(12) 140.02578 
"Ia 
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(6) st ý 286.55893 + 0.1211li (art) y-0.05213 (AY) t (1.92912) (1.53721). (0.65038) 
0.182811 St-1 -(1-311085 rLt-3 - 31.98757 rLt-, k (0.63825) (0.03187) (0.711763) 
S 57.38525 x(2)(3)*- 0.72073 
Forecasts: 
Actuals 42.0000, 
-62.0000, 
116.0000, 
Forecasts 54.4306, 
71.3659, 
1143.3945, 
-146.0000, -102.0000, 
247.00ib, 194.0000, 
-248.0000,207.0000, 
+65.69211, , 
112.118099 
17.3866,154.31911, 
14.4375, -140.2538, 
-107.0000, 
90.0000, 
205.0000. 
-32.6820, 
262.6691, 
90.6750. 
Forecast --12.4306, -211.6924, -144.4809, -74.3180, Errors 
-131.3659, ' 229.61311, . 39.6806, -172.6691, 
-27.3945, -262.4375,3117.2530, . 114.3250. 
x(i)(1) = 114.18350 
(7) Qt = 70.19218 +'0.15253 Yt 10.29868 P-0.419511 Q t (0.15698) (1.94848) t . (3.17989) 
t (1.92798) t-1 
+ 0.08686 Mt-1 - 9.63134 P t-1 (2.170114), (2.31642) 
D. W. = 1.95817, S= 41.02279, x3)(20) = 25.22700 
Forecasts: 
Actuals 2207.0000,2309.0000; 2356.0000,2291.0000, 
2561.0000, -2590.0000,2575.0000,2675.0000, 
2725.0000,2693.0000,2664.0000, '2697.0000. 
Forecasts 2251.7891,2282.4542,2380.9109,2476.3446, 
2568.5538,2713.7823,2781.3071,2846.7060, 
3009.0772,3099.6435,3200.7291,3217.5775" 
Forecast -1111.78919 26.5458, -211.9109, -185.3446, Errors 
-7.5538, -123.7823, -206.3071, -171.7060, 
-284.0772, -I406.6435, -536.7291, -520.5775. 
X(1)(12) = 552.77401. 
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(8) rLt 5.13900 + 0.001117 Y. - 0.05340 r 
(2.78662) (2.78006) ý' (0.72668) st 
+ 0.83404 r+0.09144 P 0.13189 Pt-1 
(7.19801) Lt-1 (1.36925) (1.73264) 
n. W. - 1.71473, S=0.25280, x(3)(21)"= 20.57315 
A 
Forecasts: 
Actuals 
Forocasts 
8.6600,8.4500, 
9.6300,9.9500, 
11.8500,13.3700, 
8.94459 8.1926, 
9.1891,9.7520, 
10.5738,10.6558, 
Forecast -0.281159 
Errors 0.1111099 
1.2762, 
X(1)(12) = 317.111829 
8.9800, 
10.3200, 
111.118000 
8.11! 12, 
9.80OG, 
12.5507, 
9.1600, 
11.3000, 
15.3000. 
8.3593, 
9.8067, 
13.6333. 
0.2574, 0.8388, ' 1.1007, 
0.1980, 0.5194, 1.4933, 
2.7132, 1.9293, 1.6667. 
(9) Md =- 33113.71300 + 0.70222 Y- 86.78400 r t (2.02241) (1.98319) t (2.28778) S t 
+ 62,35131 P- 59.53825 P+0.88718 Ni _ (1.60858) t (1.35454) t-1 (8.58573) ts 
D. W. -_ 2.02585, S= 138.89822, x(3)(23)"= 31.90883 
Forecasts: 
Actuals 20650.0000, 
25860. oo00, 
33180.0000, 
Forecasts 20123.4191, 
24196.13881 
30204.0,707, 
Forecast 526.5809, 
Errors 1663.8612, 
2975. *9293, 
X(1)(12) = 18116.27184 
21620.0000, 
27380.0000, 
34220.0000, 
20932.1787, 
25914.0809, 
32098.7213, 
687.8213, 
1465.9191, 
2121.2757, 
221. 
23130.0000, 
28670.0000, 
3eß30.0000, 
21893.24629 
27286.8162, 
33561.9413, 
12.36.7538, 
1383.1838, 
1268.0587, 
24160.0000, 
31010.0000, 
35920.0000. 
23087.6266, 
28122.3705, 
34485.8546. 
1072.37314, 
2887. *6295, 
-1434.1454 
I 
(10) Ms = -12117.119064 + 0.20751 Y Mot (0.82868) (0.68096) t 
+ 0.13176 ' (AA) t+ 27.90710 (0.863111) (1.38887) 
+ o. 96961. Mt-i 
(7.35358) 
+ 0.91279 D 
(1,344764) t 
rdt - 0,82232 II ý. 1,35812) 
t-s 
D. W.. = 1.87376, S= 155.02945, x(3)(21). = 33.85991 
Forecasts: 
Actuals 20650.0000,2162b. 0000,23130.0000,24160.0000, 
25850.0000,27380.0000,28670.0000,31010.0000, 
33180.0000,34220.0.000,34830.0000,35920.0000. 
Forecasts 19991.9305,20966.8082,22262.7286,23449.4636, 
24676.7629,26247.7241,27836.99289 29193.6069, 
31298.5867,33223-00539,34585-4332,35265.4196. 
Forecast 658.0695,653.1918,667.27149 710.5364, 
Errors 1183.2731,1132.2759,833.0072,1816.3931, 
1881.4133,996.99479 244.5668,654.5804. 
X(1)(12) = 574.77050 
tx s) rzt Its = rft 
(12) nt'= 393.32157 - 0.07467. Yt + 0.01557 (QnR) t (1.1889.5) (0.81872) 
+ 0.14891 (SP) t 2.43670 P+4.79598 P_ (3.66875) t (0.20079) t (0.35216) t1 
+ 0.67898 n (4.85448) t-1 
D. W. 2.15417, S= 45.32278, X(3)(21) = 32.06222 
Forecasts: 
Actuals' 4509.0000, 
4980. 
_0000, 
5477.0000, 
Forecasts '4506.5159, 
4847.9024, 
5527.4479. 
111155.0000, 
5001.0000, 
55419.0000, 
4489.0225, 
p1991.9203, 
5603.2059, 
46g3.0öo0, 
5243.0000, 
5715.0000, 
4534-0 000.9 
519.1177, 
5772.8315, 
4816.00001 
5426.0000, 
6017.0000. 
4729.1653, 
5344.0205, 
5986: 3625. 
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Forecast 2.118111, -311.0225,158.3401,86.8347, 
Errors 
. 132.0976,9.0797,123.8823,81.9795, 
-50. If/179, -5/, -. 2059, -57.8315,30.. 6375- 
2 
1) 
(12) 
. =1}0.471187 
The results are very encouraging as far as the stability 
of the parameters are concorned. Admittedly' some parameters 
do differ in the two estimation periods, indeed in some cases 
`there are drastic differences, but on the whole the model 
performs adequately on this score. The reason of the 'bats' 
performance of some parameters must be attributed to the 
limitations-of the data series. The estimation period, 
when splitting the who'lo period into "1963 2nd quarter - 
1971 3rd"Qüarter, allows only 311' observations. Given now 
the large number of predetermined variables and also the 
fact that th© technique of TSLS has boon used, some bias 
is bound to be introduced in-the estimated values of the 
parameters. This last observation however, leads, to the 
logical 'conclusion that the- tests undertaken in this section 
are rather tentative for this very reason, i. e. data 
limitations. 
, 
Its therefore, follows that since the model seems to be 
stable we cannot find any clear evidence that the introduc- 
tion of the''Compotition and Credit Control' new measures in 
1971 have caused substantial structural changes. 
The negative, absolutely disasterous, aspect of the 
results reported in this section is the specification for 
prediction as judged by the xý1)-statistic. In al'l-casesg 
without even one exception, this statistic is always signi- 
ficant, and indeed, in some cases vqry. much so. It is-of 
course, obvious that it is not just in this section that we 
2 
-find this weakness. into also had significant x(1)-statistics 
when we allowed'only one period for prediction. There may 
be more than one reason for this result: 
(i) the set of explanatory variables in each equation, or 
, in some-equations, is not complete enough, 
(ii) the form of equation(s) chosen is, probably, not'tho 
most appropriate, 
223. 
(iii) lagged values of the already included explanatory 
variables should probably have been used as additional 
variables, and 
(iv) higher order autoregressive errors may be present. 
We do not feel, 'however, that wo ought to insist 
excessively on this particular. wcalcnoss of the model because 
it'has not been constructed for prediction, although, we 
admit, this aspect of the model should-not be completely 
ignored. 
4: 5 Further Empirical Investigation: 
4.5a Introduction:. 
The model that we have tested above is an interdependent 
system, and as such it requires a simultaneous system method 
for the estimation of its parameters. Although we have been 
using the TSLS technique it seems that the appropriate method 
is the-three-stage least squares one. * Now, the three-stage 
least squares (3SLS) is a systems method, that is', it is 
applied to all the equations of the model at the same time 
and gives estimates of all the parameters simultaneously. It 
-involves, actually, the application of the method of least 
squares in three successive stages. It utilises more informa- 
tion than the single-equation techniques, that'isl it takes 
into account the entire structure of the model with all the 
restrictions that this structure imposes, on the values of. the 
parameters. The. single-equation techniques make use only of 
the variables appearing in the entire model, but they ignore 
the restrictions set by the structure on the coefficients of 
other equations, as well as the contemporaneous dependence. 
of the random torms of the various equations. In simultaneous 
equations models it is almost certain that the random 
variable of any equation, ut, will be correlated with the 
random variable of other equations. This fact is ignored 
by single-equation methods. In other words, taking into 
account the nature of economic nhenomona and'the simplifications 
* Sea Zollnerv A. and Theil II.: l*Throe-stago Least Squaros: 
Simultaneous Estimation of. Simultaneous Equations'# 
Economotrica, vol. 30,1962. 
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which we adopt in specifying the oconomotric'modols, wo 
may-well expect the us to bo contemporaneously correlated, 
that iss 
E(Uit$ u)A 
where i refers to the ith equation and j to the jth o. quation. 
In'our model supposo, for example, that there is an exogenous 
shock. to the. system such as an increase in the monetary base. 
Then both C. and. 1t are likely to increase from their current 
values and a positive covariance would appear between U1 and 
UZ. If a method of estimation that does not include this 
information is used, such as two-stage least squares, the 
estimated coefficients will be needlessly inefficient. The 
method of three-stage least squares makes use of the non- 
zero covariances among structural disturbances by first 
estimating the covariando matrix of two-stage least-squares 
residuals, and then re-estimating all structural parameters 
simultaneously. 
Another reason as to why the 3SLS is more appropriate for. 
a model'lilco ours is the exclusion of some variables from 
the structural equations. In these equations we normally 
include explicitly only the most important three or four 
explanator variables, leaving the influence of the other, 
less important, variables to be absorbed by the random 
variable of the'relation. If some variables arc omitted 
from more relations of the system it is inevitable that the 
u's of these relationships Are correlated* and hence the 
-application of 3SLS is appropriate. Application of TSLS 
under these-circumstances would ignore part of the"infor- 
mation included in the entire system and hence the estimates 
of the parameters would be loss efficient. 
* This case may, be called 'quasi-autocorrelation' since it is 
due to the autocorrolated pattern of omitted explanatory 
variables and not to the behavioural pattern of the values 
of the true u. It is to be stressed that if several 
autocorrolated explanatory variables are omitted u may 
not be autocorrelated, since the autocorrelation patterns 
of the omitted regressors may be such as to offset each 
other. 
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A crucial problem of model formulation is that of 
identification. A. model is identified if it is in a unique 
statistical form, enabling unique estimates of its parameters 
to be subsequently made from sample data. If amodel is not 
identified then estimates of parameters of relationships 
between variables measured in samples may relate to the 
model in question or to another model, or to ,a mixture of 
models. In econometric theory two possible situations of 
identifiability are traditionally distinguished: each 
equation in a model is 
(a) Underidentified 
(b) Identified 
(c) Exactly identified 
(ii) Overidentifiod. 
An equation is undoridentifiod if its statistical form 
is, not unique. A model is underidentifiod when one or more 
of its equations are undoridontifiod. 
An'equation is identified if it has a unique statistical 
form. It may be exactly identified or ovoridentified. But 
in both cases it is identified. A model is identified if all 
its equations are identified. 
We may note at this point that identification problems 
arise only for those equations which contain coefficients which 
must be estimated statistically (from sample data). Identifi- 
cation difficulties do not arise for definitional equations, 
identities, or statements of equilibrium conditions, because, 
such relationships do not require measurement. 
Identification is closely related to the estimation of 
the model. If an equation and therefore the model is under- 
identified it'is impossible to estimate all its parameters 
with any econometric technique. If an equation is identified, 
its coefficients can, in general, be statistically estimated. 
In particular: (a) If the equation is exactly identified, the 
appropriate method to be used for its ostimation'is the method 
of indirect least squares. (b) If the equation is over- 
identified indirect least squares cannot be applied, because 
it will not yield unique estimates of the structural parameters. 
226. 
I 
c 
In, this caso thore are various other methods which can be 
used, for example '3 SLS. 
There arc two conditions for identification which wo 
apply in order to establish the identifiability of our 
model. The Order Condition and the flank Condition. 
The Order Condition, which is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for the identification of an equation, 
may be stated'as follows: For an equation to be identified, 
the total number of variables excluded from, it but included 
in other equations must boat least as great as the number 
of equations of the system less one. Let, 
G =, total number of equations. (= total number 
of. endogenous variables). 
K= number of total variables in the model 
(endogenous and predetermined) 
M= number of variables, endogenous and exogenous, 
included in a particular equation. 
Then the order condition for identification may be symbolically 
expressed as 
(K - M) G-1 
1excluded 
total number of equations -1 
Lvariables 
Applying this rule to our model wo have: 
K= 319 G 11ý 
and for every equation the inequality 
31 -N)»11 
does hold. Therefore the Order Condition is satisfied, and 
the model is identified. 
The flank Condition states that: in a system of G 
equations any particular equation is identified if and only 
if it is possible to construct at least one non-zero deter- 
minant of order (G-1) from the coefficients of the variables 
excluded from that particular equation but contained in the 
other equations of the model. When wö apply this rule we 
find that in all cases it is possible to form determinants of 
order (G-. 1=11) which ar, e not zero, and thus establishing that 
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tho modal is idontifiod. Furthermore sinco for all oquationsg 
K M} G-1 
i. t follows that our modal is ovoridontifio. d. 
The analysis so. far clearly shows that the appropriate 
econometric technique for the estimation of the model is the 
3SLS or an equivalent technique. It is for this reason that 
in section 4.5b we apply the Full Information 'Maximum Likeli-, 
hood (FIPlL) tochnique which is really equivalent to 'the 3SLS 
one. 
f 
11.5b- FIML Estimat©s: 
Wo provide in this section the FI1'IL ostimates'for our 
basic model. The form the equations take is the same as 
before with-one exception. The Demand for Money is written 
and estimated in a reverse form, making the rate of interest 
as the dependent variable and the stock of money as one of 
the independent variables. This is'requirod for estimation 
purposes, but this formulation- introduces' some bias because 
there may be other factors influencing the short-term rate 
of interest which, are of course omitted. * 
We note that a now statistic is provided for these, 
estimates. This is the correlation over the-sample period 
between the 'dependent' variable, and its value 'predicted' 
by the derived reduced form.. We denote this statistic'with 
the letters 'CORI. We also provide the structural form 
error variance which is denoted with the letter W. We begin 
with the first revision of our model the one that makes use 
of the M1 'definition of money. 
(1) Yt = Ct + It + St + (TA)t ~ Qt 
-COR 0.9929. 
(2. ) (TA)t = Gt + Xt Tst 
* 
* See the papers by Chow (22), Moroney and Mason(98)9 and 
Walters (122). 
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(3) C= 111111.31107* + 0.31587 Yu + 0.57258 (AIIP ) t (3.22771) t (3.60839) 
_ 17.36554 Pt + 25.11030 Pt1- 10.98091 rLt-3 (2.50154) ("3.09026) - (0-41985) 
7.63315 rLt-4 + 0.32096 Ct_i 
(0.28556) (2.84824) 
COR = 0.9930, W= 281.9007 
(lf) yd, - 0.35933 Y+0.62013 Yd_ t (5.44988) t (9.03963) t1 
COR ._0.9871, w= 393.12116 
(5) It = 14.1117 '+ 0.02089 (, &A1) t+0.14728 
(, &Y) t (1.04021) (4.601,59) 
45.49768 rLt-3 + 44.54482 r! +0.92805 I 
(2.77991) (2.74948) Lt-ý (19.39516)ß-i 
Con = 0.. 9795, w= 167.7768 
(6) st - 224.9470 + 0.20208 (bM) t+0. f011911 (AY)t (5.11684) (6.28982) 
+ 58.02288 r- 70.58029 r'+0.545118 St-1 (1.89976) Lt-3 (2.17908) Lt-4 (5.40977) 
con, = 0.6659, W= 350-4344, 
(7) Qt =- 514.8804 + 0.30981 Yt -- 0.01 933 Mt-i + 12'. 3773471't (5.98808) (2.94103) 3357) 
--7-01,712 P 0.08884 Q (0.95756)t-1 (0.85768) t-l 
COR = 0.9896, W 231.1109 
(8) rLt'= -1.0597 + 0.00002 Yt + 0.26669 rst + 0'. 10456 Pt 
(0.08493) (3.94086) 
-0.09204 P+0.59707 r- 
(1.67836) t-1 (8.22716) I't 1 
COR = o. 978'; W_1.7743. 
* No T-Value'is provided-for the constants. The computer 
programme we have used does not provide this statistic 
for'the constants. 
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(9) -7.9820 - 0.00576 M+0.00261 Y+0.074tt0r st. (3.07589) t (1.61,769) t (0.29738)t 
+ 0.34375 r-0.00002 M 
(0.99135) 4. ý1 (0.10918) 
1 
t-1 
con 0.6625, w=3.681i6 
(10) 1'1 ='-190i. 3550 - 0.31947 Y+5.02170 n-0.03770 
(AA)t 
t (0.88076) t (5.31016) t (0.53862) 
+ 40.20548 r+0.01,577 M-2.41355 n ,t (1.27121) t-1 (2.66872) t-1 
Cott ='0.9773t w= 524.2345 
(ii) rid =Ms =Mt 
It 
t 
nt =-383.0845 
t-0-025575 
(1.99922) 
+ 0.33156 (3.15200) 
+ 0.13968 Y+0.00438 (ADR) 
(2.28838) t (1.19564). t 
(sP) 
t .. 7.94380 Pt + 24.40773 
Pt-1 
(1.19688) (3.02649)- 
ýt-1 
COR = 0.9972, w= 268.5073 
We turn, now, to the estimation of the model when the 
M3 definition of money is utilized. 
(1) Yt = Ct +. It + 'S t+ 
(TA) 
t- Qt 
COR = 0.9049 
(2) (TA)t = Gt + Xt - Tst 
We have also estimated this formulation of the Demand 
for Money-using the T. S. L. S. technique just to be consis- 
tent with our methodology, with the following results: 
r; 2.29803 - 0.00130 M+0.00041 Yt0.034446 St. (0.37445) (1.82391) t (0.14175) t (0.23240) 
+ 0.09630 P+0.00007 r1 (0.62682) t~i (. 0.115524) t"1 
S_0.81260, x3)(19) = 36.15600. 
These results are not really very different from the 
F. I. M. L. ones. . 
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(3) Ct 1817.9620 - 0.07525 Y, + 0.11898 (41111) t (o. /ý3088) (0.60067) 
- 12.13810 P+ 22.65633 r '+ 0.51174 c (2.49329) t (3.87291) t-1 (3.64'i03) t-1 
-8.12474rLt-3 5-10757 rLt- t (0.237911) (0.15244) 
COR = 0.7353, W 3115.111197 
('i) Y=0.29090 Y, +0.55065 Y 
-1 (3.25217) (12.56155) 
COR '= 0171174, w= 458.6972 
(5) 
. 
=t = 135.9732 + 
(0.02389 
(AAI) 
t +(°. 86788) 
(ny) 
t 
+ 0.839511 -It-1 - 39.1d838 rit-3 + 50.03688 rLt-1k (22.23241) (2.64189) (3-34764) 
COR = 0.9767, W= 158.3120 
(6) st =--24-0003 +(o0.018011 
. 82206) 
(AM) t +(ý: 7äi56) 
(AY) t 
+ 0.66981 St-i+61.60728 rLt-3 - 67.88958 rLt-ll (6.61595) (1.72511) (1.73682) 
Con =. 0-57049 W: 384.8122 
(7) =, -257-08118 + 0.26903 Yt5.12691 Pt t (4.78329) t (3.51117) 
+ 0.26755 P-0.09806 Q+0.01282 it (0.19133) t-1 (0.77537) t-1 (2.22177) t-1 
CoR 0.9533, W= 260.1913 
(8) rLt = 0.6965 +-0.14771 r+0.00031: Y+0.07353 P (3.1}6714) st (1.047447) t (7.811117) 
P. 
- 0.05786 P+0.62553 r (6.11834) t-1 (8.1142211) Lt-1 
COR 0.9481, W=1.6869 
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(9) r*-2.3557 + 0: 00078 Il tY st (0.83657 ), t (4.116596) t 
+ 0-02552- Pt - . 0.26586 P1+0.00007 Mt'1 (1.12197) (-12.03259 " (0.07130) " 
Con 0.6924, If = 3.9296 
(10) is = 8311.08/12 - 1.278116 Y+2.77583 Dt (3.00338) t (2.22956) t 
+ 0.29309 (AA) t+ 389214 rat + 
0.97606 lit-1. 
(2.19370') (1.57305) (20.92620) 
- 1.36507 Dt-i 
. 
(1.51111) 
COR = 0.9774 9W= 
132.1i250 
(11. ) Mt Mt bit 
(12) Bt = -305.3077 + 0.04347 Yt + 0.02317 (ABR)t (0.69153) (3.511210) 
+ 0.11187 (SP) - 4.23737 Pt + 5.95771 Pt-1 (4.63810) t (2.01234) t (4.65954) 
+ 0.81604 Bt-1 
(8.71277) 
COR = 0.9791, W- 294.7651 
These results clearly show that there are not really 
drastic differences between the T. S. L. S. and FINL estimates 
with the exception of the demand for money and in two other 
cases, . i. e. the Mt 1 variable in the imports equation, and 
the 
(AA)t in the supply of money equation. It may be that the 
* The TSLS estimates, of this equation are as' follows: 
2 rst = 
(1.45451)+ (1.87571)i1t.. }('0.59672 )Yt (2.28760)ßt 
- 0.03276 P+0.000211 N (0.76237) t`1 (0.58893) t-1 
S 0.72210, x(3)(19) ° 35.00069 
Apparently these results are not really very different from 
the above. 
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deterioration in the coefficients of the last two variables 
iss duo to the removal of t ho simultaneity bias, or indeed 
lagged values of those should have boon used. The near 
collapse of the demand for money when the FINL technique is 
employed is more obvious - the completa collapse is just 
saved by the negative and significant Mt coefficient when 
the N1. definition is used. The way wo have postulated the 
demand for money looks very suspicious indeed. The treasury 
bill rate is used as the dependent variable;, now apart 
from the fact that even if wo could use this rate as an 
endogenous variable we should still expect some deterioration 
as explained above, there is now the question whether this 
rate can be used as an ondogehous variable. The answer is 
of course, that we cannot treat it as such because the 
authorities during, the period have in fact used this rate 
as an instrument, and, consequently, we, ar. e not justified 
in treating it as an endogenous in the FIML case. It 
follows that the demand for money performs so'badly because 
of the way-wo-postulated this equation. It also follows 
that we ar. e perfectly justified'in treating this rate as an 
exogenous in the OLS and TSLS cases. Since, therefore, the 
results. obtained using TSLS and FIML are not really very 
different and since it is only in the TSLS case that wo can 
use the short-term rate as an instrument, we shall use the 
TSLS estimates in the. following analysis. 
233" 
CHAPTER 5 
POLICY IMPACT, IMPLICATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS 
5.1- 'Introduction:. 
In this section we examine the impact and implications 
of alternative monetary policies. In particular, the impact 
" and implications 
of money stock and interest rate policies 
are considered,, in order to determine which one of them is 
the optimal. The way we go about solving this problem is 
to derive what we have called - see chapter 3 section 
4 
dynamic multipliers. We are now able to derive the dynamic 
multipliers since we have obtained structural estimates, of 
pur basic 
model derived and discussed in chapter 3 and 
summarised in section 3. The structural estimates we-use 
for the derivation of the dynamic multipliers are the ones 
'discussed in chapter ýt and summarised in section 2j. These 
structural estimates utilise the Nl definition of money as 
we have already noted. We do not want to give the impression 
that we are arguing'here that the N1 definition is the proper 
one beyond any doubt. Such a conclusion should require more 
empirical investigation, especially on'the substitution 
''relationships between different definitions of money. and 
different returns on assets competing with money-for a place 
in the individuals different portfolios. This we have not 
done; it is beyond the scope of this study. Instead we 
believe that from our empirical investigation it seems that 
the NI1 definition of money performs bettor than the M3 
definition of money at an empirical level as far as our-model 
is concerned. 
We also note that'the policy instruments here are rst 
and (SP)t. The. rat is the treasury bill rate, and it is 
used as the interest rate instrument. Tlie - (SP)t is the 
security portfolio instrument which is used instead of the 
money supply or base money which are themselves endogenous. 
The (SP)t instrument affects the money supply via the base 
money, and it can, therefore, be legitimately used as the 
money supply instrument. ": " 
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5.2 Dynamic Multipliers - Dorivation'and Implications 
The way wo derive the dynamic multipliers has already boon 
discussed in chapter 3-section 4. First of all wo solve the 
estimated' structural equations to obtain-, the reduced form for 
gross national product. This form contains lagged endogenous 
variables, and by successive substitutions we got rid of all 
the lagged endogenous variables, except, of course, the 
lagged Yte The resulting equation. is called tho. 'fundamental 
dynamic equation'. The fundamental dynamic equation for gross 
national product is: 
Yt - 0.135 + 11.339 Yt_1 - 9.642 Yt-2 + so. 655 Yt_3 
- 6.924 rt-4 + 2.659 yt-5 - 0.575 Yt-6 + 0.051 Yt_7 
-, 0.043 rst + 0.260 rst-1 - 0.676 rst-2 
+ 0.985 rstr3 r 0.927 rst-4 + 0.555 rst-5 
- 0.257 rst-6 + 0.097 rst-7 + 0.022 (SP)t-1 
0.121 (SP)t-2 + 0.250 (SP)t-3 - 0.240 
(SP)t-11 
+ 0.102 ("SP)t-5 - 0.005 (SP)t-6 - 0.009 
(SP) 
t-7 
+ 0.002 (SP) t_o 
Clearly, the (SP)t ändrst variables are measured in 
different dimensions. In ordor to avoid complications of 
this nature, the estimated coefficients in equation .1 
have 
been multiplied by the ratio of the standard deviation of 
the independent-and dependent variables so that'the coefficients 
can be compared directly. They are, thus, expressed in 
standard units and direct comparison is now possible. 
Equation (1), now, can be put to two important, uses: 
Firstly, it can be used to determine the characteristic 
stability of the system. In order to do this we follow the 
ý 
Eg 
lý 
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procedure described by Chiang* and Chipman**. Wo rocall, 
first of all, that the system is stable if'dvory root of the 
characteristic equation is loss than 1 in absolute value. 
Next, we write the charactoristic equation in a general way 
as: 
(2) o(obn + «1bnr 
1+........ + Q( 'b'+ O( =0 r 
" The application, now, of the Schur theorem implies that 
the roots of. polynomial (2) will all be less-than unity, in 
absolute value if and only if the following n determinants are 
all positive: a A n. 1 n a0 o: 
a n o1 X A nQ o 
.r........ 1 
0.0 n ................ 
A a A A . no l n 0.0 
An-I An. Ao 
An'= 
,a 00000000000 . an a 
n-1. 
........ 
a1 
o; 
"Aý 
a 
......... 
o o an ........ 0a2 
0 
........ ................ ................. 
An 0 49 a 25"""".. rý 0 o............ an 1 r 11 do 0 " 
""""""""".. """.. """"""" """"""""""""""""" 
A 0........,. 0 q a a1.......... an_1 n o 
an 1 an......... 0 0 ao.......... nn 2 
....................... ............ ""... 
A1 a2........ a o 00000000000% 
n 
We explain the construction of the above determinants 
with the help of the dashed lines. ' In the upper-loft area, 
we have a0 in the diagonal, zeros above the diagonal, and 
. progressively 
larger subscripts for the successive coefficients 
in each column below the diagonal elements. In the lower- 
left area we have "an along the diagonal, . zeros above 'it, and 
bclo, %- 
* Chiang, A. C., Fundamental Methods of Mathematical 
Economics., p. p. 551-552. 
** Chipman, J. S*., The Theory of Inter-Sectoral Money Flows 
and Income Formation, p. p. 119-120. 
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it the subscripts now decrease. Finally the uppor-right 
area is a: mirror image of tlib lowor-loft area, and the lower- 
right area a mirror imago off' the upper-loft area. 
We have applied this theorem to our basic difference 
equation and the result is that the system-is stable. 
The second use for equation (1) is to solve for the. 
dynamic multipliers. This is achieved by using equation (1)' 
to express national-product in"terms of initial conditions, 
-which can"be taken as given, and the current, values of the 
exogenous variables. The time period is then increased by 
one unit and gross national product in that period is 
expressed in terms of initial conditions and the current and 
lagged values of the exogenous variables. Successive. unit 
increases in the time period generates a series of dynamic 
multipliers. We provide a specific example, now, in order 
to clarify the procedure. 
We write equation (1) as: 
(3) 
. Y1 = '0: 135 + 
4.339 Yo - 9.. 612 Y_1 + 10.655 Y-2 
6.924 Y_3_ + 2.659- Y_1, - 0.575 Y_5 + 0.051 Y_6 
0.043 rsl + 0.260 rso. - 0.676 rs.. + 0.985 rs 2 
0.927 rs_3 + 0.555 rsýý! - 0.257rs-5 + o. 097rs-6 
+-0.022 (sn)0 - 0.121 (SP) -1 + 
0.250 (sr)_2 
- 0.240 (sr)_3 + 0.102 (sr)_, 1 - 0.005 (sr)_5 
- 0.009 (sr)-6 + 0.002 (§P). 
.7 
All terms dated prior to period I are considered to be 
given by the initial conditions. This, enables us to write 
(3) as: 
(4) Y1 aoi + a11rs1 + a21(SP)1 
whero'aO1 includes all terms. in equation (3) given by the 
initial conditions; all = -0.0143 is the currant-period 
dynamic multiplier of the rate of interest, and a21 =o is 
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'. the current-period dynamic multiplier of the money stock. 
'Substituting equation (ti) into equation (3) and setting 
t=2 wo express Y2 in terms of initial conditions and the 
values of the exogenous variables in both the current and 
first period: 
(5) 1 Y2 0.135 + 4.339 a01 + 11.339 0.0hI3rs1 + 0(SP 
)1 
9.6112Y0 + 10.655 Yr1 - 6.92.4y- 2+2.. 
659 Yr3 
- 0.575 Y_11 + 0.051 Y_5 - 
- O., 676rs0 +. 0.985-rs»1 
- 0.257 rs-ll + 0-097'r 9-5 
- 0.121 (SP)0 + 0.250 (SP 
. 0.043. rs2 + 
0.260 rsl 
0.1 927 rs-2 + 0.555 rs-3 
+ 0.022 (SP)1 
-1 - 
0.2410 (SP) 
-2 
+ 0.102. (SP)_3 _ 0.005 (SP)_, 1 - 0.009 
(SP)_5 
+ 0.002 (s p) 6 
or, 
(5) Y2 =n + a22rs1 + a32(SP)1 12 , 
where ail includes all terms in equation (5)1 given by the 
initial conditions; a22 now, is the multiplier for gross 
national product in the second quarter of. the rate of. interest 
in the first quarter, that. is: 
a22 = 11.339 (-0.043) + 0.260 = 0.073". 
Similarly, a32 is the multiplier for gross national product 
in the, second quarter of money stock in the first quarter, 
which is. equal to: 
a32' = 11"339(o) + . 
0.022 = 0,022. 
Further substitutions of this type give us the multipliers 
for. gross' national product in subsequent quarters of the rate 
of interest-and money stock policy variables in the first 
quarter. These multipliers are of course what we have already 
called ? dynamic multipliers'. They measure the net change in 
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"Y during a given period attributable oxclusivoly to 
a unit change in an exogenous variable during a particular 
period in the past. 
The dynamic multipliers of the rate of interest and 
security portfolio of the flank of England are computed for 
lags up to 8 quarters. They appear in the following table: 
Dynamic Multipliers for the Time Path of Gross National Product 
Lags, i rst-i (SP) t-i 
0' '-0.043 0 
1 +0.073 +0.022 
2. +0.056 -0.025 
3, +0.066 -0.071 
t} -0.105 ' -0.073 
5. -0.560 +0.052 
6 -1.141 +0. '00 
7- -0.925 +o. 86o 
.8 +0.830 +0.763. 
' 
The dynamic multiplier. of th e rate of interest rises to 
a peak after a six quarter lag, whereas the dynamic multi- 
plier of the security portfolio rises to a peak after a seven 
quarter lag. Both sets of dynamic multipliors reach their 
peak, with oscillations as one might expect. The reason, 
however, why wo have the peaks of the dynamic multipliers in 
the sixth and seventh quarters is because of the'lags involved 
in the case of the interest rate, and in the case of the 
security portfolio the fact that any increases in the money 
supply and their resulting impact on the level of income 
induce more increases in the money supply until the peak-is 
reached in the seventh quarter. 
Inspection-of the above table reveals that . 
in these 
quarters. where the dynamic multipliers have the right sign, 
we observe that the impact of the rate of interest is stronger 
than that of the money supply as it is represented, so to 
speak, by the security portfolio instrument. It follows, 
therefore, that an interest rate policy is preferable to a 
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money supply policy in the context of the model considered 
above. This conclusion is obviously based on estimated 
coofficibnts of a smallg'linear tnacromodol incorporating 
relationships of the monetary sector also. The degree of 
faith ono attaches, to those coefficients dopends obviously 
on one's. confidence in the theoretical and empirical 
specification of the model. Considering, though, that wo 
have avoided simple linear one-equation, models, and also 
the fact that our model has boon tested with more appropriate 
techniques than just that of the O. L. S. the ground for 
confidence seems to be. quito firm. There iss however, one 
important problem which deserves some attention. In our 
" analysis we have regarded the two instruments'of monetary 
policy as being exogenously determined. Such a treatment, 
though, may result in inconsistent estimates of the para-, 
meters of the system, and therefore inconsistent dynamic 
multipliers; this inconsistency may arise when the setting 
of instruments by the authorities is affected by the rest 
of the' economic system. In this case what is required is 
joint estimation of the relationships that explain the 
setting of the, instrüments of monetary policy by the 
authorities with the, rest of the relationships that comprise 
,. 
the model under examination. An analysis of this kind may 
also help to shed some, light on the issue of the exogeneity/ 
endogeneity of monetary aggregates in empirical studies of. 
-money. and economic stabilisation. In the following section, 
then, we try to tackle some of the problems that arise from 
those issuos. 
5.3 Joint Estimation: 
We begin by postulating the arguments that can be used 
as explanatory variables in the treasury bill and security 
portfolio of the Band. of England-equations. We consider 
the latter first. 
The Dank's security portfolio is treated as the open- 
market instrument, and as such, it is the primary determinant 
of the level of the base money and deposits in the economy, 
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and hence the money supply, as it is clearly shown in 
equations (11) and (12) of our basic model. Wo have already 
seen, however, in chapter 2 section 1 that there is the, 
, argument that the Bank's security portfolio had been operated 
essentially as'an instrument for debt management* before 
the Bank altered its tactics in the markot. ** This, of 
course 'is what is known as the policy of Iloaning into the 
wind'. Goodhart (60) suggests that even within the context 
of a policy of'leaning into the wind' the authorities may 
vary their portfolio with roforonco*to their stabilisation 
objectives. ' The security portfolio in this case, however, 
does not remain a strictly exogenous policy instrument, and 
the variable one might consider in explaining the security 
portfolio would be the changes in interest rates on 
government socurities. This specification, however would be 
very inadequate because when the rate of interest is'a 
proximate target variable it would vary very little in 
comparison to the instrument utilised to achieve the end., 
Following Nobay (102) we consider the discrepancy between 
the authorities' preferred rate and the 'ox-ante' rate of 
interest to be the variable that explains changes in the 
security portfolio of the Bank. 
.k 
This discrepancy-is assumed to be related to two variables: 
(i) the forward discount on sterling (rf), and 
(ii) the level of the U. S. A. short-term rate (ru).. 
The inclusion of the forward discount on sterling is 
justified on the grounds that this is a variable which is the 
outcome of speculation influenced by the demand for currency, 
expectations of the domestic economy, the position and 
prospects for the external balance, etc; and that those 
arguments reflect and parallel closely the views of gilt- 
edged holders. The U. S. A. short-term rate is included as a 
* See the papers by Goodhart (60), Norton (103), and'the 
Bank of-England Quarterly Bulletin , June 1966. 
** See the Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin,; MMarch 1969. 
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proxy for an, overseas rate. In an 
international capital market, 'liko 
overseas*rate is very important in 
of institutions and persons holdin, 
it is also very important in their 
'ex-ante' rate. 
open economy with-a truly 
the City of London, an 
tho portfolio decisions 
g gilt-edged securities; 
formulations, of the 
We also postulate that the discrepancy between the 
authorities preferred rate and the 'ox-Tante' rate cari be 
affected by Special Deposits (SD). It has been generally, 
accepted that Special Deposits calls have been mot by the 
banks via a reduction. of their treasury bills and gilt- 
edged securities in their portfolios; * and to quote the 
Bank: "the cash required by the-banks to make the deposits 
would be provided by the Bank-normally by the purchase of 
Treasury ßills,, or poss. ibly. by the purchase of stock 
maturing in the near-future which was widely hold-as a 
money market asset. In the weekly flank Return the Treasury 
Bills (and. stock) would form the counterpart of the special 
deposits"'. " All this implies that the Dank s security 
portfolio increases when special deposits are called, with 
the banking sector reducing their security portfolio. It is 
possible, however, to have a situation where although the 
banks reduce their security portfolio the Bafflc does-not 
increase' its own portfolio. We assume that the Dank reacts 
to discrepancies between the desired bond rate change and 
the. 'ox-ante' bond rate change. Now if no such discrepancy 
exists, the Bank need not purchase securities that arc off- 
loaded by the banks. ' Sure enough, if -tile off-loading is 
substantial some impact on'the gilt-edged market will occur, 
and the Dank will, therefore, purchase securities in the 
* See, for instance, 'The Portfolio Behaviour of Commercial 
Banks' by Parkin, Gray and Barrett in The Econometric 
Study-of the U. K. od. Iiilton, and Ilea thfiold London, 
Macmillan, 1970). See also the paper by Norton (103). 
** The Radcliffe Committee, Memorandum of Evidenco, Vol. 1, p. 1. 
Sec also, Banic of England Quarterly Bulletin, December, 1960. 
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'first instance. The Bank, however, could always noutraliso 
those purchases, or ihdeecl, reduce its portfolio to 
augment its policy stance; and as the Governor of tho"Dank 
, notes: 
'it is open to the authorities - and the banks 
understand this - to ensure that the whole adjustment by 
the banks is 'not completed by such sale of gilts. The, 
initial call for Special Deposits can be supplemented by 
open market operations, by action on interest rates, and 
in duo course by-further calls of Special Deposits'. * 
Furthermore, we'include the difference between the U. K. 
short-term rate and the U. S. A. short-term rate as another. 
variable,, our familiar rdt, that can explain some of the 
changes in the security portfölio. This is justified as 
follows: The authorities may regard this difference as a 
target, variable to influence inflows of capital for balance- 
of-payments considerations. They may therefore try to 
influence this difference through open market operations 
instead of changing the Bank Rate (or Minimum lending Rate, 
as it is now called) in the first instance. We' also'includo 
Yt and Pt which are assumed to capture influences from the 
real sector. These two, variables are also included in the 
rst- and(SD)t-equations for the same reason. The equation 
for the security portfolio therefore., to be included in 
our model is: 
(SP)t =9o +' g1(SD)t + 82 rut + 83r{t + gllydt 
+ g5Yt + g6pt + Wt 
where W t_ error 
term; all coefficients are expected to be 
--positive except g4 which is expected to be negative. ' 
The treasury bill-rate equation is postulated to be: 
., rs t. _ ro + rIrut 
where Vt =' error term. 
+ r2r1t + r3Yt + r,, Pt + Vt 
0 
. Wo thus assume that the treasury bill rate is mainly 
influenced by the forward discount rate on sterling, and the 
* See Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, March 1971. 
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U. S. A. short-term rato; these variables are assumed to 
reflect the authorities' responses to balanco-of-payments 
considerations. It seems reasonable to make, this assumption 
because the authorities have varied this rate during the 
period under consideration mainly to influence capital 
movements. We also note that wo expect all coefficients 
to be positive. 
Finally, since Special Deposits have been introduced as 
an instrument. wo postulate that they are influenced by. the' 
following variables: 
(SD) 
t= ko + 
Ic1 (SP) t+ 
Ic`rst + lc3r 1+ 
lc. 1}Yt + kSPt + 
ut 
We note that the Special Deposits instrument did not 
perform well at all in any of the equations of our basic 
model. The reason may be that any call for Special Deposits 
and its immediate expected impact on. the"base of the system 
is offset. by changes in the authorities' security portfolio. 
We therefore introduce the latter in the (SD)t- equation. 
The variable rd. t-is 
introduced in order to capture any 
attempts by the authorities to neutralise the effects. of 
overseas inflows on the domestic money supply, by withdrawals 
through Special deposit calls on the clearing banks. This 
specification would only be valid of course, if the authori- 
. 
ties regard rdt as a target of policy for balance-of-payments 
purposes. Finally, the rst item is. included as aproxy for 
the Bank Rate (or Minimum Lending Rate), since the rate on, 
deposits is tightly related to it. We expect all coefficients 
to be-positive except k3 which is expected to be negative. 
We have estimated the above three equations using the 
O. L. S. technique - mainly, in order to be able to examine 
the dynamic structure of these three equations - and the 
T. S. L. S. technique within the context of-our basic modal; in 
the latter case the three equations postulated in this section 
are jointly estimated with the equations of our basic model.. 
The results are reported below,. beginning'with the O. L. S. 
estimates: 
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I'irstq tlio ostimrtos of tho (SP) t equation: ' 
(SP) =-791.54197 + 0.33570 
Y+0.821129 (sD) 
t- (1. o1ß93 )' (2.26155) t (4-48876) t 
+ 6.73052 Pt + 5.66702 r+ 71.82366 r 
(1.60060) t (0.20365) `ýý (2.092/i2) ut 
11.90937 rft 
(0.15849) 
D. W. = 2.011 88 , s= 194.058139 X(2)(6) = 5. ß998a, 
rte _ 0.94226: 
One Period, Ahead. 'Forecasts' 
Actual: 5957.0000 
Forecast: 51472.0000 
Forecast Error: 1481} . 8597 
x(1)(1) _ 6.242611 A 
The xý,, )-statistic is compörtably insignificant at the, 
5% level, which implies that the'dynamic specification of the 
equation is-adequate. The p =-0.027311 and with a T-valuo 
being: T', = 0.15322 the SP form is preferable to the other 
two forms and it is this form wo'have just reported. The 
coefficients of''the (SP)t equation are of a mixed nature 
as far as their significance is concerned, as it can be 
judged by the T-value. Only the incomo. Special Deposit and 
rut variables have the right signs and are 'significant. The 
remaining variables are insignificant all throe of them, and 
in two cases they also have the wrong sign i. e. rdt and rft" 
The specification of the equation for prediction is 
unacceptable at the 5% level but acceptable. at the 1°%; this is 
judged by the x(1)-statistic. This equation has also been 
estimated without the variables Yt and Pt included'in it. 
The results are very'similar with one exception. Addition 
of the variables Yt and Pt that are supposed to reflect 
influences from the real sector, does not improve the R2- 
statistic by much; there is only a 3%, approximately, 
improvement in the R. 
2 
. 2'i5. 
The short-term rote of interest estimated equation is 
now provided: 
- 0.98182 + 0.00016 yt0.01509 I' + 0.73719 r st '(0.25771) (0.2.1601) 
t (0.89008) t (44.71775) ut 
+ 0.30379 rft 
(3.93560) 
s ='o. 65518; x(2)(14) 5,98581, n2 0.92346 
One Period Ahead ' Forecasts 
Actual: 11.141 
Forecast: 10.5961 
Forecast Error: 0.8139 
X(1)0) = 1.51312 
This is the R. T. -F. form with P= 0.511657" and its T-Value 
being3 T =-3.6'i728. It follows, that in the rst equation 
the errors are of the first order autoregressive scheme. 
The x(2)-statistic is comfortably insignificant at the 5i 
level implying adequate dynamic specification. The specifi- 
cation for prediction is also adequate as it is revealed by 
2 
the insignificance of the x(2)-statistic. The interesting 
point about the estimates of this equation is that the over- 
seas rates-dominate it, justifying the proposition that the 
treasury bill rate in the U. K. has been very much influenced 
by the going rates elsewhere. 
The'third and final equation is that for Special Deposits: 
(SD) 
t 1280.40751 + 0.06257 Y+ t 0.12150 
(SP) 
t (1.66722) (0.45133) (1.54935) 
+ 69.97099 r st + 0.87945 P t - 24.32140 r dt (3.20047) (0.24912) (2.19629) 
S= 114.85251, X 2)(5) 9.91356, R2 = 0.91594 
One. Period Ahead 'Forecasts 
Actual: 915.0000 
Forecast: 961.0000 
Forecast Error : -46.2538 
x(1)(1. ) = 0.16 219 
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Again, this is the R. T. F. form with being significant' 
as before, i. ä. 
P^0.64422, and its T-value being: T=5.35783; 
and again the errors are of the first order autoregressive 
scheme., The x2 -statistic is comfortably insignificant 
at tho. 5% level suggesting adequate dynamic specification. 
As in the case of the rst equation similarly in the (SD)t 
equation the. two variables Yt and Pt appear with an insigni- 
ficant coefficient, suggesting that the impact of the real 
forces on'(SD)t is very weak, whereas the influence of the 
financial variables is stronger, especially that of rst and 
rdt. In particular, the sign and significance of the rdt- 
coefficient supports the view that the. authorities have in 
fact attempted to neutralise the effects of overseas inflows 
on the domestic money supply. 
We now provide the TSLS estimates for our basic model 
that includes the above three equations too. 
(1) Yt . Ct + St' + (TA)t - "Qt 
(2) (TA) 
t Gt +Xt- Ts t 
(3) 
.Cf= 1186.83919 + 0.31754 Yd + 0.46373 
(AIIP) t. (3.959444) (2.52743) (2.02645) 
- 17.062611 P+0.27916 C -, 8.53623 r (1.91359) t (2.10593) t-1 (0.26019) Lt-3 
- 7.07026 rLt- + 25-47110 P 
(0.21662) (2.354511) t-1 
D. W. = 2.12751, S=5.5., 66504, x3)(20) = 32.67161 
Ono Period Ahead 
. Actual: 
Forecast: - 
Forecast Error: 
xý1)(1) = 111.310' 
'Forecasts' 
6694.0000 
6904.5786 
-210.5786 
78 
(4 )' ' Yd = 0.14709 Yt + 0.82360 Yd t (2.40619) (10.799544)t-1 
D. W. = 2.07006, S 107.657145 9 
2117, 
X(3)(2'I) = 38.70526. 
One Period Ahead"'Forecasts 
Actual: 7703.0000 
Forecast: 73609.0363 
Forecast 'Error: 3.33.9637 
"(1)(1) = 9.62299 
, 
(5) It = . 1115.22'08 + 0.03718 
(QAI')t +-0-12493 (AY)t (3.05045) (1.75291) (2.91766) 
+ 0.92218 I -. 45.097777 r+ 143.95671 rt (20.76051)1-1 (2. ßf5001) Lt-3 (2.45322) Lt-ý 
S= 39 553411 x(2)(3) = 8.880944 
One Period Ahead 'Forecastst 
Actual: 1796.6000 
Forecast: 1816.8919 
Forecast Error: -20.8919 
2 
X(1)1) = 0.27899 
"' (6) St -. 45.27589 + 0.12244 (AM) +(40.1.91811616728) "(AY) : (0.99875) (2.17534) tt 
+ 0.83433 S 
-1"+ 
59.30355 r- 70.01728 rLt-44 (6.82218): t 
. 
(1.95854) Lt-3 (2.11993) 
2 S~ 70.97051, x(2)(3). = 3.33582 
One Period Ahead 'Forecasts' 
Actual: - 205.0000 
Forecast: 75.6482 
Forecast Error: 129.3518 
X1)(1). - 3.32192. 
(7) Qt 8.0 4.111555 + 0.21581, Yt + 10.06029 Pt + 0.08822 Q t`i (3.60361) (3.86124) (1.33312) (0.54049) 
+ 0-09369. m - 9.76337 I' t_1 (3.18609) t`1 (1.05900) 
D. W. = 2.08162, s= 49.318414, X(3)(21) _ 32.10962 
2118. 
One Period Ahead 'Forecasts' 
Actual: X697.0000 
Forecast: 2752.9322 
Forecast-Error: -55.9322 
x(1)(1) = 1.28619 
(8) r -0-31437 0.00002 yt 0-14432 r+0.71780 r Lt (0.26007) (0.08507) t (4.067.85) st (7.59553) Lt-1 
:+0.10389 Pt - 0.. 09076 Pt-1 (2.00695) 
. 
(1.62285) 
D. W. = 1.725.71, S ='0.28331, "(3)(21) = 35.17780. 
One Period Ahead 'Forecasts' 
Actual: 15.3000 
Forecast: - 14.7823 
Forecast Error: 0.5177 
X21ý(1`D. =- 3'"33969 
(9) M= 1566.06578 + 0.36982 Y. - 105.19168 r, t (1.92382) (1.89710) (4.73619) 
+ 69.34995 P- 68.02000 P t + 0.90938 Mt-1 -i (2.215113) (1.71303) (9.19605) 
D. W. -= 2. 86869, ' S= 173.67179, x(3)(23) = 41.69190 
One Period Ahead 'Forecasts' 
Actual: 
-. 13550.0000 
Forecast : , . 13280.408.9. 
Forecast Error: 269.5911 
x 1)(1) 
( 2.40964 
(10) rat' = - 958.03674 + 0.22337fß Yt + 1.22426 nt + 0.15403 (, &A) t (1.15827) (1.15823) (2.26926) (1.40872) 
+ 41.18207 r- 1.10006 
(2.03116) dý. ' (2.08032) 
D+0.86593 rs t-1 (7.92394) t-1 
D. W. 2. 64711, S= 204.35729, x(3)(21) = 43.79374 
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One Period Ahead 'Forecasts' 
Actual: 13550,0000 
Forecast: 13685.1555 
. Forecast 
Error: -135.1555 
x1)(1) = 0.43741' 
(12) Bt = 257.98318 - 0.06861 Yt + 0.15289 (SP)t (1.09529) (1.12943) (3.34292) 
+ 0.02962 (A3fl) - 14.51145 P+ 26.61849 P (3.29585) t (1.58561) t (2.58710) t`1 
+ 0.54614 ii 
(/i-33394 ) 
D. W. ='1.76405, ,S= 
51.77051, x(3)(21) = 37.35901 
One Period Ahead 'Forecasts' 
'Actual: 6017.0000" 
Forecast: ' 6038.0000 
Forecast Error: -21.5423 
X(1)(1) = 0.17315 
(13) (sP)t 797.56297 + 0.36883 Yt + 0.72057 (SD) t (1.02238) (2. i5013) (3.70772) 
+ 7"52095 Pt + 7.82831 r+ 84.33175 r (1.77043) t (0.27985) dt (2.32025) 
rut 
+ 1.51593 rft. (0.04837) 
D. W. =-I., 961929 S= 194.87103, "(3)(22) = 24.54543 
One Period Ahead 'Forecasts' . 
Actual: 5957.0000 " 
Forecast 5477.1514 
Forecast Error: 479.8486' 
2 (i) = 6.06337 " 
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(1! f )r1.00186 + 0.00016 Yt0.01502 P+0.73Gß0 r 
st '(0.26290) (0.22139) t (0.88592) t (1i. 71! 11ß) ut 
+ 0.3O3ß1 rft 
(3.93658) 
s =. 0.655'18, x(3)(21) 35.09200 
One Period Ahead 'Forecasts' 
Actual: 11.11100 
Forecast:, 10.5961 
Forecast Error: 0.8139 
x(1)(1) 1.511336 
(15) (sD) = -'ß269.27771i + 0.06280 Y+0.10302 (SP) t (1.64754) (0.45050) ý. (1.05361) t 
+ 77.711176 *r + 0.91287 P- 211.20972 r 
(3.29172) St (0.211704) t (2.17192) 
dt 
S 115.. 068 4g, "(3) (2h1) = 37.06622. 
One Period Aheäd 'Forecasts' 
Actual: 915.0000 
Forecast: 955"8069 
. , 
'Forecast Error: -40.8069 
x(1)(1) = 0.12576 
The estimates for equations (13), (11l) and (15) do not 
differ very much from those derived when the OLS technique 
is used; admittedly some small differences do, exist 
suggesting that a small degree of simultaneity is, present. 
Thö, variables Yt and Pt perform well only in the (SP)t 
equation; in fact even in this equation it is only Yt that 
is significant at the 5% level. -The financial variables are 
more important, it seems, in these three equations. With 
the exception of the coefficient of rdt in the (SP) t equation 
all the other coefficients of the financial variables are 
. acceptable as far as the signs and T-Values are concerned. 
These results reveal two interesting. points. Thofirst 
is that the authorities do not reinforce Special Deposits 
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calls by undertaking net open market operations; this rösult, 
is the direct outcome of the significant and positive 
coefficient of the'(SD, )t variable in the Banks security 
portfolio equation. What this result suggests is that the 
authorities tend to offset Special Deposits calls by 
absorbing government securities from the banks. The second 
point is that overseas ' rates' have a'role to play in those 
equations, indeod in some cases those rates dominate, in 
particular the treasury bill-rate equation is dominated by 
external considerations as expected. 
Comparing, now,, the TSLS estimates of this section with 
the ones of our basic model, wo observe that the two sots of 
estimates do not differ drastically, indeed in some cases 
the estimated coefficients are more or less the same. 
Provided, then, that the. spocification of the equations in 
the two models is satisfactory, the conclusion seems. to be that 
joint estimation is not absolutely necessary and that the' 
dynamic multipliers derived in section 5.2 are consistent, 
with one, however, qualification. The interest rate 
instrument is, in fact, affected by some variables outside 
the control of the authorities; and that this consideration 
is more prevalent when the balance-of-payments becomes one of 
the. main priorities of the authorities. Furthermore, during 
the period under consideration the balance-of-payments has 
been one of the main priorities of the authorities, conse- 
quently our results as far as the optimum monetary instru- 
ment in concerned are constrained 'by this consideration. 
" Even so, though, changes in the treasury bill rate do have 
a stronger impact in the economy than the (SP)t instrument, 
but the autonomy problem is more serious in the case of rst 
than in the case of the (SP)t instrument. 
5.11 Conclusions: 
The main aim. of this study has been to sot-up a macro- 
model of the. U. K.. economy that incorporates the monetary 
sector too and within the context of this model to determine 
, which instrument-of monetary policy is the optimal one. This y". 
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procedure, of course, presupposes the empirical estimation 
of the assumed structural relationships. of the model. Our 
empirical estimates of these structural relationships are 
quite acceptable. The major findings as far as these 
estimates are concerned are the following: Consumption is 
influenced by the: long-. term rate of interest but its impact 
is felt elfter a lag of about three quarters; and that this 
relationship is expected to be stronger after 1971. This' 
, finding is very important, 
an alternative to both the 
concerning the channels the 
operates. Contrary to the 
monetary has a more direct 
we believe, since it provides 
Keynesian and Chicago views 
rough which monetary policy 
Keynesian view, 'it implies that 
effect on consumption. This more 
direct affect is actually recognized by Friedman and }16iselman 
(53), but they. finally reject it as ono. of the main effects of 
-monetary policy. 'Investment is influenced by the long-term 
rate after a lag of three quarters, 'a result that casts 
considerable doubt on the assertion of the Redcliffe Report 
that such a relationship is unstable and unpredictable. Wo 
have not been able, -though, to find any relationship whatso- 
ever between'the money stock, however defined, and the level 
-of Consumption or Investment. Changes in the stock of money., 
however, do have a significant and predictable influence on 
Stockbuilding; this variable is also influenced by the 
long-term rate of interest with a four-quarter lag. Money 
stock, lagged one period, does influence, significantly and 
predictably, the level of imports. Finally,, both the money 
supply and the base money of the system arc neither com- 
pletely endogenous magnitudes, not completely exogenous 
ones. The two instruments of monetary policy whose impact 
on the level of income have been considered, are the Bank's 
security portfolio and'the treasury bill rate. The first 
influences the base of the system, the base influences the 
money supply and via the Stockbuilding, equation and the Imports 
equation it influences the level of income. The treasury 
bill rate via the long term interest rate influences the 
levels of Investment and Stockbuilding. and therefore the level 
of income. Given the lags that prevail in the model the 
253. 
dynamic impact of the two instruments has boon derived with 
the implied 'dynamic multipliers'. This analysis has' led 
us to the conclusion that an interest rate policy that aims 
at controlling the treasury bill rate is the optimal policy. 
hIoweverg"wo do not'like to suggest that the money supply 
should be left completely uncontrolled. Our analysis of 
section 5.2 implies that the impact of the money stock on 
the level of economic activity as measured by the level of 
national income, 
"although 
inferior that of interest rates, 
can be substantial, with sonno lag, of course. 
''We take the view, therefore, that the main aim of the 
authorities should be to control interest rates,, and that 
the money supply can be manipulated'to sonic degree to 
enable the control of. interest, rates. In a recession the 
interest rate should be made to fall. but we might still 
have tight monetary policy because the-money stock might 
be too low to allow interest rates to fall, enough; therefore, 
the money stock,, in, that case, should rise in order to 
enable 
the authorities to achieve the target interest rate structure. 
Similarly during an inflationary boom interest rates should 
be higher and the money stock should decroase, again to 
enable the monetary authorities to achieve the target interest 
rate structure. 
This'conclusion, however, is subject to a criticism which 
can be a severe one under certain circumstances. ' In the 
discussion of whother'joint estimation is required or not, 
section 5.39 we came to the conclusion that the treasury bill 
rate is very much affected by overseas rates. It follows, 
therefore, that the treasury bill rate changes not with 
respect to the authoriti'es' internal stabilisation goals, in 
terms of our basic model this would be the level of national 
income, but with respect toi say, changes in the U. S. A. 
treasury bill rate; and if the U. S. A. treasury bill rate 
changes with'respoct to the U. S. A. authorities' stabilisation 
goals it would follow that it is the U. S. A. monetary policy 
that influences the U. K. treasury bill rate. We, thus, have. 
the standard problem of autonomy discussed earlier, section 
2.4lß which is an awlcward problem especially in the case of 
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an open economy as the U. K. economy is. This argument 
applies also in the case of the (SP)t, instrumont too, so 
if we were to choose öne of those two instruments on the 
basis of the autonomy problem alone, it would be extremely 
difficult to 'favour one instrument at the cost of the other. 
We must, therefore, conclude at this stage that external 
considerations can be. a severe constrained as far as mono- 
" tary policy is concerned and that this conclusion can be a 
severe one, when the authorities have to give priority to 
balance--of-payments considerations. In particular, in cases, 
like the U. K. case, where the-financial markets are of true 
international character and capital movements, therefore, 
dare important the autonomy in manipulating the treasury bill 
rate can be severely impaired. 
This last comment suggests, perhaps, a further piece of 
research. '. Our analysis has not taken into consideration, in 
our basic. model, ' more relationships that connect the external 
sector of the economy with the internal sector, and in 
particular it has not considered in more detail details the 
link between some key overseas rates and domostic rates as 
well as the bank's security portfolio. Although the analysis 
of section 5-3-indicates to the-right direction it has boon 
rather simplistic., The reason is obvious. The basic model 
we derived and empirically tested above, has been designed 
to study the impact of alternative monetary policy instru- 
ments. It has been kept rather simple so that the deriva- 
tion of the dynamic multipliers would be manageable, especially 
duo to the lack of an appropriate computer program. * It 
would have been virtually impossible to conduct the same 
analysis with a bigger model; and also this last suggestion 
can be the main theme of a separate study. 
. 
Moro importantly, our analysis indicates that further 
roseavch is absolutely necessary to solve the problem of the 
"* The cost, in terms of time, of deriving the dynamic 
multipliers has been enormous. Wo have been absolutely 
unable to find an appropriate program for the computer. 
A 
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optimal monetary policy instrument in the case of the U. X. 
economy. The direction of this further research must focus 
on the-channels of monetary policy. This is a direct 
"result of the changes introduced in 1971 with the 'Competi-- 
tion and Credit Control' regime. The more flexibility of 
interest rates as a result of these changes implies-stronger 
relationships between interest rates and certain categories 
of expenditure. -We clearly indicated this result in the 
case of the Consumption function. Until, however, more 
data are available this experiment is severely constrained. 
It, indicates, though, that once stronger relationships. be-* 
tween interest rates and expenditures are empirically found, 
our results derived in section 5'. 2 will be strengthened and 
the superiority of interest rates as an instrument of 
monetary policy would , 
undoubtedly' be established. 
Finally, our model and our results seem to support, to a 
certain extent, the results reached by the Radcliffe 
Committee rather than the view of the Dank as to the bast 
action of the monetary authorities on interest rates. 
According to the Radcliffo Committee the monetary authorities 
ought to establish a 'target' interest rate structure and 
. operate on 
the whole range of the interest rate spectrum and 
not merely at the short end. Thus, it is argued that 'mone- 
tary policy must take its influence on the structure of 
interest rates as its'proper method of affecting financial 
conditions and eventually, through them, the level of 
demand' (75, para. 982. ) The position of the Bank, on the 
other hand-, is that the objective of the monetary authorities` 
should be to maximise the demand for government securities 
by the private sector-at any given set of interest rates and 
not to 'establish a $target''yield curve. In particular the 
position of the flank is that market expectations arc volatile 
and that they are predominantly governed by extrapolative 
elements, which means that price falls lead to the expectation 
of further price falls, in such a way that the security market 
is"unstable in the short-run. The Dank, therefore, concludes 
that the operations of the monetary authorities ought to be 
designed in . such a way as to smooth out short-term 'fluctuations 
. 56. ' 
in the interest rate around the trend. This aim, however, 
reduces the flank's readiness and capacity to undertake an 
' active interest rate policy at any but the very short arid' 
of the maturity spectrum. It is obvious after this short 
analysis on the-positions of the Committee and the Dank 
that our results support the former. Long-term interest 
rate in our model is the transmitting link between the 
real sector and the monetary sector, and the long-rate 
is 
influenced very strongly by the short-term rate via a stable 
interest rate structure. It is the latter, therefore, that 
the authorities are assumed to aiin at controlling with thin 
help of the money stock., Hand in hand, therefore, with the 
further research we suggested above should also go some 
more research on the 'term structure of interest rates' 
embodied in a macro-model like ours. 
r 
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APPENDIX 
DATA: DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES 
Yt : Gross Domestic Product at factor cost, £m., 
seasonally adjusted. Economic Trends. 
(AY)t : Changes in Yt. 
Yt. : Disposable Income, £m., seasonally adjusted. 
Economic Trends. 
Ct : Consumers' Expenditure, £m., seasonally adjusted. 
Economic Trends. 
It :, Gross Fixed Capital Formation, '£m., seasonally 
adjusted. Economic Trends. 
St : Value of Physical Increase in'Stocks and Work in 
Progress, £m., seasonally adjusted. Economic 
Trends. 
'Gt : Public Authorities Current Spending, £m., seasonally 
adjusted. Economic Trends. 
Xt ": Exports of Goods and Services, £m., seasonally-, 
adjusted. Economic Trends. 
Qt : Imports of Goods and'Servicos, £m., seasonally 
adjusted. Economic Trends. 
Tst : Adjustment to Factor Costs. It represents taxes 
on expenditure less subsidies at constant rates. 
£m., seasonally adjusted. Economic Trends. 
(QüP)t : Changes in Consumers' Hire-Purchase Debt, 
Outstanding, £m.,. seasonally adjusted. Board 
of Trade Journal. 
Pt : 'Index of Retail Prices. It includes all items 
except food whose prices show significant seasonal 
variations. Seasonally unadjusted. (January 
1962 = 100). Economic Trends. 
(AAI)t : Changes in Advances to Industry, £m., seasonally 
adjusted. Bank of England quarterly Bulletin. 
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(AA)t : Changes in Total Advances, £m., sonsonslly 
adjustodi Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin. 
rit Money Stock (Botti Mi and M3 definitions are usod), 
£m., seasonally adjusted. Bank of England 
Quarterly' Bulletin. 
(AM)t : Changes in Mt. 
Bt : Base Money, defined as: Currency hold by the 
public plus banks' reserves. £m., seasonally 
adjusted. Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin. 
(SP) 
t : 
Bank"'s Security Portfolio, £m., seasonally 
adjusted. Bank of-England Quarterly Bulletin: 
(QBR)t : Changes in Total Domestic-Borrowing Requirements, 
£m., seasonally adjusted. Bank of England 
Quarterly Bulletin. 
(SD) 
t Special Deposits, gym., flank of England 
Quarterly 
Bulletin. 
rLt : Consol Rate. Economic Trends. 
E : Treasury Bill Rate. Bank of England Quarterly st 
Bulletin. 
rdt : Interest-Rate Differential between U. K. and U. S. A. 
Treasury Bills. Bank of England 'Quarterly Bulletin. 
rut : U. S. A. Treasury Bill Rate. Bank of England 
uarterly Bulletin. 
r ft " 
Forward Discount on Sterling. Bank of England . 
Quarterly. Bulletin; 
Autocorrelation Coefficient. 
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